India must invest in its youth in coal areas for a just energy transition

After the announcement to attain net-zero by 2070 and the target to meet 50% of the energy needs from renewable energy sources at the ongoing climate conference- COP 26, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has created a hope about an effective pathway of climate action in the coming years. The pledges will mean massive decarbonization and weaning away from fossil-fuels in the next couple of decades. As India embarks on this change, it also needs to ensure that the transition is not only an energy transition, but is also just and equitable for the local economies, communities and workers in the fossil-fuel regions. 

A big component of this just transition for India will be to ensure economic and social support and growth opportunities for the workers and local communities, particularly the youth who will define the country’s workforce and will be the bearers of our development pathway. However, improving workforce participation of youth, and ensuring decent and dignified jobs for them will require planning and investment. 

As one travels through India’s fossil-fuel regions, particularly coal mining regions, the glaring presence of young men working as contractual labourers in coal mines or thermal power plants is hard to miss. 

In Korba, the biggest coal producing district of India, and a coal and coal-based thermal power hub of Chhattisgarh, the urban landscape is blotted with power plant chimneys, power grids, cooling towers. Right under the nose of the NTPC thermal power plant is Fertilizer basti where possibly every male goes to work in the plant, all on contractual basis. 

A 24 year old, holding a college degree, works as a contracted operator; a 27 year old with higher secondary schooling, was a turbine maintainer. As we interact more, we find varied levels of education among the young workers, some graduates and high school pass-outs, but most educated upto elementary school. All of them work as equipment operators of various kinds, forming the hoard of unskilled labour which is trained by the companies for the operational jobs. Irrespective of their education, all of them work on meagre incomes of Rs. 10,000-15,000 a month. The coal mining labour is similar, with poor wages, but also categorically lower levels of education, mostly up to primary school level, some having elementary level of schooling. 

All these young labourers had another thing in common – circumstances – where access to education was poor and a local economy so centric to coal that it equalized the local wages and kept them low. The situation has created a surplus in cheap labour and tipped the power equation in favour of contractors, who then can hire and fire as they wish and also keep the wages low. Most of the youth we interacted with said the other best option of work for them was construction labour which was erratic and involved shifting base as per need. The gender angle is also stark, at a time when the merit of women’s participation in the workforce is increasingly stressed.  

However, this coal district is no exception. The poor employment options in districts dependent on extractive industries is a common phenomenon.  Research shows that extractive economies, with a high natural resource base, are often ironically accompanied by poor development of other resources/sectors, low infrastructure and trade connection investments. These regions hence, remain a mono economy.  iFOREST’s prior research in Jharkhand (Ramgarh district) also showed that the development of other sectors in the district was stymied by the coal-centric focus. 

If India has to realise its vision for a clean energy transition, inclusive development and the vision of being Atmanirbhar , it must build on the potential of the country’s human resources, particularly the youth. One of the key focuses will have to be diversification of local economies and making adequate and appropriate green jobs available. Simultaneously, it will also have to invest in ensuring a healthy, educated and skilled workforce. All these investments for a new economy should start now.To let this window lapse, will be a huge loss of opportunity.

How India can meet its Glasgow promise: From reforming discoms to recruiting skilled energy managers, the list of reforms is formidable

From reforming discoms to recruiting skilled energy managers, the list of reforms is formidable.

On the first day of the Glasgow climate conference – COP26 – the biggest announcement came from India. Ending speculations on whether India ‘will’ or ‘can’ make a net-zero pledge, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the country will reach net-zero emissions by 2070. He also announced four major nearer-term targets exhibiting India’s will and ambition on climate action.

The targets, all of which are to be met by 2030, include an installed renewable energy capacity of 500 GW (up from 450 GW target); meeting 50% of the electricity requirement through renewable sources; reducing total projected cumulative carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes between 2020 and 2030; and reducing the carbon intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels (up from the 33-35% target).

So how ambitious are these new targets?
India’s renewable energy targets mean that coal power will peak before 2030, when about 70% of India’s electricity installations will be renewable-based, battery and smart grid will dominate the market. This would be one of the most rapid decarbonisations of electricity sector anywhere in the world.
India’s net-zero target is equally ambitious, but few more details are required to understand what it means. There is confusion on whether the target is for all greenhouse gases (GHGs) or only for carbon dioxide (CO 2). If it is for all GHGs, then India’s target is compliant with 1.5°C warming. If it is only for CO 2, it is 2.0°C compliant. However, even if only for CO 2, it is still a strong signal to decarbonise the economy. As zero-carbon technologies become more accessible, India will update this target to attract massive global investments.

What domestic reforms do they demand?
In nutshell, these announcements have put India in a leadership role on climate mitigation action. The question now is, what are some of the major steps that must be taken domestically to steer the course of action in the coming years? There are three ‘make or break’ factors for realising India’s ambitious targets.

  • Firstly, if 500 GW of power-generation capacity must be achieved, India must create an enabling environment for attracting global investments. Reforming the distribution companies (discoms) is most important to create that environment.
  • Secondly, for meeting 50% of electricity supply through renewables, India’s grid infrastructure will have to be strengthened and battery storage capacity will have to be massively increased. Investing in smart grid and battery infrastructure is crucial for this.
  • Third, a huge skilled workforce will be required to run the new electricity infrastructure. This means investments must start in reskilling of existing and skilling of new workforce to meet the future requirements.
  • Finally, all of these changes in the energy and industrial systems must be paralleled by a plan of just transition, to ensure that we do not carry forward the legacy of unequal development challenges of the coal era, into the new era of renewable energy and a greener economy.

In fact, while energy transition has been a hot topic on the policy and business front, just transition has not got the due attention. However, as coal power will peak before 2030, it is time for India to start policy deliberations, develop plans for, and consider investing in it. And this is why it is crucial.

Could renewables mean unequal development?
India’s energy geography will change because of massive investments in renewables. Today’s coal-producing states will not be renewable superpowers. The renewable energy will be generated in western and southern states.
Therefore, as the share of non-fossil fuel energy grows, the coal regions can spiral into a poverty trap, which many of the districts here are already saddled with. There can also be huge social instability triggered by job losses and uncertainty of income opportunities. An estimated 20 million plus workers will be impacted countrywide by the transition. In fact, the disproportionately high number of informal workers in our key economic sectors such as coal mining, transportation, steel, cement etc adds to the challenge. But all this can be avoided through a well-planned and well-managed just transition over the next decades.
Planning a ‘just’ energy transition will be a smart move by the government to further a development agenda that benefits all. We have the next 30 years to complete the transition, but the process must start now.

The writer is Director, India Just Transition Centre, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology (iFOREST)

COP26: Let us move from climate crisis to climate collaboration

Glasgow will not solve the climate crisis but it can fast-track global climate collaboration.

A great hype has been created around the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) at Glasgow. John Kerry, the US climate czar, has called this meeting the world’s “last best chance” to avoid climate hara-kiri. Similar sentiment has been expressed by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. More than 100 world leaders will attend this climate gala, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden.

This is not the first time such hype has been created around climate summits. I can list at least three (two of which I attended) – Kyoto in 1997, Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015 – where the noise was deafening, but the outcome was muted. Unfortunately, Glasgow COP is heading in the same direction.

Over the last few months, a long list of demands has been put forth by various governments. The UK is pushing for a treaty to “consign coal power to history”, the US wants a net-zero deal, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) has demanded a 1.5°C declaration. Least Developing Countries (LDCs) want climate polluters to pay them billions of dollars for loss and damage, and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) want $100 billion climate finance and carbon space. Unfortunately, most of these demands will not be met because the groundwork has not been done to achieve them.

Take the case of coal power phase-out. The UK is pushing to end coal power by 2030 in developed countries and by 2040 in the rest of the world. But it has failed to get support from most coal-consuming countries, especially the top two consumers, India and China.
The reason is simple: Unlike developed countries that depend on gas for electricity, coal provides 70% of India’s and 62% of China’s electricity production. While phasing out of coal power is essential to combat the climate crisis, so is gas power. Countries are not convinced that prioritising one over the other is the right way to move ahead. Also, there has not been any discussion on how this coal transition will happen and who will pay for the closure of coal mines and power plants.

As a sizeable population depends on coal for livelihood in countries like India, huge investments are required to transition coal regions to non-coal economies. But, there has not been any discussion on global cooperation on coal transition. So, without discussing the nut-bolts, expecting a coal power treaty is unrealistic.

Likewise, there are disagreements on loss and damage. Developing countries are now facing a new reality – the destruction unleashed by the climate crisis is taking lives, destroying assets and infrastructure, and costing vast amounts of money in relief and reconstruction. They are demanding that the big polluters compensate them for the losses. But the developed countries have refused to negotiate any responsibility for climate-induced losses. This issue is going to be a significant sticking point at Glasgow and may derail the negotiations.
Similar disagreements exist on all major proposals. So, what should we realistically expect from Glasgow?

COP26 is taking place in the background of a vast trust deficit that emerged between countries during the Trump regime; the vaccine apartheid and the unilateral withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan have further eroded the credibility of developed countries. Hence, the pretence of the developed countries that everything is hunky-dory is misplaced. Therefore, their attempt to forge an alliance on issues like net zero is destined to become high-sounding declarations that are ritually announced at all COPs.

But the Glasgow meeting can achieve some important outcomes, the most important being the rule book for the Paris Agreement. Over the last six years, countries have struggled to finish the rule book and operationalise the Agreement in its entirety, mainly due to disagreements over the design of the carbon market. Theoretically, the carbon market can enhance mitigation, reduce cost and transfer real resources to developing countries for decarbonisation. At Glasgow, negotiators must set robust rules to eliminate past loopholes and ensure the carbon market works for the planet.

Glasgow is also an opportunity to kick-start the process of confidence-building to bring back the global collaboration on track. Both developed and developing countries must cross the aisles, understand each other’s concerns, and announce confidence-building measures.
Developed countries can put out a new plan for climate finance that is ambitious and credible. A recent report on climate finance road map shows how little money is being given by them. For example, in 2019, developed countries provided $16.7 billion as a grant. This means that every person in developed countries contributed just $1 per month for climate finance. Developed countries can surely afford more than this. A credible climate finance plan from them is, therefore, crucial.

Similarly, developing countries need to discuss their decarbonisation plans because there is no carbon space to emit. Even if developed countries reach net zero by 2030 (which is unlikely), developing countries will still have to start reducing emissions very soon. So, a serious plan on decarbonisation from developing countries would go a long way in building confidence in the process.
#TelltheTruth is a popular hashtag for COP26. It exemplifies the frustration of young climate campaigners with the negotiation process. At COP26, leaders must tell the truth. Dishonesty and falsehood are the reason why the three decades of climate negotiations have achieved little.

The writer is CEO, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability and Technology (iFOREST)

The UNEP Production Gap Report’s call for a Just Transition is as timely as it is urgent

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and leading global research institutes released the Production Gap Report on Thursday.  The report raises clear concern on countries following their net-zero ‘pledge’. Most governments plan to produce more than twice the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would be consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.

As part of the Paris Agreement at the COP21 in 2015, countries pledged to reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses to keep global warming from breaching the 2°C mark, preferably keeping it to 1.5°C. Now, many countries have declared their net-zero emission targets for 2050. 

The report finds that despite the climate action commitments and targets for net-zero, the governments would be producing 240% more coal, 57% more oil and 71% more gas collectively. Countries globally have directed over USD 300 billion of new funds towards fossil fuels since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, more than they have towards clean energy.

Taking a closer look at 15 fossil-fuel producing countries, including India, the report states that the thrust is towards ramping up fossil-fuel production. India plans to expand coal production by nearly 60% from 2019 to 2040, by removal of barriers to land acquisition and building capacity for exploration. India also plans to increase its oil and gas production by over 40% in the same duration. India has so far not set a net-zero emission target. There is no policy or discourse for a just transition away from fossil fuels. 

The Production Gap report is the second clarion call for climate action. Earlier this year, the InterGovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) sounded the “red code for humanity” stating that there is no time to defer action, if the climate catastrophe has to be avoided. 

 As the global leaders converge for COP 26 two weeks down the line, the Production Gap report calls for “rapid and immediate steps” and to ensure a “just and equitable transition” to cleaner sources of energy, a key agenda to take forward. 

The call for a “just transition” is as timely as it is urgent. Just transition is not a one-time fix, rather a process. This process is not just technological, but a human one as well which involves economies, workers and local communities and ensuring justice for them. 

So far, the discourse on just transition has been limited and restricted largely to the developed economies where the challenge of transitioning has been to account for the workforce employed in the fossil fuel industry. For developing economies like India, the challenges are bigger. Apart from formal workers, there is a huge informal workforce dependence on the fossil-fuel industry, which is largely unaccounted for. 

iFOREST’s latest research has shown that about 21.5 million workers working in fossil-fuel and dependent sectors will need employment to prevent socio-economic distress in the regions. At least 32% of these are informal workers. In key fossil fuel sectors such as coal mining, iron and steel and automobile industries, the informal workforce is four times those formally employed. Coal mining in India, for instance, employs an estimated 2.6 million people, of which 70% are informal workers. In fact, in the old coal mining region of eastern India, many people eke out a living by manually gathering and selling coal in local markets.  These workers also have to be accounted for and provided with alternative livelihoods and required skills. 

There is also a huge indirect local dependence on the fossil fuel industry. Ground interactions in many of India’s coal mining regions show that local businesses mushroom and thrive on the demand created by the workforce in the local coal and coal-based industries. Often these businesses also lead to rapid urbanization of small concentrated pockets of otherwise rural districts. 

This is why planning will be required to bring together resources, align policy and even development outcomes, create a political will and social appetite for a fossil fuel transition. The local industry, businesses and communities will need to be brought on board for an economic diversification of the region. 

Additionally, in developing economies such as India, the fossil fuel regions suffer from the resource curse. They are among the poorest regions where communities have been burdened with displacement, loss of land, and multiple levels of deprivation of income and  decent livelihood, healthcare, education and even sanitation for years. About 17 of India’s top coal mining districts, have about 30% of people who are multidimensionally poor, more than the country’s average of 27.5%. Justice for them is a key component of this transition

To be able to achieve this, the planning and action must start now, so that in the next two decades, countries like India are ready for the transition. Going by precedence, Ruhr Valley in Germany, a highly industrialised region with a coal-centric economy, took 50 years to transition from coal, after resistance from industry and local communities. The economy shifted to tourism based one after due policy and financial thrust, and roping in the stakeholders through bottom-up approach.

If the world has to meet the climate action commitments, a just transition to cleaner sources of energy is an inevitability. Inaction towards decarbonization also thwarts the renewable energy ambitions. A push towards climate action has to be coupled with a push for cleaner sources of energy but also at the same time to decarbonize. 

At the launch of the Production Gap report, there was a push for a fossil fuel non-proliferation treaty led by civil society groups globally, to ensure that countries don’t cheat and match climate commitment with action by ending new exploration for fossil fuels, phase out of existing production and invest in a transformational plan. To ensure these, a just transition is an imperative.

Climate: Reality Check

Transition from fossil fuels in India is a matter of politics, communities, federalism & jobs

The latest IPCC report paints a grim picture of the future if the world fails to eliminate the use of fossil fuels over the next three decades. India will be disproportionately impacted by extreme weather events. Therefore, the only question in front of us is how best to plan this transition to secure a just and equitable outcome. Otherwise, chaos and disruptions are a foregone conclusion.

Note here that there is a stark asymmetry in India’s energy map. While 85% of coal production is concentrated in relatively poor eastern and central states of Jharkhand, Odisha, Chhattisgarh, West Bengal and Madhya Pradesh, over 60% of renewable energy potential (and 80% of current capacity) is concentrated in relatively wealthy southern and western states – Gujarat, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Telangana.

As India and the rest of the world embark on the most significant energy shift since the invention of steam engines to combat the climate crisis, this disparity raises many questions. For example:

  • How will the energy transition affect inter-state relations? What implications will it have on government revenue, public expenditure and regional inequality?
  • What happens to districts like Dhanbad, Singrauli, Korba, Angul, or Paschim Bardhaman, where coal is the fulcrum of jobs and growth?
  • How will we re-skill and re-employ millions of workers formally and informally employed in fossil fuel-dependent industries like thermal power, steel, cement, refineries, automobile, petrol pumps, or urea fertiliser?

These aren’t hypothetical questions to be debated through a future lens. These are, on the contrary, current concerns that must be addressed immediately, as coal and oil use will have to decline dramatically over the next 2-3 decades to avoid the worst impacts of global warming.

The good news is that this rapid transition is technologically feasible, and the market is now willing and ready to switch to non-fossil alternatives in many industries since they are profitable. Hence, all major Indian companies, from Tata’s to Reliance and Adani’s to Mahindra’s, are putting billions of dollars in renewable energy, battery storage and EVs.

However, if the transition away from coal (and oil) is not well-managed, many of the country’s disadvantaged districts will be pushed even further into poverty. Furthermore, it will have serious ramifications for the political economy in central and eastern India, where coal is firmly embedded in local culture and politics. Their politics can even put a brake on the energy transition itself.

Therefore, the energy transition is more than technological fixes and investments; it is also about workers and communities who will be affected. To get this transition right, we will have to start developing policies and plans for a Just Transition and not merely an energy transition. A well-planned Just Transition will help districts and states dependent on fossil fuels to diversify their economy and secure decent work opportunities for their population.

But what does a Just Transition look like in India? What is it going to entail? To answer, we must first comprehend the nature of the fossil fuel economy as well as the obstacles of phasing it out.

To begin with, the Indian fossil fuel industry, particularly coal, is plagued by the “resource curse” and informal workers. Most coal areas are impoverished and polluted, with more than half of the population suffering from multidimensional poverty. In addition, the informal workforce is approximately four times the formal employees. As a result, a vast majority of workers don’t have employment security.

Secondly, the fossil fuel industry has a large footprint. There are 120 districts in which these businesses play a significant role. Of these, 60 districts account for 95% of coal production, 60% thermal power capacity, and 90% automobile and automobile component manufacturing. Disruptions will occur in these districts early on, perhaps within the next five years, as alternative technologies are already in the market for these sectors.

Thirdly, the industry employs a large number of people, with at least 20 million people working in mines and factories. Automobile, iron and steel, and coal mining are the biggest employers. To put things in perspective, the coal-mining sector in the United States employed 54,000 people in 2019; in India, the figure is over 2.0 million.

Finally, the fossil fuel industries contribute significantly to the exchequer. Taxes on coal, oil and gas contributed 18.8% of the total revenue receipts of the central government and about 8.3% of the state governments in 2019-20. Thus, these taxes are essential for the government’s revenue and spending.

Considering the above, a Just Transition in India will need policy and planning for five key elements (the five R’s):

  • Restructuring of the economy and industries in fossil fuel-dependent districts/ states;
  • Repurposing of land and infrastructure, as these industries hold vast land and assets. For example, coal mines and thermal power plants alone have 0.3 million hectares of land, which can be repurposed to build a new green economy;
  • Reskilling existing and skilling new workforce to avoid job loss and create a new workforce for the green industries;
  • Revenue substitution and investments in Just Transition. This will require progressively moving taxes away from fossils and using fossil taxes like GST compensation cess (formerly coal cess) and District Mineral Foundation funds for Just Transition; and,
  • Responsible social and environmental practices during the transition process to create a better world than today.

Phase-out of fossil fuels is imminent; we have no choice.

Just Transition in Coal: A Perspective from Jharkhand

This article originally appeared in Vol LVI No. 29 of the Economic & Political Weekly, published on 17 July 2021.

The article discusses why it is an imperative for India to begin deliberation on a just transition from coal in light of some of the compelling factors. It then evaluates what a just transition in India might entail building on an onground study of a coal district in Jharkhand, one of India’s top coal mining states. And fi nally, it outlines the planning and policy considerations that will be necessary to support a
just transition.

Over the past two decades, a growing body of research on climate change has made it clear that a shift away from the fossil fuel economy is inevitable. This will entail a system transition in electricity generation, based on renewable energy sources and simultaneous phasing out of coal-based power by 2050 (IPCC 2018).

However, there are socio-economic consequences of such a transition that cannot be overlooked. A fundamental concern is about the fate of fossil fuel industry workers and local communities who are dependent on it. Just transition as a policy and planning concept tries to address this. Originally advocated by labour unions (Galgóczi 2018), and later merging with the broader debate on environmental justice, the concept underscores the need of ensuring social justice in the shift towards a low carbon, or a carbon neutral future (Morena et al 2019).

The basic idea of a just transition is to secure a sustainable and decent livelihood for the people who are dependent on the fossil fuel industry through proper planning and investments. Simultaneously, there must be efforts to eradicate poverty in those regions, and to build thriving and resilient communities (ITUC 2017). It insists on the idea that a healthy economy and a clean environment can and should coexist (Just Transition Alliance 2018).

The socio-economic aspect of the energy transition is now an essential component of the climate change discourse. In 2015, just transition was included in the preamble of the historic Paris Agreement (2015) as, taking into account the imperatives of a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent work and quality jobs in accordance with nationally defined development priorities.

Since then, it has become an important policy component of climate change mitigation action. Countries of the global North are coming up with just transition policies and plans. In most countries of the global South, including India, the discussion on a just transition is either in its infancy or has not been initiated (Pai et al 2020).

India and Just Transition
In India, a policy discourse on a just transition has not been initiated yet because of our high dependence on coal for energy security and industrial growth. However, it is time for such a discussion to begin considering five compelling factors.

First, in India, coal is losing its edge progressively. While overall coal mining is still profi table, with the country’s largest coal producer Coal India Limited (CIL) recording profi ts, about two-thirds of the CIL-operated coal mines are unprofi table and are closing down (Bhushan et al 2020). These are primarily low yielding underground mines, which are a disproportionately high number compared to their cumulative production capacity. As per the latest information of the company, of the 352 mines CIL and its subsidiaries currently operate nearly 45% are underground mines (158 mines). However, they account for only about 5% of the company’s raw coal production (CIL 2020). The employee liability of these mines is very signifi cant, as they employ about 40%–45% of CIL’s total workforce. As per internal inputs, the loss from continuing with these mines is about 16,000 crore per year, about the same as the company’s annual profi t in 2018–19. The alarming issue is that these unprofi table mines are closing down in an unplanned manner (Bhushan et al 2020). Besides underground mines, old opencast mines are also proving to be unprofi table and are either closed or temporarily discontinued. For example, in Jharkhand, one of India’s top coal producing states, more than 50% of the coal mines are currently closed, including both opencast and underground mines (Department of Mines and Geology 2020).

Second, coal is facing a major challenge due to the growing cost competitiveness and reliability of power from renewable energy sources. The installed cost and tariffs of utility-scale solar photovoltaic plants in India have fallen by 85% since 2010 (Henbest 2020). In 2019, it stayed around 2.50–3.00/kWh, depending on the location of the offtake risk (Saran et al 2019). This is 20% to 30% cheaper than the cost of power from existing coal plants. Solar power prices are expected to fall further in the coming years to around 2.00/kWh by 2030, while the cheapest pithead coal power price is likely to rise to `4.85/kWh by that time (CPI and TERI 2019).

The third reason is the pollution and environmental burden of coal-based power and coal mining. Coal-based power plants are the largest source of industrial pollution in India. Of the entire industrial sector, they alone account for 60% of suspended particulate matter (SPM) emissions, 50% of sulphur dioxide (SO2), 30% of nitrogen oxides (NOx), and 80% of mercury (Hg) emissions (Bhushan et al 2015). Considering this, the environmental standards of coal-based power have been made progressively stringent. In 2015, the Ministry of Forest, Environment and Climate Change (MoEFCC) imposed new standards on coal power plants to limit their emissions of SO2, NOx, PM and Hg. The estimated capital expenditure required to meet these standards is about 86,135 crore. This will add between 0.32/kWh and `0.72/kWh to the existing power tariffs (or around 9% to 21% to their average generation tariff) depending on the size of the units and other factors (Garg et al 2019). For coal mining, MoEFCC in 2010 had identifi ed most of the top coal mining areas as critically polluted areas. These include Hazaribagh and Dhanbad in Jharkhand, Singrauli in Madhya Pradesh, Korba in Chhattisgarh, and Angul (Talcher coal-fields) in Odisha, among others (Bhushan and Banerjee 2015). In addition, coal mining remains one of the major factors for forest-land diversion. On an average, an estimate of the last 40 years shows that 20%–25% of total forest land diversion is due to mining, and about half of that is for coal (Bhushan etal 2020).

Fourth, we need to plan a transition away from coal to reverse the legacy problem of resource curse in the coal regions. Most of India’s top coal mining districts suffer from this, with the local people facing displacement and deprivation due to resource extraction. In many of India’s top coal mining districts there is a high proportion of deprivation and poverty. For example, in districts such as Singrauli, Sidhi, Chatra, Godda, Surguja, Korba, and Sonbhadra, about 40% or more of the people are multidimensionally poor, exhibiting very poor status of health, education, and living standards (as per Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative multidimensional poverty index calculator). This is nearly twice the all-India average of 27.9% (Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative 2020).

Finally, is the urgency of climate change action. For India, this becomes necessary not only considering our environmental obligations, but also given the economic and social costs of the climate crisis. India is the fi fth most vulnerable country to climate change impacts, as per the Global Climate Change Risk Index 2020 (Eckstein 2019). Under business-as-usual scenario, climate change will increase the stress on the country’s natural ecosystems, agricultural output, and freshwater resources, while also causing escalating damage to infrastructure. These will have severe consequences for the country’s food, water and energy security, public health, and for sustaining the country’s economic growth (Bhushan et al 2020). In 2018, India’s economic losses due to climate change were the second-highest in the world, with the estimated loss at 2.7 lakh crore, which is equivalent to about 0.36% of its gross domestic product (GDP) (Eckstein 2019). The Ministry of Finance (2020), has further estimated that the cumulative costs of climate change adaptation till 2030 will be 85.6 lakh crore, equivalent to nearly 58% of India’s GDP in 2019–20 at constant prices (National Statistical Offi ce 2020).

Global experiences of successful coal transitions show that if a transition is planned in a timely and deliberative manner, it will not be a tradeoff between

the environment and economy, and can lead to positive social and environmental outcomes (Bhushan et al 2020). In fact, just transition will be an appropriate policy move for the Government of India (GOI) to complement its vision of energy transition and to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Evaluating a Just Transition
In countries of the global North, the experience on just transition has been primarily related to the formal workforce of the coal industry and associated socio-economic factors (Bhushan et al 2020). However, in India, the situation is different considering that most of our key economic sectors are based on an informal economy (Labour Bureau 2014). Global experiences also suggest that there is no one standardised approach for a just transition. The dependence on fossil fuel, and the nature of the transition will vary from country to country and from region to region within a country. Any approach to a just transition thus needs to be evaluated in a country-specific manner and planned in the context of respective fossil fuel/coal mining regions (Bhushan et al 2020).

Ramgarh district of Jharkhand constitutes a representative case to evaluate what just transition means for India. One of Jharkhand’s top coal mining districts, Ramgarh produces about 13 million tonnes of coal per year. However, production has been steadily declining over the past four years. Currently 50% of the total of 24 coal mines in the district are closed or have been temporarily discontinued due to various reasons, including unprofitability. 1 The remaining mines have a productive life of 10–25 years, and there are very few new ones in the pipeline ( Department of Mines and Geology 2020). Therefore, coal mining activities in the district will largely be phased out in the next decade or two. While coal still remains central to the district’s economy, Ramgarh is as an appropriate case to understand what a coal phase-out will look like, and what it will entail.

Study Approach
The Ramgarh study is based on a mixed approach of primary and secondary research. A primary survey was conducted of 406 households in the district, that were selected through a process of strati fi ed random sampling.2 Samples were chosen from three geographic strata: 0–3 kilometre (km), 3–10 km, and beyond 10 km, from the mine/mine cluster, to minimise the possibility of clustering and selection bias.3 Besides, 14 focus group discussions were conducted with various stakeholder groups in the three main coal mining blocks, namely Mandu, Patratu and Chitarpur, covering 138 participants. Personal interviews were also conducted with state government representatives, the district administration, public representatives, panchayati raj members, labour unions, coal industry officials, and civil society groups.
Secondary data was obtained for understanding the coal industry profi le in Jharkhand and Ramgarh, and for analysing the demographic distribution, economic status, social infrastructure, and key development parameters in Ramgarh. The data also helped to evaluate the political economy of coal mining in the region, and to identify the various stakeholder groups that will be affected, and are related to the just transition process.

Key Observations
The Ramgarh case study brings out four key observations that are important for understanding just transition in India.
First, the dependence on coal mining for income is signifi cantly high. Out of the total surveyed households, 27% (equivalent to 54,000 households in the district) depended directly on coal for an income. Nearly three-fourths of them (71%) were part of the informal coal economy, including coal gatherers and sellers, casual labourers, and other contractual workers (including businesses). Only 29% had formal employment with coal companies.

Majority of the people belonging to the informal economy also fall within the low-income group, with a monthly household income between 5,000 and 10,000. This group of people also lack labour protection or social safety.

Second, income dependence on coal is spatially concentrated. While more than 40% of the households within a radius of 3 km from the mines derived direct income from coal, this proportion sharply declined to less than 17% for households living beyond 3 km of a mine. In fact, beyond 10 km from coal mining areas, agriculture was observed to be the most signifi cant source of employment. The district’s overall worker distribution, as per government data, also indicated high agricultural dependence, particularly in the rural areas, which is as high as 75% of the total main workers.

Third, the distributional impact of coal mining in the region has been extremely limited, benefi ting only a few. The district remains extremely poor in terms of social infrastructure or access to basic amenities. For example, there is nearly a 50% defi cit in the required number of primary healthcare centres. Moreover, even the existing ones do not meet the necessary Indian public health standards in terms of medical staff, treatment facilities, etc. The same situation is with access to education. Only 16% of the schools offer secondary/higher secondary education, with average enrolment below 50%. With respect to people’s access to basic amenities, such as clean drinking water, only about 17% of households in rural areas have access to the piped water supply. These are the areas which are also affected by mining. In fact, Ramgarh falls in the list of aspirational districts of the NITI Aayog, given its poor human development indicators (NITI Aayog 2018).

Besides social infrastructure, coal mining has also not improved the overall economic status of the district. Ramgarh’s per capita GDP is nearly half of the all-India average. This places the district among the low-income category as per global standards. Over 63% of the district’s households have a monthly income below `10,000 (Bhushan et al 2020).

Finally, and most importantly, a focus on coal mining and related industry over decades has stymied the development of other sectors and the diversifi cation of the economy. Coal remains the single largest contributor to the district’s GDP, with a share of about 21%. In addition, other industries are also coal-reliant, such as coal washeries, thermal power plants, sponge iron units, refractories, etc. On the contrary, other potential sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fi sheries, and service sectors remain grossly underdeveloped. The situation has also contributed to a perceived sense of coal dependence in the mining areas. This is evident from the fact that while 27% households reported a direct income from coal, nearly three-fourths of the surveyed households expressed a sense of “perceived” dependence.

All of the above-mentioned factors, such as high proportion of informal workforce, low-income, poor social infrastructure and development indicators, a coal-centric economy, and underdevelopment of other economic sectors puts the district at a high risk from an unplanned coal mine closure. It therefore becomes imperative to plan a transition that is timely, deliberative and just.

Developing Policy Mechanisms
Just transition planning in India will not be a linear question of substituting a “mono” industry (coal) along with its workforce. Considering the nature of dependence and the poor socio-economic status of most coal mining areas in India, just transition will require “structural changes” to support a broad-based socio-economic transition. An integrated approach will be required to reverse the “resource curse” in coal mining areas, create sustainable economic opportunities, and build climate resilience. The Ramgarh experience also clearly brings out that, considering the socio-economic complexity of the coal regions and the varied stakeholders, planning for a just transition must be a phased and deliberative process.

There will be six key components of just transition planning at the district level. This includes, defi ning a time frame for a just transition (including of phased closure of coal mines and coal-based power), establishing an inclusive transition planning mechanism, providing alternative employment opportunities for formal and informal workers in the short term, planning economic diver-sifi cation (including industrial restructuring) for the long term, improving social and physical infrastructure to build community resilience, and securing fi nancial resources to support a just transition.

However, a just transition plan cannot be implemented at the district level in absence of a well-structured governance mechanism, which is based on utmost principles of cooperative federalism between the union and the state governments, and an inclusive decision-making process by engaging various stakeholders.

The governance framework of just transition must include eight key pillars. These include strong support of the union and state government(s) on developing policies and mobilising financial support, a diverse coalition among various actors and stakeholders, an effective communication strategy on just transition to build stakeholder confi dence, economic diver-sifi cation and social sec urity planning, coal sector transition planning, development of social and physical infrastructure development, and securing public and private investments for the transition.
On the policy front, a crucial aspect will be developing a “national just transition policy.” The union government should develop the policy, including components of coal phase-out strategy at the national- and state-levels, plan for phasing out coal-based power and simultaneous incentivisation of clean energy, and regulatory revisions of the coal industry pertaining to mine closure and reclamation, leasing/lease transfer, la-bour, etc. The union government’s support will also be crucial for building on existing laws and schemes to enable locally deliverable actions, providing a financial package, and pushing for an international framework at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to support just transition in developing countries.
The state government, on the other hand, will be at the front line for dealing with just transition. This will require building a broad-based consensus, and a strategic action plan to phase out coal mining and coal-based power, develop-ing economic and industrial strategy to steer away from coal dependence in terms of revenue, employment, and industries, and develop a state-level policy on just transition aligned with the national framework.

The actual planning and implementation will happen at the district level, where all stakeholders will need to engage through a participatory process.

Conclusions
The overall scenario of coal mining and coal-based power in India, and specifi -cally the Ramgarh experience, shows that just transition is not a consideration of the future anymore. The issue is here and now. The Ramgarh study is a telling case of the subnational status of coal mining and coal regions. In many coal districts, mines are being temporarily or permanently closed without any framework in place to support the local economy and restore the local environment. Therefore, there is an immediate need to develop just transition plans and a policy framework for these areas to avoid economic and social disruptions. A well-planned just transition is also necessary to compliment India’s ambitious plan for energy transition, and enhance its efforts of climate change mitigation action.

 

 

Single-use-plastics bans have failed. Relying on command and control to fix environmental problems is taking us nowhere

Exactly three years back, single-use plastics (SUPs) took centre stage in India when PM Modi, on June 5, 2018, announced that the country would completely phase out these products by 2022. Now, barely a year before the deadline, the Union environment ministry has issued a draft notification to impose a nationwide ban by July 1, 2022.

The Draft Plastic Waste Management (Amendment) Rules, 2021, published just before the second wave of the pandemic hit the country, proposes to ban SUPs in three stages. Plastic carry bags of less than 120 micron thickness will be phased out by September 30, 2021. Plastic earbuds, sticks, flags, and thermocol decorations will be banned from January 1, 2022. Lastly, plastic and thermocol plates, cutlery, wrapping films, and banners will be prohibited from July 1, 2022.

The draft rule is a significant change in strategy, as the Centre, until now, had encouraged states to phase out these products. Consequently, 30 states/ Union territories have enacted laws to ban various SUPs. As the state-level bans have been largely unsuccessful, the Centre has decided to step in. But the question is, if the state bans have failed, will a similar national ban work?

Restrictions on SUPs have been attempted in India from 1999, when the sale of thin polythene bags was prohibited. Since then, three national laws and numerous state laws have been enacted to phase out these products. But in the last 22 years, we have not been able to eliminate even one product. Why? Is this because of poor enforcement (an oft-mentioned reason) or because of some other factors?

A closer look at SUP bans by states shows that the enforcements were carried out in fits and starts, and hence, it did contribute to the failure. But this was not the main factor; the absence of a strategic approach seems to be a bigger problem.

The foremost factor is the lack of alternatives to SUPs and the government’s failure in promoting them. So far, the thinking within the government has been that once the ban is enforced, alternatives would emerge to fill the gap. But this has not happened simply because there is no supportive infrastructure and incentive to produce alternatives in volume. Alternatives have remained a niche business as the government never had a policy to mainstream them.

The unrealistic time frame for phasing out these products is the second important factor for the failure. Bans have been imposed either immediately or within few months, providing little time to the industry and users to adapt. This time as well, most states/ UTs imposed an immediate ban, threatening the livelihoods of millions of people.

Experience worldwide shows that a total ban on widely-used products requires an incremental approach to change the economy and public behaviour. This is precisely the reason why European countries have given themselves at least a decade to eliminate SUPs. We, on the other hand, want to do it in months!

The success of bans is also linked to local waste management practices, the third factor. States like Kerala and Sikkim had more success than others because of their long-running campaign on waste management. Therefore, a sound waste management ecosystem, including segregation, collection, and recycling, is a prerequisite to manage SUPs, which doesn’t exist in most states.

The fourth important factor is an overreliance on bans while ignoring other instruments such as fiscal incentives and disincentives, certification and labelling, and extended producer responsibility. Our propensity to rely only on command and control to fix environmental problems is taking us nowhere. We need to use both carrots and sticks to eliminate SUPs.

Lastly, reducing SUPs requires a long-term vision, strategy and targets for the plastic industry. While on the one hand, the central government is proposing to ban SUPs, on the other, it is also promoting the plastic industry. This contradiction is at the heart of the SUP conundrum. To resolve this, India needs a comprehensive national strategy that embeds the circular economy principles in the plastic industry. The goal is not just to eliminate SUPs but also to reduce plastic production and consumption, improve waste management and reduce plastic pollution.

As India approaches the 2022 deadline, the pressure on the central government is mounting to do something. A note of caution at this point is that hastily enacted legislation has not worked in the last two decades and is not likely to deliver in the future as well. Therefore, the environment ministry must carefully examine past successes and failures before enacting another law to ban SUPs.

कोयला खनन का ढाई सौ साल पुराना कारोबार बदल जाएगा, इसके लिए अभी से नीतियां बनानी होंगी

इंटर गवर्नमेंटल पैनल ऑन क्लाइमेट चेंज (आईपीसीसी) की 2018 रिपोर्ट के अनुसार 2050 तक कोयला आधारित विद्युत उत्पादन लगभग बंद होना है। यह ग्लोबल वार्मिंग को दो डिग्री सेल्सियस के अंदर रखने के लिए आईपीसीसी द्वारा सुझाए गए महत्वपूर्ण उपायों में से एक है। इस तरह कोयला उद्योगों से राज्यों को होने वाली आय कम होती जाएगी। फिर खत्म होगी। भविष्य की इस चुनौती का हल, कोयला उत्पादक राज्य भावी नीतियों में तलाश रहे होंगे।

बचपन में कहावत सुनी, ‘अग्र सोची, सदा सुखी’। आज की दुनिया में जब टेक्नोलॉजी प्रेरित बदलाव बहुत तेज हों, तो इस जोखिम को कौन टाल सकता है? वैसे भी व्यावहारिक विजन के तहत इससे प्रभावित राज्यों की नीतियों में विकल्प की कोशिश होगी ही। पर क्या भविष्य के ऐसे सवाल, राज्यों की राजनीति में एजेंडा या मुद्दा हैं? क्या केंद्र के साथ मिलकर राज्य अपने-अपने प्रभावित होने वाले इलाकों की वैकल्पिक नीति व योजना बना रहे हैं? संबंधित राज्यों की राजनीति का यह लोक मुद्दा है? इसके समाधान के लिए लोक पहल है? मसलन झारखंड को सालाना बजट में कोयला से 5-6% आय होती है।

अगर यह क्रमशः घटे या बंद हो, तो सरकार को दूसरे स्रोत से वह आमद चाहिए। मुल्क में लगभग 3.5 लाख लोग कोयला उद्योग में प्रत्यक्ष रूप से जुड़े हैं। इन्हें रोजगार की जरूरत होगी। 1.5 करोड़ लोग अप्रत्यक्ष रूप से इस पर निर्भर हैं। इन्हें दूसरे क्षेत्र में अवसर देना होगा। झारखंड, बंगाल, उड़ीसा, छत्तीसगढ़, मध्यप्रदेश, आंध्रप्रदेश, तेलंगाना, महाराष्ट्र, तमिलनाडु वगैरह के सामने यह सवाल होगा।

एक और कारण है। भारत के बिजली उत्पादन में कोयला संचालित विद्युत उत्पादन का हिस्सा 71% के आसपास है। उधर सौर ऊर्जा उत्पादन लागत लगातार घट रही है। 2020 नवंबर में नेशनल थर्मल पावर कॉर्पोरेशन ने 470 मेगावाट सौर ऊर्जा प्लांट (सोलर पावर) की निविदा 2.01 रुपए प्रति किलोवाट पर पाई। यह लागत कीमत मौजूदा कोयला आधारित ऊर्जा से 40% कम है।

2015 में पर्यावरण, जंगल और मौसम परिवर्तन मंत्रालय ने कोयला आधारित ऊर्जा संयंत्रों के लिए नई प्रदूषण नीति तय की। तत्कालीन पावर प्लांट्स को, दिसंबर 2017 तक इसका पालन करना था। नए पावर प्लांटों को जनवरी 2017 के बाद, यह मापदंड लागू करना था। किसी भी कोयला पावर प्लांट ने यह मानक पूरा नहीं किया। यह समय सीमा बढ़ाकर 2022 हुई।

दुनिया के जो मुल्क कोयला उद्योग का विकल्प ढूंढ रहे हैं, वे खनन श्रमिकों के लिए नया क्षेत्र ढूंढ रहे हैं। यहां ढांचागत बदलाव की जरूरत होगी। व्यापक अर्थ में यह सामाजिक-आर्थिक बदलाव होगा। उद्योगों को नया रूप देना होगा। इन्फ्रास्ट्रक्चर और आधारभूत सामाजिक संरचना में निवेश बढ़ाना होगा। इस काम में डिस्ट्रिक्ट मिनरल्स फंड (डीएमएफ) की राशि उपयोग हो सकती है, वैकल्पिक आर्थिक ढांचा बनाने-विकसित करने में।

भविष्य में यह उद्योग परंपरागत स्वरूप में नहीं रहता, तो हर कोयला उत्पादक राज्य को अलग-अलग नीति बनानी होगी, क्योंकि कोयला खनन का 257 साल पुराना वाणिज्यिक कारोबार (1774 से) बदलेगा। एक मुकम्मल रोड मैप, अभी से ही बनाना होगा।

कुछ दिनों पहले छत्तीसगढ़ ने ‘रिन्यूएबल एनर्जी रोड मैप’ बनाया है। दरअसल देश के पूर्वी राज्यों की ताकत मिनिरल पावर (खनिज संपदा) रही है। यह परंपरागत संपदा, पुराने स्वरूप में नहीं रहनेवाली। देश के पूर्वी क्षेत्र या राज्य, इस चुनौती को अवसर के रूप में बदल सकते हैं। जैसे झारखंड में सौर ऊर्जा की बड़ी क्षमता है, क्योंकि राज्य को वर्ष में 300 दिन सौर ताप मिलता है।

भारत में जिला खनिज फाउंडेशन कोष में लगभग 45,000 करोड़ रु. हैं। हर साल करीब 6-7 हजार करोड़ रु. इस मद में आते हैं। इसमें कोयला व लिगनाइट का हिस्सा 41% है, जिसका 45% ही उपयोग हो रहा है। डीएमएफ के अलावा कोयला क्षेत्रों में कोल सेस भी एकत्रित होता है।

हर साल इस फंड में करीब 38,000 करोड़ जमा होते हैं। वर्तमान में इसका उपयोग जीएसटी भुगतान में हो रहा है, लेकिन 2022 के बाद यह कोयला क्षेत्रों के विकास के लिए उपलब्ध होगा। डीएमएफ व कोल सेस में उपलब्ध राशि का उपयोग संबंधित राज्यों में भविष्य में संरचनात्मक बदलाव की दृष्टि से होना चाहिए।

(ये लेखक के अपने विचार हैं)

 

Become climate champions: India’s top family conglomerates must play a leadership role in its fight against climate change

The private sector in India has traditionally avoided engagement on climate issues publicly. But this seems to be changing. On November 5, 2020, 24 leading companies signed a ‘declaration of the private sector on climate change’ to tackle the climate crisis. This is an important beginning as the private sector will have to play a crucial role in mobilising resources, knowledge, and innovation. And within the private sector, family-controlled conglomerates are uniquely positioned to lead the low/no-carbon growth trajectory.

Family ownership is the most dominant form of business around the world. Historically, family businesses have dominated the Indian industry. Until the 1990s, a few old business ‘houses’ were dominant, holding diversified business interests across the economy. Their dominance was partly enabled by the planned economy ‘license raj’ model of the time. Since the economic reforms of 1991, these older business houses have been challenged by new families and non-family entrants. But the power of family conglomerates as a business model has not diminished. While some of the older houses did not survive the reforms, many – such as the Tatas, the Bajajs, the Birlas, the Mahindras – did and flourished and are joined by new houses –the Ambanis, the Adanis, the Mittals, and the Jindals.

Presently, India has the third-highest number of publicly-listed, family-controlled companies in the world, after China and the United States. Fifteen of the BSE Sensex – the index of 30 reputed companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange – are family-controlled, accounting for more than half of the Sensex combined market capitalisation. Share-price returns of family businesses have also consistently outperformed non-family firms.

One of the key features of prominent family conglomerates in India is that they operate in fossil-fuel intensive sectors and are responsible for a significant share of India’s carbon dioxide emissions.

Today, just seven family conglomerates (Reliance, Adani, Tata, Aditya Birla, Mahindra, Jindal, and Vedanta) are responsible for emitting at least 530 million tonnes of CO2 annually. This is equivalent to 22% of India’s total CO2 emissions. In 2019-20, these seven groups operated 25% of India’s coal-based power plants (50,000 MW); produced 39% of India’s steel (43 million tonnes), 27% of India’s cement (91 million tonnes), and 22% of India’s passenger and commercial vehicles (0.92 million). They also accounted for 30% of oil refining capacity and 25% crude oil production.

If these companies get serious about climate action, India’s emission profile will look fundamentally different. While this ‘seriousness’ primarily comes down to the business argument, there is evidence that family businesses take a more long-term view on investments than non-family firms. Also, studies indicate that they are socially more responsible as they invest in the social and physical infrastructure of the areas they operate in.

The reason why a family conglomerate can take such investment decisions is its unique structure. Unlike other corporates, family businesses are organised around patriarchs/ matriarchs, who bear the ultimate responsibility and hold final decision-making powers. Though the ‘professionalisation’ of family businesses has resulted in hiring competent executives to advise and assist, they still run on the will of the founder or his appointed successor.

To avert a crisis like climate change, forward-thinking and long-term planning is required, for which the value of committed visionary leadership cannot be underestimated. As family conglomerates are organised around visionaries, if they sincerely act on the climate crisis, they can change the trajectory of their own business and that of the sector rapidly. To some extent, they already are doing so.

Mukesh Ambani has recently announced that Reliance Industries would become a net zero-carbon company by 2035. RIL is planning multi-billion dollar investments in hydrogen, wind, solar, fuel cells, and battery to become one of the world’s top “new energy” companies. Tata’s have also strongly signalled that they are moving out of the coal sector and moving into renewable energy, electric vehicles, and hydrogen-based steel making. Similarly, Mahindra has committed to aligning its operations with the science-based targets in the Paris Agreement, and Adani is investing hugely in the solar business to become the “world’s largest” green energy enterprise.

While these announcements and investments are encouraging, it is also a fact that many of these conglomerates continue to invest in fossil fuels. For example, during the recent auction of coal mines, Vedanta, Aditya Birla, Jindal, and Adani made acquisitions of coal assets, despite announcing ambitious renewable energy targets.

This seeming contradiction fits in with another well-known characteristic of Indian family conglomerates – they operate within a broad vision but have mostly grown opportunistically in areas where government incentives to expand are available.  Therefore, even though they are bullish on a low-carbon future, much work needs to be done to move these family conglomerates from merely being followers of government policies to proactive climate champions. This can be a virtuous cycle – these conglomerates have a strong influence on government policy; if they are brought on board, a stronger climate policy is likely to follow.

Given their financial prowess and policy influence, the commitment of these families will be critical for accelerating the transformative changes that climate change requires. Cultivating their next generation to champion climate actions could be an important strategy to move them towards a green future. The business case will be an important part of the engagement, but not the only argument. These industry captains will have to be convinced of the new reality – our children are inheriting a dangerously climate-risked world. Family wealth will not provide infinite protection, but if used wisely, it can certainly contribute to making the world safer for everyone.

Clean up Indian Railways: It must match its climate credentials with sound pollution and waste management

Railways fascinate me. Professionally, I advocate for a massive expansion of rail networks to address the air pollution and climate crisis. Rail transport is not only highly energy efficient compared to road and air transport, it can also completely shift to renewable energy. It will, therefore, play a significant role in reducing emissions from the transport sector. The Indian Railways has recognised this potential and has set a target to achieve net zero carbon emission by 2030, the most ambitious climate target set in the country.

Personally, I love long train journeys. Travelling on the Coromandel Express from Howrah to Chennai, Netravati Express from Mangalore to Mumbai (when it ran on metre gauge), and the Rajdhani from Delhi to Mumbai and Kolkata are some of my favourite travel memories. But during all these times, like most people, I took for granted the noise, the open toilets (now stinking bio-toilets), and the waste along the tracks and stations. But as Indian Railways is expanding, modernising and privatising, environmental issues we overlooked in the past mustn’t be ignored anymore.

Indian Railways is big in every aspect; it runs the fourth largest railway system globally and carries 8 billion passengers and more than a billion tonnes of freight a year. These numbers are projected to increase by 50% over the next 10 years. As it’s already one of the largest consumers of water and energy and generator of waste, its environmental footprint will increase significantly in a business as usual scenario. While Indian Railways has made significant progress in energy efficiency, renewable energy and cleanliness, there are grave concerns of water and noise pollution and waste management.

Let’s first start with the law. For a long time, Railways had taken the view that the country’s key environmental laws – the Water, the Air, and the Hazardous Waste Act – do not apply to its operations. Therefore, no railway station took permits from the pollution control boards (PCBs) or complied with the regulations. A recent National Green Tribunal judgment has categorically rejected this stand and has directed the Railways to abide by the laws. However, the Railways is still reluctant to comply, and most stations are still operating without consent from PCBs.

The situation’s no different with railway sidings/ goods sheds, a major source of air pollution. The majority of these sidings are operated by private companies, but many are working without consent. Reports by the Comptroller and Auditor General and the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) have confirmed poor air pollution management at these establishments.

Poor handling of wastewater has also been identified as a significant concern by the CPCB. Since most stations have not installed Effluent Treatment Plants (ETPs), effluents generated from cleaning trains and stations are discharged into municipal drainages or low lying areas. The situation is the same with Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs).

Every day about 5,000-6,000 tonnes of fecal matter is generated from toilets in the trains and on stations. This is equivalent to the fecal waste generated in a large metro city. While 95% of trains have installed bio-toilets, they are “no better than septic tanks” and the water discharged no better than raw sewage. In the absence of STPs at most stations, the sewage is discharged untreated. In a country where hotels with more than 20 rooms are being directed to install STPs, Railways’ failure to install ETPs and STPs is discriminatory, so say the least.

Noise pollution is an even more problematic issue. More noise is considered useful in the railway establishment for accident prevention. There are strict instructions to honk at all gates, turns and at the time of entry and exit from a station. During the night, train drivers are instructed to honk to ensure they’re alert and not sleeping. Though accidents are a real problem because of encroachments and unfenced railway tracks, continuing with the current strategy is counterproductive because of enormous health implications.

High noise levels lead to poor learning, aggression, hypertension and cardiovascular disease. For millions of citizens living near railway stations and tracks, the railways’ current position is an untenable proposition. Indian Railways will have to find a solution that balances imperatives of accident prevention and noise control.

On waste management, Indian Railways has made some progress. It runs ‘Swachh Rail Abhiyan’ for improving cleanliness and waste management. While there’s no doubt that cleanliness has improved significantly, and some of our railway stations match global standards, the same cannot be said about solid waste.

Indian Railways seems to have an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ approach while dealing with solid wastes. Wastes are collected mainly in unsegregated form and disposed of along with the municipal wastes or burnt or dumped near the track. In fact, the Railways has not even enforced the single use plastic rules of various states, including the national ban on polythene bags. Overall, while Indian Railways is doing a lot on energy issues (because it also makes good economic sense), the same cannot be said about pollution or waste.

The fundamental problem seems to be a sense of ‘exceptionalism’. Railways have historically operated independently of the civil administration. It doesn’t follow many of the laws applicable to a similar service industry like the airline industry. It’s time these anomalies are corrected. Indian Railways should comply with environmental laws and work with civil authorities to solve pollution and waste issues. Its low energy footprint must be matched with sound environmental management.

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