Who gets to stay cool as India heats up?

On a sweltering afternoon in a dense neighbourhood, a family sits huddled under the monotonous whirl of a worn-out ceiling fan, its blades failing to push away the stifling heat. Just a few blocks away, in a gated community, cool air flows steadily and quietly from highly efficient air-conditioners, keeping the heat firmly outside. 

This is the story of cooling in India. This picture with stark contrast, reflects who gets access to innovation — and who gets left behind. Wealth and awareness allow some to build homes that blend aesthetics with thermal efficiency. They can afford designers who know how to angle windows for cross-ventilation, choose insulation wisely, and layer materials to reflect heat while using energy efficiently. On the other hand, dense informal settlements continue to struggle under corrugated tin or asbestos roofs that trap heat, with roof surfaces often touching 60°C and indoor temperatures going upto 45°C during summer afternoons. Such homes with little insulation and poor ventilation can become unbearable heat traps in Indian cities. 

The rising urban heat in Indian cities is no longer surprising. Summers extend longer, monsoons bring thick humidity, and nights remain stubbornly warm. Yet, millions still lack real solutions. Less than 10% of Indian households own air conditioners, leaving over one billion people susceptible to increasingly frequent and intense heatwaves. They rely on patchwork coping mechanisms like fans and air coolers. In contrast, those with means enjoy homes designed around comfort and efficiency as a standard. 

Thermal efficiency of our built environment 

Currently, building regulations like the Energy Conservation & Sustainable Building Code (ECSBC) and the guidelines under Eco-Niwas Samhita (ENS) exclude most small-plot or informal housing simply because they technically fall below the compliance threshold, compounding the challenge faced by tenants of small homes and packed settlements. Instead, they’re offered band-aid solutions like periodic applications of reflective roof paint with a mere four-year lifespan, or the promise of midday cooling shelters they might only access during extreme days and only if the shelter is within proximity or along their route. These aren’t safety nets; they are reminders of how little priority is placed on ‘thermal comfort for all’. 

Architects and engineers trained in building energy performance also tend to serve the affluent segments. There is little mainstream advocacy or financial incentive for integrating passive cooling into affordable housing projects. Homes in poorer neighborhoods often suffer from their heat retention characteristics, like dark, flat roofs that bake all afternoon, narrow roads trapping hot air, and dense layouts that cut out breeze entirely. 

ECSBC and ENS, though progressive on paper, struggle with enforcement. Municipal authorities lack the technical capacity or political will to ensure compliance, especially in government-sponsored affordable housing units. As a result, thermal efficiency remains aspirational and not systemic. The real victims are the economically weaker sections, amid rising temperatures. 

Temporary solutions not only underscore this imbalance but also highlight the poor aspirations we have set to achieve thermal equity. Providing low-income communities with a coat of reflective paint on their roofs or a few hours of air-conditioning in a city-run cooling shelter might give them some respite. However, these gestures alone don’t solve long-term problems. 

There is a need to expand aspirations and integrate thermal comfort and passive cooling into affordable housing projects. Achieving thermal equity requires widening the scope of building codes like ECSBC and ENS to include smaller plots.  

Notably, the ENS acknowledges that states and local bodies must adapt compliance criteria to local conditions, whether it is based on a minimum connected load or plot area. We require clear, contextual, achievable standards that elevate thermal comfort for all, and not just for large-scale or high-income developments. In 2024, the minimum plot area threshold for ENS compliance was raised from 500 m2 to 3,000 m2, pushing a growing number of housing developments outside the regulatory bracket. 

What needs attention on the policy front? 

  • States and local bodies must set compliance criteria suited to local growth patterns. They should assess real estate trends before fixing thresholds for connected load or plot area, ensuring that most buildings fall under the regulatory ambit.  
  • As per iFOREST’s  IHCAP report, an analysis of Bhubaneswar city’s building approval data of 2023, none of the newly approved residential projects were qualified for compliance under the ENS 2024 criterion of 3000> the ENS 2024 criterion of ≥ 3,000 m². When the ≥ 500 m² threshold was applied, only 1.4% of the city’s new housing stock qualified for compliance, leaving out almost all 
  • For informal settlements, new and achievable standards must be developed, focusing on passive cooling strategies and minimum thermal comfort benchmarks. These should be simple, incremental, and adaptable to local building practices. 
  • Building thermal performance shall be mandated for government housing programmes like the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY), where the focus has largely been on unit delivery and cost efficiency. Integrating retrofit programmes, subsidised passive upgrades, and technical assistance into such schemes would ensure that thermal comfort becomes a core consideration in affordable housing and slum redevelopment.  
  • Importantly, the PMAY framework already embodies one of the building blocks needed – the Technology Innovation Grant (TIG). Currently designed to support new construction technologies, TIG must also extend explicitly to innovations that improve the thermal efficiency of buildings for low-income groups. 

Energy efficiency of our space cooling systems

While energy-efficient cooling appliances have begun entering the market, their benefits tend to trickle upward. High-efficiency fans, inverter split ACs, and variable refrigerant flow (VRF) systems remain financially inaccessible for most. On the policy end, the story isn’t better. The BEE (Bureau of Energy Efficiency) star-rating program supports efficient appliances; however, many can’t afford the premium. 

Financially, parity demands that efficient technology be affordable. Municipalities and state agencies can enable bulk procurement through agencies like EESL or facilitate access to energy-efficient appliances via collective procurement and financing schemes. Low-interest loans tied to energy savings or pay-as-you-save models can further improve affordability, making efficient cooling accessible even to those living on the margins. If efficiency is only meant for those who can afford better, it becomes a luxury. 

The government can also play a catalytic role in promoting centralised cooling systems. It can identify high-density zones suitable for district cooling, integrate such systems into city master plans, and streamline approvals for pilot projects. Policy support—such as viability gap funding, concessional power tariffs, and public-private partnerships—can help attract private investment. Developing model contracts and technical guidelines at the national level would further reduce risks and enable cities to adopt centralised cooling with confidence. 

It is crucial to prioritise thermally efficient buildings before focusing on energy-efficient appliances. Reducing the demand for cooling by enhancing thermal comfort in homes and offices will make the subsequent use of energy-efficient appliances more effective and manageable. Although this approach may be more challenging initially, it addresses the root cause by lowering space cooling requirements, leading to a sustainable and impactful reform in energy usage. 

Cooling framework that builds in equity  

In September, iFOREST released India’s first city-level Integrated Heat and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP) tailored for Bhubaneswar to address rising heat stress and cooling demand in an integrated manner. 

Developed in collaboration with the Singapore-ETH Centre (SEC), the IHCAP provides a comprehensive roadmap to tackle the growing challenge of increasing temperatures and humidity, the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect, and rapidly rising demand for cooling.  

It offers five pillars that hold equity at the heart of it: 

  • Cool the City: Expand urban greening in all wards to meet WHO’s benchmark of 9 m² per person; implement citywide cool roof programmes; restore water bodies; promote green roads, pavements, and undertake traffic decongestion. 
  • Cool Buildings: Revise and implement Odisha Energy Conservation Building Codes for all commercial and institutional buildings over 500 m²; adopt Eco-Niwas Samhita 2024 for residential plots above 225 m². 
  • Sustainable Cooling for All: Roll out white roof programmes in slums; provide incentives for super-efficient fans and 5-star ACs; pilot district cooling systems in commercial and institutional zones. 
  • Enhance Heat Resilience: Strengthen electricity, water, and health infrastructure; establish cooling shelters and shaded, ventilated bus stops. 
  • Adapt to Heat: Revise heat thresholds to include humidity and night-time conditions; introduce spatial heat-risk mapping; pilot parametric insurance for vulnerable workers. 

 

Conclusion 

Recognising cooling as an essential service is urgent. In a warming world, thermal comfort is no longer optional. It intersects with health, education, and productivity. Children studying in overheated homes, patients recovering in stifling wards, and workers struggling through humid shifts are all casualties of heat that could have been mitigated by design, policy, and care. 

Imagine a future where every corner of our city, regardless of postal code, has homes that breathe, that reflect, that stay cool without guzzling energy. Thermal comfort must not be a reward of wealth but the foundation of our built environment. This isn’t idealism, it’s equity.

Technology does not trickle down by chance. It must trickle down by choice. And it must be the collective choice of policymakers, planners, markets, and citizens to decide whether access to cooling and thermal comfort is a marker of progress or a yardstick of privilege.

Shree Nidhi Gowthaman is a Senior Research Associate at iFOREST.

Electric trucks are coming, but are we ready for the shift? 

The trucking industry is the backbone of India’s economy, transporting over 70% of the country’s freight. But as India pushes toward cleaner mobility, the sector is at a turning point. While electric two-wheelers, three-wheelers, passenger cars, and light commercial vehicles are making inroads, electrifying medium and heavy-duty vehicles (MHDVs) presents a different challenge. These trucks cover long distances, carry heavy loads, and require a well-developed charging and servicing ecosystem—infrastructure that is still in its early stages.

Beyond infrastructure and technology, another critical question looms: How will the shift to electric freight vehicles (EFVs) impact the workforce? A transition of this scale doesn’t just affect vehicles; it affects people—drivers, mechanics, fleet operators, and thousands of workers in manufacturing and logistics.

To gain deeper insight into the workforce impact, iFOREST conducted research with over 400 stakeholders across India, including truck drivers, fleet operators, repair and maintenance workers, automotive component manufacturers (ACMs), and electric truck OEMs. Our work in the medium and heavy-duty freight segment extends our ongoing efforts toward a Just Transition in the automobile sector. Here, we highlight key challenges in ensuring that workers—especially those in informal roles—are not left behind in the shift to greener technology.

The freight industry in India remains highly informal across its entire value chain. Our analysis indicates that in the manufacturing sector, 30% of smaller and medium-sized ACMs, which constitute the majority of enterprises, will need to adapt to changing demand as engine assemblies, transmissions, exhaust systems, and radiator systems become less relevant. Additionally, the survey reveals that informal repair and maintenance technicians, who rely on generational knowledge, have a significant opportunity to transition into high-value EV servicing roles, provided they receive adequate skilling support. Similarly, in the end-of-life stage, battery recycling and sustainable disposal practices will open new avenues of employment for scrapping and recycling workers.

Ensuring a just and inclusive transition is essential to protect thousands of workers from getting impacted. A Just Transition is not just about moving to cleaner technology but about ensuring that workers dependent on traditional industries are not abandoned in the process.

The skilling gap: Who gets left behind?

This transition will erase some jobs (engine and transmission technicians), transform others through reskilling, and create entirely new roles (EV charging operators and high-voltage specialists). But with the sector’s deep informality, the question remains: Who will take responsibility for reskilling a workforce that doesn’t even exist on formal records? Without intervention, thousands risk losing their livelihoods simply due to a lack of relevant skills.

Our study shows that the traditional ICE medium and heavy-duty vehicle (MHDV) sector currently supports around 529 distinct job roles across manufacturing, service and repair, dealership, transport logistics and warehouse management, and end-of-life management. As diesel trucks are phased out, 64 roles will evolve or merge into new positions, and 93 will require structured reskilling. For instance, diesel mechanics can become EV powertrain specialists, and fuel station attendants can transition into charging station operators. The transition won’t just replace jobs; it will also create 71 entirely new roles, from battery recycling specialists to high-voltage system technicians—expanding the total job pool to 536. The biggest shake-up will hit manufacturing, where engine assembly jobs disappear in favor of EV powertrain and battery integration. Repair and logistics workers must adapt to software-driven diagnostics and digital fleet management, while end-of-life management will demand expertise in battery recycling and hazardous waste handling.

The problem isn’t just that old jobs are disappearing—it’s that new jobs require a higher skill level.

A closer examination of the National Skills Qualification Framework (NSQF) levels shows that emerging job roles require higher NSQF levels, whereas many obsolete jobs fall within lower NSQF levels. Workers who relied on hands-on experience now need formal education and certifications—resources they often lack.  Another major roadblock is that most skilling programs require basic education, excluding many informal workers despite their industry expertise. They cannot enroll in training courses that would help them move into new jobs. Without targeted interventions, these workers risk being left behind, widening inequalities in the evolving job market.

Leaving no one behind

During my research, a Noida-based truck driver working for IX Energy Pvt Ltd., a technology company building electric transport solutions, said, “I drove a diesel truck for 10 years, trained by my ustaad. When my boss bought an electric truck, I had no choice but to learn. After just a week of in-house training, I was driving comfortably. Since my job now requires advanced operations like digital literacy diagnosing issues is easier than before. My pay went up from ₹ 20,000 to ₹ 32,000 plus benefits”.

Skilling is not just about preserving jobs—it’s key to ensuring electrification meets its sustainability goals. Meenu Sarawgi, Executive Vice President & Chief at ASDC, pointed out, “Even for diesel trucks, skilling courses are almost non-existent—people assume learning on the job is enough. Poor training harms vehicle efficiency. As electrification brings new opportunities, we must do it right from the start. Training workers in EV technology is the only way to achieve the efficiency these vehicles promise.”

A Just Transition is not a choice; it is a necessity. If structured skilling programs are not implemented, the very people who have kept India’s freight sector running for decades risk being left behind. The responsibility lies with OEMs, policymakers, and industry leaders to ensure this transition prioritizes people, not just technology. If done right, electrification can open new doors while protecting livelihoods—but without action, it could deepen inequalities rather than bridge them.

The road ahead is electric, but it must also be just.

This study was undertaken in collaboration with C40 Cities and The Climate Pledge as part of the Laneshift programme.

 

Samreen Dhingra is a senior research associate at iFOREST

 

Heating and cooling: Two Challenges, One Plan

As climate change accelerates, cities across India are getting hotter and becoming more vulnerable to extreme heat waves. Staying cool isn’t just about comfort anymore — it’s becoming essential for our health, food systems, and economic activity. Right now, most of our cooling needs are met through active technologies like air conditioners. But this growing reliance comes at a cost. It’s fueling a vicious cycle: more cooling means more energy use and emissions, which drive climate change. And that, in turn, increases our need for cooling even more.

Data from International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) shows that heating and cooling account for nearly half of the global final energy consumption. It is the largest source of energy end use, ahead of electricity (20%) and transport (30%) and is responsible for more than 40% of global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions.

Our cities are heating up – not only due to climate change, but also because urban areas experience additional heat from the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect. As a result, cities become significantly warmer than the nearby rural areas, sometimes by as much as 5°C, especially in certain climate zones. Why? As cities grow and urbanise rapidly, green spaces shrink, concrete and asphalt dominate, and heat from cars, factories, and air conditioners builds up. High-density buildings, restricted wind circulation, changing land use, and urban sprawl, all add to the problem. Together, these factors trap heat, make cities hotter, more uncomfortable, and increasingly vulnerable during heat waves.

It is clear that heating and cooling are deeply interconnected and must be addressed collectively.

Gaps in current policies

At the national level, India has made significant strides in developing heating and cooling policy frameworks. The India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP), for example, outlines sector-specific strategies for space cooling, cold chains, refrigerants, air conditioning in transport, and more. Institutions such as Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) and the National Center for Cold-chain Development (NCCD) rate buildings and appliances for sustainability and  energy efficiency. There is also the national guideline for Heat Action Plans (HAP) by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that guides the state, district and city planning on heat adaptation efforts.

A Heat Action Plan (HAP) devises strategies to adapt to the adverse effects of extreme heat. It incorporates early warning systems, preparedness efforts, and responsive actions to reduce the incidence of heat-related illnesses and fatalities. However, HAPs focus solely on short-term adaptation measures, with minimal emphasis on mitigation. They do not consider cooling interventions.

While the Climate Change Action Plan and the Energy Efficiency Action Plan address cooling by reducing GHG emissions and energy intensity, at the state and city levels, there are actually very few policies that directly address the cooling needs.

An approach to addressing cooling at the state and city level is observed in the form of cool roof policies, where several states have established specific targets to improve thermal comfort. Telangana, for instance, has a target of covering 300 sq km of area with cool roofs by 2029.

The result is a fragmented policy landscape, leading to missed opportunities, overlapping mandates, and critical gaps in coverage. Without a unified approach, cities struggle to implement effective and scalable solutions to address heating and cooling challenges. Further, many of the existing action plans lack any specificity regarding execution and fixing responsibilities.

As a result, implementation remains a significant weakness — targets are set without a road map, responsible agencies, or resource planning. Moreover, there is no city-level framework that comprehensively links space cooling, building codes, urban planning, and citizen health & well-being.

Why Cities Must Lead

Although national and state governments establish the overarching vision and policy framework, it is at the municipal level where the implementation takes place. Urban areas not only bear the brunt of climate impacts, but also serve as the primary arenas for planning, infrastructure development, and decisions that determine daily energy use.

Urban local bodies can regulate building design, promote cool roofs, retrofit infrastructure, and implement early warning systems for heat waves. They are also best placed to coordinate across sectors such as urban planning, housing, public health, water, and energy, all of which intersect in the heating-cooling nexus.

Cities are uniquely positioned to design and implement context-specific solutions. And we have observed this with the implementation of the current HAPs, as various cities in India are adopting innovative solutions as a part of their HAPs to support vulnerable groups affected by extreme heat.

For instance, the Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service (AMTS), along with MHT, have launched India’s inaugural ‘Cool Bus Stop’, featuring a High-Pressure Mist System designed to alleviate rising temperatures and enhance commuter comfort. The Chennai Municipal Corporation is establishing air-conditioned rest areas for gig workers, one of the most vulnerable groups, who lack sufficient space for rest and safety amid the intensifying summer heat.

Despite concerns regarding the current framework of HAP, it is undeniable that the implementation of HAPs at the urban level has yielded positive results. However, without an integrated and actionable framework, cities lack the direction and resources to implement heating and cooling solutions effectively. The Integrated Heating and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP), can develop on the shortcomings of the HAPs and act as the missing link in India’s climate response at the city level.

An Integrated Approach to Heating and Cooling

An IHCAP brings together all aspects of thermal comfort into one unified plan tailored to local conditions. By aligning adaptation and mitigation goals, defining clear roles, and laying out implementable strategies, IHCAPs help cities move from intention to action.

The International Energy Agency (IEA)’s 2018 report ‘The Future of Cooling’ shows that cooling appliances account for about a fifth of the total electricity in buildings around the world, or 10% of all global electricity consumption. In a nutshell, cooling is the strongest driver of growth in electricity demand from buildings. Just three countries – India, China, Indonesia – contribute to half of it.

By integrating cooling and heating initiatives, cities can lower emissions from the cooling sector. Increasing blue-green infrastructure and prioritising energy-efficient and sustainable buildings will help lessen the demand for active cooling. Additionally, adopting innovative and efficient cooling systems such as district cooling, water-based chillers, not-in-kind technology, and high-star-rated ACS will further reduce energy demand intensity.

For instance, implementing a district cooling system offers numerous benefits. By integrating the cooling needs of multiple buildings, it lowers the capacity required for the cooling plant, enhances plant efficiency, and utilises natural refrigerants. This approach typically leads to a 25% reduction in annual energy demand, 40-80% decrease in peak power demand, and a 30-35% cut in greenhouse gas emissions.

With cities on the front lines of climate change, empowering them with a robust, integrated framework isn’t just smart policy — it’s a necessity for sustainable urban futures.

Rohit Bagai is a Senior Research Associate and Nidhi Bali is Director – Urban Transition at iFOREST

 

Why India needs balanced renewable energy growth

India is beefing up 500GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030. But lopsided regional development of the clean energy sector could lead to grid congestion and opportunities going in the hands of too few.

In 2022, at the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), India set a target for 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030[1]. As of December 2024, we’re nearly halfway there, with 209 GW of capacity installed[2]. In addition, according to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA)’s quarterly report on ongoing renewable energy (RE) projects, another 79 GW is under construction and 95 GW is in other (upstream) stages of development[3]. In other words, India is well on its way to reaching the envisioned 2030 target.

However, the gross capacity addition figures hide a rising regional disparity in capacity additions of RE. As of December 2024, seven states in south and west India make up over 80 per cent of India’s RE-installed capacity[1]. In descending order, they are Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. Further, just two of these states — Gujarat and Rajasthan — make up 37 per cent of the total.

Continuing the uneven regional development of energy resources would raise three main issues — technical, financial, and economic.

Transmission investments and costs

A key concern with putting all your eggs in one basket in the context of electricity generation is grid congestion. As more and more capacity is built in the same region, grid congestion becomes more likely. If left unchecked, this can lead to the curtailment of power from otherwise perfectly operational plants.

To prevent this from happening, additional investment in transmission infrastructure is required. In December 2022, the CEA published a report on the transmission system requirement to integrate 500 GW of RE by 2030. According to it, the tentative cost of building this transmission system is Rs 2.4 trillion (Rs 244,200 Cr)[5]. These investments will follow the geographic trend in capacity addition — accruing largely to Gujarat, Rajasthan and a few Southern states.

Further, transmission investments in these areas are already creating pressure on land sources, such as agricultural land and areas populated by the Great Indian Bustard (GIB). Regarding the latter, a 2023 factual report by the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change stated that collisions with power lines are a key factor for adult mortality in the species[6]. The report goes on to state that there is a “high density of transmission lines because of the impetus on renewable energy production in GIB habitats in Rajasthan and Gujarat”.

Transmission losses also make the endeavour inefficient. Transmission losses and associated costs rise linearly as we increase the distance between the point of generation and the point of consumption. In a nation as vast as India, the losses associated with transmitting energy (say from the West to the East) can be substantial. Even with immense transmission investments, a degree of inefficiency would still be present in the system.

Financial concerns

The cost of acquiring electricity from generators is passed on from transmission companies (transcos) to distribution companies (discoms). In many states, discoms continue to be owned and operated by subnational governments. If a state’s exchequer is financially stressed, energy security can come under duress.

This is precisely the case in eastern India. Thus far, the eastern region states have drawn royalties from coal production. As we move away from thermal energy to renewable alternatives, these royalties will decrease, while purchases from RE centres in other states rise. Mitra and Chandra (2023) illustrate the expected result of these two forces. According to their research, a state such as Chhattisgarh may see its budget deficit rise to as much as 17.1 per cent by 2030 — substantially higher than the limit posed by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003)[7]. Needless to say, these dual pressures can significantly hamper the fiscal capabilities of a state.

Green growth and state economies

The final set of concerns has to do with the local economic effects of lopsided RE growth. In the last decade of RE growth, nearly 80,000 jobs were created in the RE sector (utility-solar, wind and rooftop solar)[8]. However, given roughly 70 per cent of the capacity addition was carried out in just the aforementioned states[9], it stands to reason that these jobs also largely accrued to the same states.

In addition, these states are also emerging as centres of industries that are downstream of RE. Green hydrogen hubs are already being established in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu[10] [11]. In the latter case, the project (an investment of Rs 36 billion) is set to create 1,000 jobs in the Thuthukudi area.

The implication is that the growing disparity of RE capacity can translate into lopsided development across regions. In such a scenario, the benefits of green growth would be localised to just a few states, undermining the ‘just-ness’ of India’s energy transition.

As we rally for an energy transition ahead of The International Day of Clean Energy, celebrated this week, it is worth underlining that India must move away from coal-fed power plants in eastern India to meet its decarbonisation goals. But as Mitra and Chandra (2023) point out, climate change mitigation has become a national level issue with states being kept out of the decision-making process[12]. The outcome is a mad rush by policymakers to court developers and attract RE (and downstream industry) to their states. Instead, these

threats suggest the need for a more co-operative federalist approach to tackle climate change while keeping technical, financial and economic outcomes in mind.

[1] Press Information Bureau, Government of India. 2022. “India’s stand at COP-26”. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1795071

[2] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India. 2024. “State-wise RE installed capacity”. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3716e1b8c6cd17b771da77391355749f3/uploads/2025/01/202501081447570936.pdf

[3] Central Electricity Authority, Government of India. 2024. “Quarterly Report on Under-construction Renewable Energy Projects”. https://cea.nic.in/quarterly-report/?lang=en [4] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India. 2024. “State-wise RE installed capacity”. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3716e1b8c6cd17b771da77391355749f3/uploads/2025/01/202501081447570936.pdf

[5] Central Electricity Authority, Government of India. 2022. “Transmission system for integration over 500 GW RE capacity by 2030”. https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/notification/2022/12/CEA_Tx_Plan_for_500GW_Non_fossil_capacity_by_2030.pdf

[6] Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change, Government of India. 2023. “Factual report on the Great Indian Bustard recovery programme”. https://greentribunal.gov.in/sites/default/files/all_documents/Report%20byNo.385-2019..pdf

[7] Sanjay Mitra and Rohit Chandra. 2023. “Deep decarbonization and regional equity”. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2023/10/WP_402_2023.pdf

[8]Kuldeep, Neeraj, Joshi, Madhura et al. 2019. “Powering Jobs Growth with Green Energy”. Council on Energy, Environment and Water, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Skill Council for Green Jobs. https://www.ceew.in/sites/default/files/CEEW-Jobs-Issue-Brief-2019-2-web-24Jul19.pdf

[9] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India. “State-wise cumulative installed capacity”. https://mnre.gov.in/year-wise-achievement/

[10] Chauhan, Bala. 2022. “Karnataka plans India’s first green hydrogen cluster in Mangaluru”. The New Indian Express. https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/karnataka/2022/Oct/31/karnataka-plans-indias-first-green-hydrogen-cluster-in-mangaluru-2513358.html

[11] Yadav, Subhash. 2024. “Sembcorp industries developing Rs 36,000 crore green hydrogen project in TN”. Iamrenew. https://www.iamrenew.com/green-energy/sembcorp-industriesdeveloping-rs-36000-crore-green-hydrogen-project-in-tn/

[12] Sanjay Mitra and Rohit Chandra. 2023. “Deep decarbonization and regional equity”. National Institute of Public Finance and Policy. https://nipfp.org.in/media/medialibrary/2023/10/WP_402_2023.pdf

 

Just Transition a cross-cutting agenda at COP29, but finance and inclusion remain loose ends

As countries prepare to update their climate pledges under the upcoming Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) 3.0 cycle, Just Transition is emerging as an essential cross-cutting agenda to strengthen the action of mitigation, adaption, and resilience measures by various countries.

The draft negotiation text of the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (UAE-JTWP) has underscored the “multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional nature of just transition” that cuts across all the pillars of climate action. This comprehensive approach envisions addressing not only the carbon transition but also the socio-economic transformations it entails. Therefore, to ensure a Just Transition, or move away from fossil fuels, requires a ‘whole-of-economy’ approach.

Where are we on actionable steps?

An important agenda for COP29 this week will be to frame actionable steps under the JTWP to enable countries to design and implement Just Transition measures, aligning with climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. While each country’s journey to a Just Transition will be based on unique national circumstances, including socio-economic conditions, resources, and priorities, some clear actionable steps can ensure collective and timebound action.

The second annual inter-ministerial roundtable held in Baku on November 18th brought to light some steps that must be enforced through the work programme.

A key one in this regard is the need for strong financial commitments to support Just Transition measures in developing countries. There is a strong sentiment from the negotiators that this requires significant public investment to ensure a fair and inclusive transition. The emphasis should be on prioritizing public finance as the primary driver, rather than high reliance on market mechanisms or investments driven by profit. By placing public finance at the forefront, international institutions can address the social and economic challenges of transition, ensuring that the process is equitable and aligned with long-term development goals.

The other aspect is to guide Parties and build their capacity to develop comprehensive Just Transition policies and plans that can be suitably integrated into the updated NDs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and also development plans.

Finally, there is a need to specify measurable targets, especially short and medium-term targets, to achieve long-term outcomes.

With such measures put in place through the JTWP, Just Transition can be a huge opportunity to support inclusive and green economic growth in developing countries, and not undermine their developmental ambitions.

 

Listening to voices beyond decision-makers

Besides these, an important issue for Just Transition will be to create appropriate platforms, to ensure representation and participation of various stakeholders.  Mr. Nabeel Munir, the Chairperson of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to the UNFCCC, in his opening remarks at the inter-ministerial roundtable emphasized that a transition “will never be just if the floor is only given to the decision-makers.”

The JTWP should therefore design spaces where diverse voices can actively contribute to decision-making. This inclusivity will help to bring to the floor the unique challenges and needs of those most affected by the transition, making policies more responsive and grounded in local realities. Such an approach will also build trust, legitimacy, and broader support for Just Transition action and make it truly a people’s agenda.

 

FAQs – Data and Science of Air Pollution

Air pollution is plaguing the capital and smaller cities across India. But who contributes the most—vehicles, industries, wood-fired cookstoves, or stubble burning? These FAQs address common questions, using latest data.

1. What is the true scale of our pollution crisis?

We are facing a subcontinental-scale problem. The thick haze in Delhi extends across the Indo-Gangetic Plains (IGP). Smaller cities like Bhiwadi, Darbhanga, and Moradabad often report higher pollution levels than Delhi, and rural areas are equally affected.

Pollution levels are 5–10 times higher than national standards and 20–40 times higher than WHO health-based guidelines. Solving this problem requires collective action from every city, state, and sector of the economy to significantly reduce emissions.

2. What are the main sources of pollution in India and Delhi-NCR?

Our research shows that India emits approximately 5.2 million tonnes (MT) of direct PM2.5 annually (excluding natural and manmade dust). Of this:

  • 48% comes from biomass (e.g., fuelwood and dung cakes) used for cooking and heating.
  • 6.5% comes from open burning of crop residues. Together, biomass burning accounts for 55% of total PM2.5 emissions.
  • 37% comes from industry and power plants.
  • 7% comes from the transport sector.

Figure 1: PM2.5 inventory of India

Source: iFOREST

In Delhi-NCR, biomass burning contributes more than 60% of PM2.5, industry accounts for 25%, and transport contributes around 6%.

Figure 2: PM2.5 inventory of Delhi-NCR

Source: iFOREST

3. Are there other studies that support the claim that biomass is a major source of pollution in Delhi-NCR?

Several studies confirm the significant role of biomass burning in Delhi-NCR’s air pollution, including one from the Central Pollution Control Board.

1. Awasthi, A. et al.: Biomass-burning sources control ambient particulate matter, but traffic and industrial sources control volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions and secondary-pollutant formation during extreme pollution events in Delhi, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 24, 10279–10304, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-24-10279-2024, 2024.

This paper shows that during the smog season, direct PM10 (52 ± 8 %) and PM2.5 (48 ± 12 %) emissions were dominated by different biomass-burning sources.

2. Mishra, S. et al.: Rapid night-time nanoparticle growth in Delhi driven by biomass-burning emissions, Nat. Geosci., 16, 224–230, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-023-01138-x, 2023.

This paper found that biomass burning is the primary cause of intense and frequent night time particle growth during haze development in Delhi.

3.  Lalchandani, V. et al.: Effect of Biomass Burning on PM2.5 Composition and Secondary Aerosol Formation During Post-Monsoon and Winter Haze Episodes in Delhi, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., 126, e2021JD035232, https://doi.org/10.1029/2021JD035232, 2021.

This paper too finds that the burning of biomass material is the largest contributor to haze events during post-monsoon and winter haze events.

4. Central Pollution Control Board: Report of the Committee in O.A. No. 19/2021 in the matter of Sanjay Kumar versus State of UP & Ors, in compliance with the order dated 09.09.2021 of the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal, December 2022.

This report of the Central Pollution Control Board, on the direction of the NGT, published the emissions inventory of the entire Indo-Gangetic Plans, found the following:

The total PM2.5 emissions was 2.3 million tonnes. Biomass burning contributed about 35% of the total PM2.5, industries contributed 48.5% and transport sector’s contribution was 5%.

As you can see from the above reports, while numbers can vary dependent on the methodology and scope of the study, there is no doubt that biomass is a major contributor of air pollution in Delhi and in the entire country.

4. Why does biomass burning in homes and fields contribute so much to PM2.5?

The reason is simple: unlike automobiles and industries where some pollution control devices are used, biomass cookstoves and open burning in fields emit all of their pollutants unconstrained into the air. Thus, PM2.5 emission per kilogram of biomass in cookstoves is tens to hundreds of times more than those from per kg of coal in power plants or diesel in automobiles.

An estimate by renowned scientists Kirk R. Smith and Ajay Pillarisetti show that one year of cooking on a traditional chulha emits particles equivalent to the emissions of 20 diesel trucks driving 50,000 km a year and meeting Euro 6 standards. This is precisely why rural areas suffer equally from air pollution. There is ample research evidence to show that outdoor air pollution in India is not just an urban India problem.

5. Are we not blaming and victimising the poor by focussing on biomass?

Absolutely not. The poor, especially poor women and children, are the worst sufferers of air pollution. They are hit twice over. They are affected by indoor air pollution, because of firewood and cow dung cakes burning in their chulhas and they are affected by outdoor air pollution.

We advocate for transitioning the poor to cleaner cooking fuels, reducing their exposure to harmful pollutants. This makes air pollution mitigation a pro-poor and pro-women agenda, as it prioritises vulnerable populations while also addressing the main sources of pollution.

Central Government schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which enable the poor with cleaner cooking fuels, have been far more transformative in combating air pollution than implementing GRAP, odd even, or other quick fix measures that are implemented each year. We are recommending a new version of PMUY to support the poor households in shifting to cleaner cooking fuel like LPG, biogas or electricity.

6. Are you not equating the luxury emissions of rich to the survival emissions of poor?

When we use the framework of ‘luxury vs. survival’ emissions, which is a construct of the climate change politics between developed and developing countries, we are basically advocating to keep the poor exposed to the worst air pollution. This ‘luxury vs. survival’ emissions politics basically says that let the poor burn biomass and suffer, till the time we can show that we are acting on the rich by focussing on SUVs and large industries. This is what we have done in the last 25 years. Our singular focus has been on automobiles and large industries but it has not made any significant impact on the air quality. ‘Luxury vs. survival’ emissions is one of the most unethical framing of the air pollution issue.

The fact is that the politics over rich vs. poor, farmers vs. city-dwellers, SUVs vs. cook stoves, and Diwali vs. stubble burning have stalled real work on air pollution. We must work on an agenda which helps the poor and small industries to transition to cleaner fuels.

7. What are iFOREST’s key policy recommendations for Delhi-NCR?

  • PM Ujjwala 3.0: Our study shows that the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana has been the most impactful air pollution intervention in the last decade. Expanding access to clean cooking fuel across Delhi-NCR could reduce PM2.5 generation by 25%. Achieving this will require a new PM Ujjwala Yojana to transition households to LPG or electricity for cooking. Research indicates a 75% subsidy is necessary to enable exclusive LPG use in low-income households, requiring around Rs. 5,000–6,000 per household annually, similar to the PM Kisan Samman Nidhi. In Delhi-NCR, this initiative would cost around Rs. 6,000–7,000 crore per year, a fraction of the annual healthcare costs associated with air pollution-related diseases. This will be a profoundly pro-poor and pro-women initiative, especially considering that nearly 600,000 Indians, primarily women, die prematurely from indoor air pollution each year.
  • Clean Heating Fuel: Across India, over 90% of households rely on biomass and solid fuels to heat their homes during winter, contributing to pollution spikes in December and January. One of China’s pivotal air quality initiatives was a national clean heating fuel policy. While developing a similar long-term plan is essential, in the short term, the Delhi government could ensure that only electricity is used for winter heating and enforce a strict ban on open burning. This approach will yield swift improvements in Delhi’s air quality.
  • Package to End Stubble Burning: Stubble burning is a primary contributor to the sharp rise in pollution levels each October and November. Curbing this practice would reduce the occurrence of severe and hazardous air pollution days. Both short- and long-term strategies are needed. In the long term, agriculture in Punjab, Haryana, and parts of UP must transition from intensive rice-wheat farming to a diversified crop system. In the short term, technology and incentives can play a key role. The simplest technological solution is to modify or mandate combine harvesters that cut closer to the ground like manual harvesting, leaving minimal stubble on the ground. Additionally, an incentive of Rs. 1,000 per acre—similar to what the Haryana Government provides—could encourage farmers to manage stubble sustainably, coupled with penalties, such as fine and exclusion from government schemes for those who continue to burn it. This scheme would cost approximately Rs. 2,500 crores annually.
  • Energy Transition in Industry: Industry and power plants account for roughly one-third of annual PM2.5 emissions in Delhi-NCR. Reducing these emissions will require both technological upgrades and stricter enforcement. A scheme encouraging MSMEs to adopt cleaner fuel sources, especially electric boilers and furnaces, could significantly curb emissions. For larger industries, stringent pollution norms and enforcement are essential. Shutting down older thermal power plants and enforcing the 2015 standards, which have yet to be fully implemented, will also be critical.
  • EVs and Public Transport: Scaling up electric vehicles is crucial for reducing city’s air pollution. Initially, the focus should be on transitioning two- and three-wheelers, as well as buses, since they are already economically viable. Aiming for 100% electrification of new two- and three-wheeler sales by 2030, and converting all new buses to electric by 2025 in Delhi-NCR, would significantly lower vehicle emissions. Additionally, setting a 30–50% electrification target for cars and other vehicles will help accelerate the transition to cleaner urban transport. Apart from EVs, scaling up public transport and NMTs is crucial. This will also need clear city-wide targets and promotion as a lifestyle choice.
  • Green Belt Development: Dust pollution from within Delhi and neighboring areas, coupled with seasonal dust from the Thar Desert, has a substantial impact on air quality. Creating a green belt around Delhi would serve as a natural barrier against incoming dust. Additionally, increasing green cover within the city, including roadside and open space greening, is essential to control local dust pollution.
  • Strengthen Municipalities: Local sources of pollution—such as dust from roads and construction, open burning, traffic congestion, and inadequate waste management—are best controlled by municipalities. Municipalities must be held accountable for addressing these issues year-round, rather than only during peak pollution seasons. Strengthening the National Clean Air Program to support municipal efforts will be key to achieving sustainable air quality improvements.

How are Indian households cooling themselves?

The answer is not air conditioners

The recent USD 1 trillion Infrastructure Bill in the United States’ agenda to Build Back Better has allotted about USD 5 billion to a variety of measures that will reduce building electricity use, improve building materials, and create a skilled workforce to design, build and maintain energy efficient buildings. A large fraction of this funding, about USD 3.5 billion, will focus on improving access to thermal comfort for low income households – better insulation, windows, roofing, heating and cooling devices. The bill also directs USD 500 million to public schools for replacement of old inefficient HVAC systems, among other measures. Given that about buildings account for about 75 percent of the country’s electricity demand, this bill is a significant step in the right direction. Such an overhaul is much needed for country where 90 percent of the households in the United States have HVAC systems for their cooling, ventilation and heating needs.

In contrast, the India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP) in 2019 reported that about 10 percent of India’s 272 million households own air conditioners with an expected increase of cooling demand by eleven times in residential sector over the next two decades. The corollary to rapid increase in cooling demand, in the absence of suitable interventions is, uptake of least efficient air conditioners. While India’s per capita buildings energy use is among the lowest in the world today, it is set to grow faster than any region in the coming decades. In order to be able to envision a sustainable future for residential cooling, perhaps even massive financial investment on infrastructure, we must first come to terms with how India currently accesses thermal comfort.

Accessing thermal comfort through stacking strategies 

As a tropical country with over five different climate zones experiencing air conditioner proliferation in the recent decade, much of India’s population comfort range in temperature is dictated by the outside climate. An investigation in a government school located in the city of Ambala 1 found that a temperature range of 15.3-33.7°C fell under occupant comfort; a range that is higher than those prescribed by both Indian and International Standards for adult population. Another study in affordable housing in Mumbai 2 revealed occupant comfort in the temperature range of 19.8-34.8°C, wherein both the minimum and maximum were about 6°C higher than prescribed standards., 3,4

This tolerance to higher temperatures has been attributed to urban residents’ commonly used adaptive actions such as the use of a ceiling fans, opening of windows, and use of curtains. Less commonly used adaptive actions were roof or floor wetting and use of air-conditioners or air-coolers. These are actions that we have witnessed or performed in our own households as means to achieve thermal comfort during sweltering summers. These can also be dubbed as energy conservation behaviours that help achieve optimal thermal comfort.

Stacking of strategies that reduce dependence on air conditioners in Indian households are common and often include the use of fans in tandem or as a substitute. A study in Pondicherry’s Auroville further substantiated this finding in addition to the observation that households did not use air conditioners continuously for attaining thermal comfort. Households across India are also known to avoid starting air-conditioner usage until outside temperatures exceeded 32°C 5 and peak use of air conditioners are during the hours when all residents of the house are presumably at home, that is between 10pm and 1am. 6

Additional energy conservation behaviours among the small fraction of air conditioner owning households have also been well noted. A 2020 study in Delhi reported three-fourth of the surveyed households used their air-conditioners for 6 hours or lower. The study further stated that even in the wealthiest neighbourhoods, during the hottest months of the year, about 15 percent of the households used air-conditioners for more than 8 hours per day. Another study in 2019 across four cities – Dhanbad, Meerut, Madurai and Vadodara – revealed that households used their air conditioners for less than six months in a year, with a majority stating four months. 7

Achievability of thermal comfort in public spaces

Today the majority of Indian households are either adapting to outside temperatures or adopting some energy conservation behaviours in relation to affording thermal comfort. Beyond homes, public spaces such as offices, shops, schools, hospitals, courtrooms etc, access to thermal comfort may not be as straight forward. A 2019 report by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy stated that in survey across 6650 users of District Courts, about 37% stated the need for better ventilation in waiting areas. 8 These respondents stated that there was a need to add fans or air conditioners to these spaces to improve the user experience. A report by the sub-committee of the National Court Management Systems Committee recommended proper ventilation and temperature control either by air conditioners or coolers as imperative infrastructure provision for courts.

In addition to these waiting areas court complexes like many other publicly accessed buildings have a host of other amenities – ATMs, a bank branch, a canteen, first-aid care services, oath commissioners, photocopy facility, a police booth, a post office, public notaries, stamp vendors, and typists. Anecdotally we observe that ATM booths used for an average of less than fifteen minutes by people are stocked with a full-powered air conditioning, while offices of photocopiers, public notaries spaces inhabited for at least nine hours a day are likely to be inadequately ventilated and are more likely rely entirely on fans for thermal comfort.

Thermal comfort is a niche subject that remains with architects, builders and energy consultants. While temperatures are rapidly soaring as a result of climate change, thermal comfort is not yet a human rights issue nor is it a developmental concern (given the plethora of other real human rights violations this neglect is understandable). However, when regulations are not able to consider all a respects of how thermal comfort pervades our day-to-day it is likely to serve the needs of very few. This is already being observed in how cooling is often confounded with air conditioning, both by policy and people. Existing programmes focusing on cooling energy efficiency (for e.g. BEE’s star rating programme and EESL’s super-efficient air conditioner programme) while successful, have not reached the halls of courtrooms and many such publicly accessed spaces.

To afford a future where thermal comfort for all is a reality, we need to first study how we access it today. We need to understand who is accessing thermal comfort and how. There needs to be more conversations between those that design buildings and those that design policies.

This is the second of a series of five essays aiming to examine the essential elements of access to thermal comfort or cooling in India. 

1.  Composite climate zone
2.  Warm and humid climate zone
3.  Standards compared by the study were IMAC (NBC 2016) and Adaptive model (ASHRAE 55-2010). 
4. Malik, J and Bardhan R. (2020). Thermal comfort in affordable housing of Mumbai, India. Energise 2020 Paper Proceedings. https://www.energiseindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Energise-2020-paper-proceedings.pdf
5.  Somvanshi, A. (2019) A midsummer nightmare. Centre for Science and Environment
6. Khosla, R., Agarwal, A., Sircar, N., and Chaterjee, D. (2021). The what, why, and how of changing cooling energy consumption in India’s urban household. Environmental Research Letters. 16 044035 https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/abecbc
7. Gorthi, A., Bhasin, S., and Chaturvedi, V. (2020). Assessing Consumers’ behaviours, perceptions, and challenges to enhance air conditioner energy efficiency. Energise 2020 Paper Proceedings. https://www.energiseindia.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Energise-2020-paper-proceedings.pdf
8. https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/National-report_single_Aug-1.pdf

Defining the future of cooling

Green, clean and lean air-conditioners, but with no access it is just mean!

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) sixth assessment report (2021) in clear terms attributed climate change to human activities and stated that many parts of the world are already experiencing its ill-effects. Lancet’s Countdown on Health Climate Change (2021), further substantiated the impact of extreme climate events by reporting that between 2018 and 2019 India had the biggest absolute increase in heat related mortality in the world. Empirical evidence from Kolkata shows that the city has warmed by 2.6°C relative to 1950, the highest among the cities sampled by the IPCC. The next in-line in terms of rapidly warming cities, stated another analysis, were Bengaluru and Delhi with a predicted +1°C rise in temperatures.

For climate scientists, policymakers, and activists this signals urgent action – net-zero goals and targeted climate finance, among other such solutions. For an average citizen, this signals the need to purchase an air conditioner. Controlled, optimal indoor temperatures are an undeniable adaptation strategy, linked closely to health, productivity and ultimately economic development.

However, here lies the challenge. With less than 10 percent of the households owning air conditioners today, India has been postulated to be a tremendous market for cooling appliances. However, India is already among the top 10 countries with the largest urban populations at risk from the lack of cooling; with more than 110 million people at risk. There is a heat inequity at play here – only some of us are likely to successfully adapt to the impacts of extreme heat.

Simultaneously, there is the much talked about dichotomy of cooling – the more we cool our residences and offices, the more the planet heats up. When thermal comfort or more generally cooling is already an adaptation need, how can cities also make it a key sector for climate change mitigation?

Defining our cooling goals 

Global discourse around environmentally-responsible cooling had its inception at the Montreal Protocol, as a result of which ozone depleting refrigerants have been phased out by 197 countries. More recently, the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol has countries phasing down potent greenhouse gases (GHG) used as refrigerants while simultaneous pushing for improvements in energy efficiency in cooling appliances. The Kigali Amendment has thus centred cooling as a key sector for climate mitigation and this in turn has given rise to variety of strategies.

Today, there is acknowledgement among governments on the importance and need for cooling, especially under the popular rhetoric of ‘cooling for all’. Strategies such as green cooling, climate-friendly cooling, and sustainable cooling, to name a few, are being explored as potential ways to mitigate effects of cooling. However, a critical question to ask at this time is what these mean and whom they benefit.

The first among these is Green Cooling which “requires the use of natural refrigerant and energy efficient appliances and buildings.” This strategy aims to reduce demand for cooling, and minimise the GHG emissions during the operational lifetime of the cooling equipment. A key feature of green cooling is that the demand for cooling is reduced through better building design and material use, thereby limiting the need for energy guzzling air conditioners for cooling.

A slightly more reformed version of Green Cooling is Net-Zero Cooling, which looks to eliminate any carbon emissions from cooling. Net-zero cooling is defined in the Climate Action Pathway as “reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from cooling during operational life of products (excluding resource extraction and manufacturing) to as close to zero as possible and any remaining GHG emissions would be balanced with an equivalent amount of carbon removal – for example, by restoring forests and through direct air capture and storage technology.” Net-zero cooling, like green cooling, as per the EIA’s recent analysis, focuses on natural refrigerants with minimal global warming potential. 
Both green and net-zero cooling place technology at the centre and aim to minimise GHG emissions from cooling during the lifetime of the appliance. They have been instrumental in promoting alternative, climate-friendly approaches like natural refrigerants, not-in-kind technologies, cooling as a service, district cooling, cool roofs, to name a few. At the moment however, mainstreaming these technologies and making them affordable comes with a slew of challenges, noted in our latest series of Policy Briefs on Green Cooling in India. Further, a recent analysis found that even with the most accelerated technology progress projection of efficient cooling appliances, in a ‘cooling for all’ scenario the energy demand for cooling is ~2.5 times the maximum energy we can afford to allot to this sector to keep temperature rise under 2°C.

How to avoid cooling for some and heating for others

A recent report by the Centre for Sustainable Cooling stated – “We urgently need access to clean cooling for all. In order to achieve this, we need to stop asking ourselves ‘how much electricity do we need to generate?’ and start asking ‘what is the service we require, and how can we provide it in the least damaging way?’” They further define ‘Clean Cooling’ as a means to “meet cooling needs efficiently and sustainably within the constraints from climate change, natural resource and clean air targets. Clean cooling necessarily must be affordable and accessible to all to deliver the societal, economic and health goals. It likely starts with mitigating demand.”

The global discourse on cooling for thermal comfort has moved from being solely technology focused to acknowledging the humans who are likely to need access to it. The fact that the discourse on cooling largely has its roots in Montreal Protocol has often led to cooling being confounded with air conditioning. Whereas the fact remains that a majority of urban households in India rely on electric fans (>90% as per Census 2011-12). Given the aspirational aspect of owning air conditioners in addition to rapidly heating urban centres, the growing middle class is predicted to buy the least expensive and thus least efficient air conditioners in the coming decade.

To avoid such a future, our developmental and climate policies, roadmaps, and programmes must not only address cooling as an important resource but also place the end-users as the focus of cooling strategies. Critical questions that such policies must address are: who will need to be prioritised and how do we prioritise them? how do we move away from cooling only affluent spaces? how do we finance such an endeavour? Discourse of this nature is vital to reinventing strategies, redefining goals and refining approaches.

This is the first of a series of five essays aiming to examine the essential elements of access to thermal comfort or cooling in India.


1. According to a report by the Centre for Sustainable Cooling – “Cooling for All, a hypothetical scenario is developed whereby refrigeration equipment penetrations globally converge by 2050 with those experienced in the developed world today (USA as the proxy), and air conditioning is made available to all populations experiencing more than 2000 Cooling Degree Days per year.” They further define cooling degree day (CDD) as “the demand for cooling a building. It is the number of degrees that a day’s average temperature is above 21° C in this instance multiplied by the number of days per year. China experiences 2,030 cooling-degree days per year, whereas the United Kingdom experiences 135. The UAE experiences over 10,000 cooling degree-days per year.”

Who’s afraid of net zero target?

A storm is brewing on the climate diplomacy front that India needs to navigate carefully to avoid becoming a fall guy. The issue at hand is the pledge by countries to achieve “net zero” emission by the mid-century. Over 120 countries have already announced their intention to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. China intends carbon neutrality before 2060, and the US is considering a 2050 pledge. Being the third-largest emitter, there is pressure on India to announce its commitment as well.

Net zero or carbon neutrality means that the amount of CO2 produced by a country is balanced by the amount removed from the atmosphere. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, global net CO2 emissions should decline by about 45% by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050.

There is considerable scepticism around net zero in India. Many argue that net zero is not equitable and fair as it does not differentiate between developing and developed countries in sharing the burden of mitigation. Another argument is that it will limit India’s development potential. Some also criticise mid-century net zero as allowing uncontrolled emissions today while relying on uncertain technologies to offset emissions in the future. Finally, many net zero pledges are premised upon trading and offsetting emissions, allowing the rich to continue emitting and buying their way out.

There is some merit to the above scepticism. Historically, developed countries have shifted the goalposts on climate action and reneged on financial and technological promises to developing countries. However, we cannot shy away from net zero, as declaring a carbon neutrality target is inevitable for every country to meet the 1.5°C goals; the only question is when and how.

The first step for India to decide the contours of net zero is to stop reacting to terms set by developed countries. In three decades of climate negotiations, we have primarily been a reactive party, not a proactive one shaping the discussion. With net zero as well, we face a choice – either reject the idea citing equity and fairness or embrace and remould it to achieve climate goals and secure our developmental space. I strongly believe we have an opportunity to develop a fair, ambitious and effective consensus on net zero. Let me propose a five-point agenda that India can consider to set the terms for future global action.

First, net zero should be built on self-differentiation, a cornerstone of the Paris Agreement. It is a no-brainer that if the global net zero deadline is mid-century, then the developed countries’ deadline will be 2040. High-emitting emerging economies like China will have to follow soon and reach net zero before 2050. Countries like India with per capita emissions below the global average will get a little more time – until 2060.

Second, the net zero target has to be flexible. Newer disruptive technologies would allow us to decarbonise faster at a much lower cost than what can be envisioned today. Take, for example, India’s solar energy target. From a modest 20GW in 2010 (enhanced to 100GW in 2015), we are now targeting 450GW of renewables by 2030, largely from solar. That is a 15-fold ambition enhancement within a decade. Countries should therefore revisit their net zero targets every ten years to firm up their commitments.

Third, while net zero is the ultimate goal, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), due every five years, are the means to achieve the goal. IPCC is very clear; an ambitious 2030 target must accompany net zero. So, countries pledging net zero must also announce enhanced NDCs for 2030.

Fourth, net zero has to be legally binding. Less than ten countries have enacted domestic law on net zero; the rest have made pledges or policy statements. While policy pronouncement is important, compliance can only be assured through a law. This is especially necessary for the US, where climate ambition shifts quickly with change in the political landscape. If the Biden administration is serious about net zero, it should get a law through the US Congress.

Finally, and most importantly, setting a net zero target will not by itself guarantee positive and equitable social and economic outcomes. The rapid transition required in the next 2-3 decades will disrupt the economic and social fabric of fossil-fuel dependent regions. Hence, the net zero targets must be paralleled by an international framework on Just Transition.

Achieving net zero over the next 3-4 decades is very much possible for India. We are developing at a time in history when low/ no-carbon technologies will grow exponentially. A well-designed net zero plan will be an opportunity for us to pole vault to a green future. While there will be an extra cost, studies indicate that these will be modest and compensated by lower adaptation costs and reduced loss from extreme weather events. Besides, it will have enormous co-benefits in reducing air and water pollution and improving forest and soil quality, contributing to overall environmental improvement and human well-being. By announcing our net zero commitment, we will also send a clear signal that we are open to global finance and technology support for a green and just transition.

The bottom line is we are one of the most vulnerable countries to climatic disruptions. It is, therefore, in our interest that a serious effort is made globally to meet the 1.5°C goals. In this endeavour, we can either be a bystander or a leader.

The Glasgow Ambition Cycle — Domestic Considerations

Political Summary

Two 5-year cycles currently drive the implementation of the Paris Agreement (PA): one of communicating national targets (“Nationally Determined Contributions” NDCs) and one of taking stock of global efforts. In order to complete the ambition mechanism of the PA, which is critical for its full operationalisation and the achievement of its objectives, another 5-year cycle, the “Glasgow Ambition Cycle” (GAC), aimed at ratcheting up the collective ambition of NDCs, has been proposed. It is gaining significant traction and appeal for adoption at COP 26 in Glasgow under negotiations on Common Time Frames (CTF, see Ambition Cycle on course to land in Glasgow).  The GAC provides an elegant and non-controversial solution to the sticking options currently being negotiated, and is meant to start in 2025 when countries would be requested to:

  • communicate (at least) a 2035 NDC (‘with a time frame up to 2035’);
  • re-visit any NDCs communicated earlier to see whether, in light of changed circumstances, their ambition could be increased; and
  • repeat these two steps, ceteris paribus, every five years – thus in 2030 they would be: communicating a 2040 NDC and revisiting (inter alia) the 2035 NDC communicated five years earlier, and so forth.

As recently remarked by Marianne Karlsen (Chair of the UNFCCC/PA Subsidiary Body for Implementation): “Parties are increasingly realizing the importance of the issue [CTF] to the overall dynamics and well-functioning of the Paris Agreement. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that CTF is very much a political issue because establishing timeframes often involves parliaments and cabinets. So, this has to be something that politicians also need to get on the radar to work with.”[1]

This is why this OCP blog post takes a look at domestic considerations and demonstrates that the GAC is flexible enough to be accommodated and workable in three key Parties: India, China and the European Union.

India. India has a well-established revolving five-year electricity planning cycle consisting of Electric Power Surveys (EPS) and National Electricity Plans (NEP). The Surveys involve annual demand projections for the next ten years as well as long-term (‘perspective’) projections for 15- and 20-year time horizons. The Plans contain a detailed growth strategy, including investments in generation, transmission, and distribution, for the next five years and the roadmap for the subsequent five years.

The 20th EPS, to be published in 2022, will contain yearly projections of electricity demand till 2030 and long-term projections for 2035 and 2040. The 4th NEP will be available in 2023; it will contain a detailed plan for 2022-27 and a perspective plan for 2027-32. As the electricity sector is the single largest source of GHG emissions in India, accounting for 47 per cent of the country’s total emissions, its planning cycle can be argued to be already in conformity with the GAC, and therefore in principle, the GAC can be accommodated in India’s NDC communication cycle, given the information in the 20th EPS/4th NEP.

China. China’s overall socio-economic development policy in the first half of the 21st century is dominated by two ‘Centenary Goals’; these mark the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 and the centenary of the People’s Republic in 2049. As the mid-point between these two centenaries, 2035 has received special attention in China’s current policy making. The deliberations for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) include, for the first time, a longer-term vision with a 2035 target, which will set the development pathways for the next 15 years. This combination of short-term and long-term targets in China’s policy making is significant for global climate policy, not least because it is perfectly consistent with the proposed Glasgow Ambition Cycle.

The European Union. A key domestic consideration in the EU for determining the timeframe of climate targets is that implementing legislation can take up to 5 years to be adopted. The 2020 communication of a 2030 NDC update shows that a 2025 communication of a 2035 NDC should (in principle) be possible, even if a 2040 timeframe remains the preferred option among some of the key domestic constituents. Given that the Paris Agreement does not preclude the communication of multiple NDCs, there is no need to choose between the two options: the EU can communicate both a 2035 and a 2040 NDC in 2025, and thus take into account all domestic preferences and do so in a manner consistent with the Glasgow Ambition Cycle. The communication of a 2035 in order to facilitate a harmonisation of the GAC should not be seen as a mutually exclusive option, but rather a demonstration of political flexibility that will not prejudice the substantive essence of the EU’s overall ambition.

The Case of India: Electric Power Surveys and National Electricity Plans

India has an elaborate system for developing a National Electricity Plan every five years.[2] This system has been codified by an act of parliament – the Electricity Act of 2003 (‘the Act’). The Act obligates the Central Electricity Authority to formulate policies and plans for the development of the electricity sector, and to conduct and publish an Electric Power Survey (EPS) every five years to forecast both the country’s electricity demand and the contribution of various sources of electricity to meet that demand. The Act also stipulates the preparation of a National Electricity Plan (NEP) every five years, in accordance with India’s National Electricity Policy.

The EPS forecasts, every five years, the electricity demand for the entire country and for each State and Union Territory in the short, medium, and long term. Year-wise electricity demand projections are made for the next ten years, while long-term (perspective) demand projections are carried out for 15- and 20-year time horizons. So far, nineteen EPS have been published, the latest one in January 2017.

The 20th EPS will be published in 2022. It will contain:

  • Annual electricity demand projections for each State, Union Territory, Region, and All India in detail for the years 2021 to 2031 (see figure above);[3]
  • Electricity demand for the terminal years 2036 and 2041.

The NEP contains a five-year detailed plan and a 15-year perspective plan. It includes:

  • Short-term and long-term demand forecast for different regions;
  • Suggested areas/locations for capacity additions in generation and transmission, keeping in view the economics of generation and transmission, losses in the system, load centre requirements, grid stability, security of supply, quality of power (including voltage profile, etc.), and environmental considerations including rehabilitation and resettlement;
  • Integration of possible locations of capacity additions with the transmission system and development of the national grid – including the type of transmission systems and requirement of redundancies;
  • Different technologies available for efficient generation, transmission, and distribution; and,
  • Fuel choices based on economy, energy security, and environmental considerations.

The latest (Third) NEP was published in January 2018. It contains a review of the previous five-years (2012-17), a detailed plan for the next five years (2017-22), and a perspectives plan for 2022-27.

The Fourth National Electricity Plan will be available in 2023. It will contain a detailed plan for 2022-27 and a perspective plan for 2027-32.

From the above, it is clear that a revolving five-year planning cycle for the electricity sector is well-established in the country. As the electricity sector is the single largest source of GHG emissions in India (accounting for 47 per cent of the country’s total emissions, including LULUCF[4]), its planning cycle could become a basis for India’s NDC communication cycle.

The Case of China: Enhanced Five-Year Planning

At the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1997, President Jiang Zemin introduced two ‘Centenary Goals’ to guide the socio-economic development in China. The first goal refers to the centenary, in 2021, of the founding of the CCP, with the Centenary Goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects; the second one referring to the centenary, in 2049, of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with the goal for China to become a basically modern socialist country.

At the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017, President Xi Jinping brought forward this goal to 2035 as a new mid-term goal, with the second Centenary Goal changing to China becoming fully modernized by 2050.

Three years later, in October 2020, President Xi Jinping introduced, for the first time, a longer-term vision – a 2035 development target – in the course of the discussions on the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) at the 19th meeting of the CPC Central Committee.

This new combination of short-term and longer-term targets in China’ policy making is significant not only for China’s carbon emissions peaking and carbon-neutrality targets, but also for the international climate regime.

At the time of writing, some provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities have published their 14th FYP and 2035 long-term policy recommendations. Among these, the important mid-

and long-term policy goals related to climate change include (but are not limited to): clarifying the carbon emissions peaking action plan, limiting coal use, increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix, promoting the intelligence and digitalization of energy development models, and developing green financial service systems. These targets will become the backbone of climate policy making at regional levels in the near future.

Since the formulation of its first five-year plan 70 years ago, China has completed thirteen FYPs, and FYPs will continue to provide guidance to the socio-economic development in China, despite debates on the effectiveness of such administrative economic planning. FYPs fit well with the proposed Glasgow Ambition Cycle, particularly in conjunction with the new longer-term 2035 planning horizon.

In short, the establishment of the 2035 target enables China to play an important role in international climate change negotiations. This is crucial for the ability of China’s own adaptive measures to engage with climate change impacts domestically, and also for the joint efforts of the international community to combat climate change. Combining the carbon emissions peaking and carbon-neutrality timelines, China has the opportunity to demonstrate its contribution to climate change mitigation and also its leadership, in the near future.

The Case of the EU: The Issue of Implementing Legislation

The Glasgow Ambition Cycle crucially requires the communication of a 2035 NDC by 2025. Could this be a realistic option for the EU? A practical way to assess possibilities is to look at precedents – in this case at EU past communications under the Paris Agreement (PA).

On 6 March 2015 (see Table 1 below), the EU communicated their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) with a ‘point target’ of emissions in 2030 being at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels, which became its initial NDC on 5 October 2016, when the EU ratified the PA.

This was based on an EU-wide emission trajectory with annual figures from 2021 to 2030, formulated and adopted by EU heads of government in 2014. The subsequent formulation and adoption of the legislation required for implementing the 40 per cent target took almost five years, beginning in July 2015 and ending in December 2020 with the setting of the final 40 per cent target trajectory.

In March 2020, the Commission promulgated the European Climate Law [ECL], which not only mandates the EU to be ‘climate-neutral’ by 2050, but also “proposes the adoption of a 2030-2050 EU-wide trajectory for greenhouse gas emission reductions”[ECL], and five-yearly assessments of “the consistency of EU and national measures with the climate-neutrality objective and the 2030-2050 trajectory”[ECL], synchronized with the Global Stocktakes of the Paris Agreement.

On 17 December 2020, the EU communicated an update of their initial NDC with a new, more ambitious target of at least 55 per cent below the 1990 level for 2030 emissions and – according to the EU Climate Action Progress Report, November 2020 (see also Figure 1) – the Commission is currently determining the annual emissions allocations (AEAs) for each country for the years 2021 – 2030, to take into account the updated, more ambitious, 2030 target.

Figure 1.Emissions in sectors covered by effort-sharing legislation 2005-2030 and Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs), EU-27 (Mt CO2 eq) [Fig. 4 in Climate Action Progress Report 2020]

What is to happen next? In a first instance, new implementing legislation for the 55 per cent target will have to be adopted, and it is expected that this will take (at least) until 2024, which means that in practice the implementation of the updated 55 per cent NDC is unlikely to commence before 2025.

Box 1. Draft by the European Council for the implementing regulation of the ECL (12 December 2020)

Assuming the adoption of the ECL by 2022, the next milestone will be the first of the ECL-mandated assessments in 2023. Following the pattern seen in the run up to the 2015 communication of the (I)NDC, it stands to reason – not least on the basis of the position of the European Council (see Box 1) – that this will be followed by the formulation and adoption of a second ten-year trajectory (2031-40, see Figure 2), presumably based on the 2050 net-zero trajectory mandated in the ECL.

Figure 2. EU Domestic and Paris Agreement Cycles

According to Art. 4.9 of the PA, all Parties have to communicate an NDC in 2025. The key question in the present context is about what timeframes the EU could realistically consider in light of domestic considerations?

One of the key domestic constraints, the time it takes to adopt the required implementing legislation (up to 5 years, as mentioned above), for one rules out another update of the 2030 NDC.

Given the INDC precedent, one option clearly is the communication of a 2040 NDC. But, to be sure, the 2020 communication of the updated 2030 NDC equally provides a precedent for the option of communicating a 2035 NDC, which seems to be the preferred option of a number of Member States,[5] and is consistent with the GAC. Fortunately, Art. 4.9 allows for multiple NDCs to be communicated simultaneously, so that there is no need to choose one over the other.

In short, keeping in mind the domestic legislative constraints, it is possible (as illustrated in Figure 2) for the EU to include the communication pattern set in Paris in a cycle that would be consistent with the GAC by communicating both a 2035 and a 2040 NDC in 2025, updating the 2040 NDC in 2030, and communicating a 2045 NDC and the 2050 (‘net-zero’) NDC in 2035.

Table 1. EU Climate Legislation/Regulation/NDC Timetable.  Courtesy of Artur Runge-Metzger

The authors would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, feedback received (in alphabetical order) by Annika Christell, Kishan Kumarsingh, Geert Fremout, and Artur Runge-Metzger.

[1] Source: In conversation with SBI and SBSTA Chairs ERCST.

[2] References:

  • The Electricity Act, 2003 (available at http://www.cercind.gov.in/act-with-amendment.pdf).
  • 19th Electric Power Survey, 2017 (available at https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/summary_19th_eps.pdf).
  • National Electricity Plan, 2018 (available at https://cea.nic.in/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/nep_jan_2018.pdf).

[3] Note that strictly speaking, the projections are made for financial years, starting in April and ending in March of the following calendar year. However, to avoid cumbersome notation, the calendar year of the initial nine months is here used to designate the financial year in question, i.e., ‘2020’ instead of ‘FY 2020-21’.

[4] MoEFCC. (2018). India: Second Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India.

[5] See Appendix 3 in Enhance Climate Ambition in 2020: Here’s looking at EU, kid!

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