The trucking industry is the backbone of India’s economy, transporting over 70% of the country’s freight. But as India pushes toward cleaner mobility, the sector is at a turning point. While electric two-wheelers, three-wheelers, passenger cars, and light commercial vehicles are making inroads, electrifying medium and heavy-duty vehicles (MHDVs) presents a different challenge. These trucks cover long distances, carry heavy loads, and require a well-developed charging and servicing ecosystem—infrastructure that is still in its early stages.
Beyond infrastructure and technology, another critical question looms: How will the shift to electric freight vehicles (EFVs) impact the workforce? A transition of this scale doesn’t just affect vehicles; it affects people—drivers, mechanics, fleet operators, and thousands of workers in manufacturing and logistics.
To gain deeper insight into the workforce impact, iFOREST conducted research with over 400 stakeholders across India, including truck drivers, fleet operators, repair and maintenance workers, automotive component manufacturers (ACMs), and electric truck OEMs. Our work in the medium and heavy-duty freight segment extends our ongoing efforts toward a Just Transition in the automobile sector. Here, we highlight key challenges in ensuring that workers—especially those in informal roles—are not left behind in the shift to greener technology.
The freight industry in India remains highly informal across its entire value chain. Our analysis indicates that in the manufacturing sector, 30% of smaller and medium-sized ACMs, which constitute the majority of enterprises, will need to adapt to changing demand as engine assemblies, transmissions, exhaust systems, and radiator systems become less relevant. Additionally, the survey reveals that informal repair and maintenance technicians, who rely on generational knowledge, have a significant opportunity to transition into high-value EV servicing roles, provided they receive adequate skilling support. Similarly, in the end-of-life stage, battery recycling and sustainable disposal practices will open new avenues of employment for scrapping and recycling workers.
Ensuring a just and inclusive transition is essential to protect thousands of workers from getting impacted. A Just Transition is not just about moving to cleaner technology but about ensuring that workers dependent on traditional industries are not abandoned in the process.
The skilling gap: Who gets left behind?
This transition will erase some jobs (engine and transmission technicians), transform others through reskilling, and create entirely new roles (EV charging operators and high-voltage specialists). But with the sector’s deep informality, the question remains: Who will take responsibility for reskilling a workforce that doesn’t even exist on formal records? Without intervention, thousands risk losing their livelihoods simply due to a lack of relevant skills.
Our study shows that the traditional ICE medium and heavy-duty vehicle (MHDV) sector currently supports around 529 distinct job roles across manufacturing, service and repair, dealership, transport logistics and warehouse management, and end-of-life management. As diesel trucks are phased out, 64 roles will evolve or merge into new positions, and 93 will require structured reskilling. For instance, diesel mechanics can become EV powertrain specialists, and fuel station attendants can transition into charging station operators. The transition won’t just replace jobs; it will also create 71 entirely new roles, from battery recycling specialists to high-voltage system technicians—expanding the total job pool to 536. The biggest shake-up will hit manufacturing, where engine assembly jobs disappear in favor of EV powertrain and battery integration. Repair and logistics workers must adapt to software-driven diagnostics and digital fleet management, while end-of-life management will demand expertise in battery recycling and hazardous waste handling.
The problem isn’t just that old jobs are disappearing—it’s that new jobs require a higher skill level.
A closer examination of the National Skills Qualification Framework (NSQF) levels shows that emerging job roles require higher NSQF levels, whereas many obsolete jobs fall within lower NSQF levels. Workers who relied on hands-on experience now need formal education and certifications—resources they often lack. Another major roadblock is that most skilling programs require basic education, excluding many informal workers despite their industry expertise. They cannot enroll in training courses that would help them move into new jobs. Without targeted interventions, these workers risk being left behind, widening inequalities in the evolving job market.
Leaving no one behind
During my research, a Noida-based truck driver working for IX Energy Pvt Ltd., a technology company building electric transport solutions, said, “I drove a diesel truck for 10 years, trained by my ustaad. When my boss bought an electric truck, I had no choice but to learn. After just a week of in-house training, I was driving comfortably. Since my job now requires advanced operations like digital literacy diagnosing issues is easier than before. My pay went up from ₹ 20,000 to ₹ 32,000 plus benefits”.
Skilling is not just about preserving jobs—it’s key to ensuring electrification meets its sustainability goals. Meenu Sarawgi, Executive Vice President & Chief at ASDC, pointed out, “Even for diesel trucks, skilling courses are almost non-existent—people assume learning on the job is enough. Poor training harms vehicle efficiency. As electrification brings new opportunities, we must do it right from the start. Training workers in EV technology is the only way to achieve the efficiency these vehicles promise.”
A Just Transition is not a choice; it is a necessity. If structured skilling programs are not implemented, the very people who have kept India’s freight sector running for decades risk being left behind. The responsibility lies with OEMs, policymakers, and industry leaders to ensure this transition prioritizes people, not just technology. If done right, electrification can open new doors while protecting livelihoods—but without action, it could deepen inequalities rather than bridge them.
The road ahead is electric, but it must also be just.
This study was undertaken in collaboration with C40 Cities and The Climate Pledge as part of the Laneshift programme.
Samreen Dhingra is a senior research associate at iFOREST
As climate change accelerates, cities across India are getting hotter and becoming more vulnerable to extreme heat waves. Staying cool isn’t just about comfort anymore — it’s becoming essential for our health, food systems, and economic activity. Right now, most of our cooling needs are met through active technologies like air conditioners. But this growing reliance comes at a cost. It’s fueling a vicious cycle: more cooling means more energy use and emissions, which drive climate change. And that, in turn, increases our need for cooling even more.
Our cities are heating up – not only due to climate change, but also because urban areas experience additional heat from the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect. As a result, cities become significantly warmer than the nearby rural areas, sometimes by as much as 5°C, especially in certain climate zones. Why? As cities grow and urbanise rapidly, green spaces shrink, concrete and asphalt dominate, and heat from cars, factories, and air conditioners builds up. High-density buildings, restricted wind circulation, changing land use, and urban sprawl, all add to the problem. Together, these factors trap heat, make cities hotter, more uncomfortable, and increasingly vulnerable during heat waves.
It is clear that heating and cooling are deeply interconnected and must be addressed collectively.
Gaps in current policies
At the national level, India has made significant strides in developing heating and cooling policy frameworks. The India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP), for example, outlines sector-specific strategies for space cooling, cold chains, refrigerants, air conditioning in transport, and more. Institutions such as Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) and the National Center for Cold-chain Development (NCCD) rate buildings and appliances for sustainability and energy efficiency. There is also the national guideline for Heat Action Plans (HAP) by the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) that guides the state, district and city planning on heat adaptation efforts.
A Heat Action Plan (HAP) devises strategies to adapt to the adverse effects of extreme heat. It incorporates early warning systems, preparedness efforts, and responsive actions to reduce the incidence of heat-related illnesses and fatalities. However, HAPs focus solely on short-term adaptation measures, with minimal emphasis on mitigation. They do not consider cooling interventions.
While the Climate Change Action Plan and the Energy Efficiency Action Plan address cooling by reducing GHG emissions and energy intensity, at the state and city levels, there are actually very few policies that directly address the cooling needs.
An approach to addressing cooling at the state and city level is observed in the form of cool roof policies, where several states have established specific targets to improve thermal comfort. Telangana, for instance, has a target of covering 300 sq km of area with cool roofs by 2029.
The result is a fragmented policy landscape, leading to missed opportunities, overlapping mandates, and critical gaps in coverage. Without a unified approach, cities struggle to implement effective and scalable solutions to address heating and cooling challenges. Further, many of the existing action plans lack any specificity regarding execution and fixing responsibilities.
As a result, implementation remains a significant weakness — targets are set without a road map, responsible agencies, or resource planning. Moreover, there is no city-level framework that comprehensively links space cooling, building codes, urban planning, and citizen health & well-being.
Why Cities Must Lead
Although national and state governments establish the overarching vision and policy framework, it is at the municipal level where the implementation takes place. Urban areas not only bear the brunt of climate impacts, but also serve as the primary arenas for planning, infrastructure development, and decisions that determine daily energy use.
Urban local bodies can regulate building design, promote cool roofs, retrofit infrastructure, and implement early warning systems for heat waves. They are also best placed to coordinate across sectors such as urban planning, housing, public health, water, and energy, all of which intersect in the heating-cooling nexus.
Cities are uniquely positioned to design and implement context-specific solutions. And we have observed this with the implementation of the current HAPs, as various cities in India are adopting innovative solutions as a part of their HAPs to support vulnerable groups affected by extreme heat.
For instance, the Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service (AMTS), along with MHT, have launched India’s inaugural ‘Cool Bus Stop’, featuring a High-Pressure Mist System designed to alleviate rising temperatures and enhance commuter comfort. The Chennai Municipal Corporation is establishing air-conditioned rest areas for gig workers, one of the most vulnerable groups, who lack sufficient space for rest and safety amid the intensifying summer heat.
Despite concerns regarding the current framework of HAP, it is undeniable that the implementation of HAPs at the urban level has yielded positive results. However, without an integrated and actionable framework, cities lack the direction and resources to implement heating and cooling solutions effectively. The Integrated Heating and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP), can develop on the shortcomings of the HAPs and act as the missing link in India’s climate response at the city level.
An Integrated Approach to Heating and Cooling
An IHCAP brings together all aspects of thermal comfort into one unified plan tailored to local conditions. By aligning adaptation and mitigation goals, defining clear roles, and laying out implementable strategies, IHCAPs help cities move from intention to action.
By integrating cooling and heating initiatives, cities can lower emissions from the cooling sector. Increasing blue-green infrastructure and prioritising energy-efficient and sustainable buildings will help lessen the demand for active cooling. Additionally, adopting innovative and efficient cooling systems such as district cooling, water-based chillers, not-in-kind technology, and high-star-rated ACS will further reduce energy demand intensity.
With cities on the front lines of climate change, empowering them with a robust, integrated framework isn’t just smart policy — it’s a necessity for sustainable urban futures.
Rohit Bagai is a Senior Research Associate and Nidhi Bali is Director – Urban Transition at iFOREST
India is beefing up 500GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030. But lopsided regional development of the clean energy sector could lead to grid congestion and opportunities going in the hands of too few.
In 2022, at the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), India set a target for 500 GW of non-fossil fuel capacity by 2030[1]. As of December 2024, we’re nearly halfway there, with 209 GW of capacity installed[2]. In addition, according to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA)’s quarterly report on ongoing renewable energy (RE) projects, another 79 GW is under construction and 95 GW is in other (upstream) stages of development[3]. In other words, India is well on its way to reaching the envisioned 2030 target.
However, the gross capacity addition figures hide a rising regional disparity in capacity additions of RE. As of December 2024, seven states in south and west India make up over 80 per cent of India’s RE-installed capacity[1]. In descending order, they are Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. Further, just two of these states — Gujarat and Rajasthan — make up 37 per cent of the total.
Continuing the uneven regional development of energy resources would raise three main issues — technical, financial, and economic.
Transmission investments and costs
A key concern with putting all your eggs in one basket in the context of electricity generation is grid congestion. As more and more capacity is built in the same region, grid congestion becomes more likely. If left unchecked, this can lead to the curtailment of power from otherwise perfectly operational plants.
To prevent this from happening, additional investment in transmission infrastructure is required. In December 2022, the CEA published a report on the transmission system requirement to integrate 500 GW of RE by 2030. According to it, the tentative cost of building this transmission system is Rs 2.4 trillion (Rs 244,200 Cr)[5]. These investments will follow the geographic trend in capacity addition — accruing largely to Gujarat, Rajasthan and a few Southern states.
Further, transmission investments in these areas are already creating pressure on land sources, such as agricultural land and areas populated by the Great Indian Bustard (GIB). Regarding the latter, a 2023 factual report by the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change stated that collisions with power lines are a key factor for adult mortality in the species[6]. The report goes on to state that there is a “high density of transmission lines because of the impetus on renewable energy production in GIB habitats in Rajasthan and Gujarat”.
Transmission losses also make the endeavour inefficient. Transmission losses and associated costs rise linearly as we increase the distance between the point of generation and the point of consumption. In a nation as vast as India, the losses associated with transmitting energy (say from the West to the East) can be substantial. Even with immense transmission investments, a degree of inefficiency would still be present in the system.
Financial concerns
The cost of acquiring electricity from generators is passed on from transmission companies (transcos) to distribution companies (discoms). In many states, discoms continue to be owned and operated by subnational governments. If a state’s exchequer is financially stressed, energy security can come under duress.
This is precisely the case in eastern India. Thus far, the eastern region states have drawn royalties from coal production. As we move away from thermal energy to renewable alternatives, these royalties will decrease, while purchases from RE centres in other states rise. Mitra and Chandra (2023) illustrate the expected result of these two forces. According to their research, a state such as Chhattisgarh may see its budget deficit rise to as much as 17.1 per cent by 2030 — substantially higher than the limit posed by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, 2003)[7]. Needless to say, these dual pressures can significantly hamper the fiscal capabilities of a state.
Green growth and state economies
The final set of concerns has to do with the local economic effects of lopsided RE growth. In the last decade of RE growth, nearly 80,000 jobs were created in the RE sector (utility-solar, wind and rooftop solar)[8]. However, given roughly 70 per cent of the capacity addition was carried out in just the aforementioned states[9], it stands to reason that these jobs also largely accrued to the same states.
In addition, these states are also emerging as centres of industries that are downstream of RE. Green hydrogen hubs are already being established in Karnataka and Tamil Nadu[10][11]. In the latter case, the project (an investment of Rs 36 billion) is set to create 1,000 jobs in the Thuthukudi area.
The implication is that the growing disparity of RE capacity can translate into lopsided development across regions. In such a scenario, the benefits of green growth would be localised to just a few states, undermining the ‘just-ness’ of India’s energy transition.
As we rally for an energy transition ahead of The International Day of Clean Energy, celebrated this week, it is worth underlining that India must move away from coal-fed power plants in eastern India to meet its decarbonisation goals. But as Mitra and Chandra (2023) point out, climate change mitigation has become a national level issue with states being kept out of the decision-making process[12]. The outcome is a mad rush by policymakers to court developers and attract RE (and downstream industry) to their states. Instead, these
threats suggest the need for a more co-operative federalist approach to tackle climate change while keeping technical, financial and economic outcomes in mind.
As countries prepare to update their climate pledges under the upcoming Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) 3.0 cycle, Just Transition is emerging as an essential cross-cutting agenda to strengthen the action of mitigation, adaption, and resilience measures by various countries.
The draft negotiation text of the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (UAE-JTWP) has underscored the “multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional nature of just transition” that cuts across all the pillars of climate action. This comprehensive approach envisions addressing not only the carbon transition but also the socio-economic transformations it entails. Therefore, to ensure a Just Transition, or move away from fossil fuels, requires a ‘whole-of-economy’ approach.
Where are we on actionable steps?
An important agenda for COP29 this week will be to frame actionable steps under the JTWP to enable countries to design and implement Just Transition measures, aligning with climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. While each country’s journey to a Just Transition will be based on unique national circumstances, including socio-economic conditions, resources, and priorities, some clear actionable steps can ensure collective and timebound action.
The second annual inter-ministerial roundtable held in Baku on November 18th brought to light some steps that must be enforced through the work programme.
A key one in this regard is the need for strong financial commitments to support Just Transition measures in developing countries. There is a strong sentiment from the negotiators that this requires significant public investment to ensure a fair and inclusive transition. The emphasis should be on prioritizing public finance as the primary driver, rather than high reliance on market mechanisms or investments driven by profit. By placing public finance at the forefront, international institutions can address the social and economic challenges of transition, ensuring that the process is equitable and aligned with long-term development goals.
The other aspect is to guide Parties and build their capacity to develop comprehensive Just Transition policies and plans that can be suitably integrated into the updated NDs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and also development plans.
Finally, there is a need to specify measurable targets, especially short and medium-term targets, to achieve long-term outcomes.
With such measures put in place through the JTWP, Just Transition can be a huge opportunity to support inclusive and green economic growth in developing countries, and not undermine their developmental ambitions.
Listening to voices beyond decision-makers
Besides these, an important issue for Just Transition will be to create appropriate platforms, to ensure representation and participation of various stakeholders. Mr. Nabeel Munir, the Chairperson of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to the UNFCCC, in his opening remarks at the inter-ministerial roundtable emphasized that a transition “will never be just if the floor is only given to the decision-makers.”
The JTWP should therefore design spaces where diverse voices can actively contribute to decision-making. This inclusivity will help to bring to the floor the unique challenges and needs of those most affected by the transition, making policies more responsive and grounded in local realities. Such an approach will also build trust, legitimacy, and broader support for Just Transition action and make it truly a people’s agenda.
The recent USD 1 trillion Infrastructure Bill in the United States’ agenda to Build Back Better has allotted about USD 5 billion to a variety of measures that will reduce building electricity use, improve building materials, and create a skilled workforce to design, build and maintain energy efficient buildings. A large fraction of this funding, about USD 3.5 billion, will focus on improving access to thermal comfort for low income households – better insulation, windows, roofing, heating and cooling devices. The bill also directs USD 500 million to public schools for replacement of old inefficient HVAC systems, among other measures. Given that about buildings account for about 75 percent of the country’s electricity demand, this bill is a significant step in the right direction. Such an overhaul is much needed for country where 90 percent of the households in the United States have HVAC systems for their cooling, ventilation and heating needs.
In contrast, the India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP) in 2019 reported that about 10 percent of India’s 272 million households own air conditioners with an expected increase of cooling demand by eleven times in residential sector over the next two decades. The corollary to rapid increase in cooling demand, in the absence of suitable interventions is, uptake of least efficient air conditioners. While India’s per capita buildings energy use is among the lowest in the world today, it is set to grow faster than any region in the coming decades. In order to be able to envision a sustainable future for residential cooling, perhaps even massive financial investment on infrastructure, we must first come to terms with how India currently accesses thermal comfort.
Accessing thermal comfort through stacking strategies
As a tropical country with over five different climate zones experiencing air conditioner proliferation in the recent decade, much of India’s population comfort range in temperature is dictated by the outside climate. An investigation in a government school located in the city of Ambala 1 found that a temperature range of 15.3-33.7°C fell under occupant comfort; a range that is higher than those prescribed by both Indian and International Standards for adult population. Another study in affordable housing in Mumbai 2 revealed occupant comfort in the temperature range of 19.8-34.8°C, wherein both the minimum and maximum were about 6°C higher than prescribed standards.,3,4
This tolerance to higher temperatures has been attributed to urban residents’ commonly used adaptive actions such as the use of a ceiling fans, opening of windows, and use of curtains. Less commonly used adaptive actions were roof or floor wetting and use of air-conditioners or air-coolers. These are actions that we have witnessed or performed in our own households as means to achieve thermal comfort during sweltering summers. These can also be dubbed as energy conservation behaviours that help achieve optimal thermal comfort.
Stacking of strategies that reduce dependence on air conditioners in Indian households are common and often include the use of fans in tandem or as a substitute. A study in Pondicherry’s Auroville further substantiated this finding in addition to the observation that households did not use air conditioners continuously for attaining thermal comfort. Households across India are also known to avoid starting air-conditioner usage until outside temperatures exceeded 32°C 5 and peak use of air conditioners are during the hours when all residents of the house are presumably at home, that is between 10pm and 1am. 6
Additional energy conservation behaviours among the small fraction of air conditioner owning households have also been well noted. A 2020 study in Delhi reported three-fourth of the surveyed households used their air-conditioners for 6 hours or lower. The study further stated that even in the wealthiest neighbourhoods, during the hottest months of the year, about 15 percent of the households used air-conditioners for more than 8 hours per day. Another study in 2019 across four cities – Dhanbad, Meerut, Madurai and Vadodara – revealed that households used their air conditioners for less than six months in a year, with a majority stating four months. 7
Achievability of thermal comfort in public spaces
Today the majority of Indian households are either adapting to outside temperatures or adopting some energy conservation behaviours in relation to affording thermal comfort. Beyond homes, public spaces such as offices, shops, schools, hospitals, courtrooms etc, access to thermal comfort may not be as straight forward. A 2019 report by Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy stated that in survey across 6650 users of District Courts, about 37% stated the need for better ventilation in waiting areas. 8 These respondents stated that there was a need to add fans or air conditioners to these spaces to improve the user experience. A report by the sub-committee of the National Court Management Systems Committee recommended proper ventilation and temperature control either by air conditioners or coolers as imperative infrastructure provision for courts.
In addition to these waiting areas court complexes like many other publicly accessed buildings have a host of other amenities – ATMs, a bank branch, a canteen, first-aid care services, oath commissioners, photocopy facility, a police booth, a post office, public notaries, stamp vendors, and typists. Anecdotally we observe that ATM booths used for an average of less than fifteen minutes by people are stocked with a full-powered air conditioning, while offices of photocopiers, public notaries spaces inhabited for at least nine hours a day are likely to be inadequately ventilated and are more likely rely entirely on fans for thermal comfort.
Thermal comfort is a niche subject that remains with architects, builders and energy consultants. While temperatures are rapidly soaring as a result of climate change, thermal comfort is not yet a human rights issue nor is it a developmental concern (given the plethora of other real human rights violations this neglect is understandable). However, when regulations are not able to consider all a respects of how thermal comfort pervades our day-to-day it is likely to serve the needs of very few. This is already being observed in how cooling is often confounded with air conditioning, both by policy and people. Existing programmes focusing on cooling energy efficiency (for e.g. BEE’s star rating programme and EESL’s super-efficient air conditioner programme) while successful, have not reached the halls of courtrooms and many such publicly accessed spaces.
To afford a future where thermal comfort for all is a reality, we need to first study how we access it today. We need to understand who is accessing thermal comfort and how. There needs to be more conversations between those that design buildings and those that design policies.
This is the second of a series of five essays aiming to examine the essential elements of access to thermal comfort or cooling in India.
A storm is brewing on the climate diplomacy front that India needs to navigate carefully to avoid becoming a fall guy. The issue at hand is the pledge by countries to achieve “net zero” emission by the mid-century. Over 120 countries have already announced their intention to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. China intends carbon neutrality before 2060, and the US is considering a 2050 pledge. Being the third-largest emitter, there is pressure on India to announce its commitment as well.
Net zero or carbon neutrality means that the amount of CO2 produced by a country is balanced by the amount removed from the atmosphere. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C, global net CO2 emissions should decline by about 45% by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050.
There is considerable scepticism around net zero in India. Many argue that net zero is not equitable and fair as it does not differentiate between developing and developed countries in sharing the burden of mitigation. Another argument is that it will limit India’s development potential. Some also criticise mid-century net zero as allowing uncontrolled emissions today while relying on uncertain technologies to offset emissions in the future. Finally, many net zero pledges are premised upon trading and offsetting emissions, allowing the rich to continue emitting and buying their way out.
There is some merit to the above scepticism. Historically, developed countries have shifted the goalposts on climate action and reneged on financial and technological promises to developing countries. However, we cannot shy away from net zero, as declaring a carbon neutrality target is inevitable for every country to meet the 1.5°C goals; the only question is when and how.
The first step for India to decide the contours of net zero is to stop reacting to terms set by developed countries. In three decades of climate negotiations, we have primarily been a reactive party, not a proactive one shaping the discussion. With net zero as well, we face a choice – either reject the idea citing equity and fairness or embrace and remould it to achieve climate goals and secure our developmental space. I strongly believe we have an opportunity to develop a fair, ambitious and effective consensus on net zero. Let me propose a five-point agenda that India can consider to set the terms for future global action.
First, net zero should be built on self-differentiation, a cornerstone of the Paris Agreement. It is a no-brainer that if the global net zero deadline is mid-century, then the developed countries’ deadline will be 2040. High-emitting emerging economies like China will have to follow soon and reach net zero before 2050. Countries like India with per capita emissions below the global average will get a little more time – until 2060.
Second, the net zero target has to be flexible. Newer disruptive technologies would allow us to decarbonise faster at a much lower cost than what can be envisioned today. Take, for example, India’s solar energy target. From a modest 20GW in 2010 (enhanced to 100GW in 2015), we are now targeting 450GW of renewables by 2030, largely from solar. That is a 15-fold ambition enhancement within a decade. Countries should therefore revisit their net zero targets every ten years to firm up their commitments.
Third, while net zero is the ultimate goal, the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), due every five years, are the means to achieve the goal. IPCC is very clear; an ambitious 2030 target must accompany net zero. So, countries pledging net zero must also announce enhanced NDCs for 2030.
Fourth, net zero has to be legally binding. Less than ten countries have enacted domestic law on net zero; the rest have made pledges or policy statements. While policy pronouncement is important, compliance can only be assured through a law. This is especially necessary for the US, where climate ambition shifts quickly with change in the political landscape. If the Biden administration is serious about net zero, it should get a law through the US Congress.
Finally, and most importantly, setting a net zero target will not by itself guarantee positive and equitable social and economic outcomes. The rapid transition required in the next 2-3 decades will disrupt the economic and social fabric of fossil-fuel dependent regions. Hence, the net zero targets must be paralleled by an international framework on Just Transition.
Achieving net zero over the next 3-4 decades is very much possible for India. We are developing at a time in history when low/ no-carbon technologies will grow exponentially. A well-designed net zero plan will be an opportunity for us to pole vault to a green future. While there will be an extra cost, studies indicate that these will be modest and compensated by lower adaptation costs and reduced loss from extreme weather events. Besides, it will have enormous co-benefits in reducing air and water pollution and improving forest and soil quality, contributing to overall environmental improvement and human well-being. By announcing our net zero commitment, we will also send a clear signal that we are open to global finance and technology support for a green and just transition.
The bottom line is we are one of the most vulnerable countries to climatic disruptions. It is, therefore, in our interest that a serious effort is made globally to meet the 1.5°C goals. In this endeavour, we can either be a bystander or a leader.
Two 5-year cycles currently drive the implementation of the Paris Agreement (PA): one of communicating national targets (“Nationally Determined Contributions” NDCs) and one of taking stock of global efforts. In order to complete the ambition mechanism of the PA, which is critical for its full operationalisation and the achievement of its objectives, another 5-year cycle, the “Glasgow Ambition Cycle” (GAC), aimed at ratcheting up the collective ambition of NDCs, has been proposed. It is gaining significant traction and appeal for adoption at COP 26 in Glasgow under negotiations on Common Time Frames (CTF, see Ambition Cycle on course to land in Glasgow). The GAC provides an elegant and non-controversial solution to the sticking options currently being negotiated, and is meant to start in 2025 when countries would be requested to:
communicate (at least) a 2035 NDC (‘with a time frame up to 2035’);
re-visit any NDCs communicated earlier to see whether, in light of changed circumstances, their ambition could be increased; and
repeat these two steps, ceteris paribus, every five years – thus in 2030 they would be: communicating a 2040 NDC and revisiting (inter alia) the 2035 NDC communicated five years earlier, and so forth.
As recently remarked by Marianne Karlsen (Chair of the UNFCCC/PA Subsidiary Body for Implementation): “Parties are increasingly realizing the importance of the issue [CTF] to the overall dynamics and well-functioning of the Paris Agreement. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that CTF is very much a political issue because establishing timeframes often involves parliaments and cabinets. So, this has to be something that politicians also need to get on the radar to work with.”[1]
This is why this OCP blog post takes a look at domestic considerations and demonstrates that the GAC is flexible enough to be accommodated and workable in three key Parties: India, China and the European Union.
India. India has a well-established revolving five-year electricity planning cycle consisting of Electric Power Surveys (EPS) and National Electricity Plans (NEP). The Surveys involve annual demand projections for the next ten years as well as long-term (‘perspective’) projections for 15- and 20-year time horizons. The Plans contain a detailed growth strategy, including investments in generation, transmission, and distribution, for the next five years and the roadmap for the subsequent five years.
The 20th EPS, to be published in 2022, will contain yearly projections of electricity demand till 2030 and long-term projections for 2035 and 2040. The 4th NEP will be available in 2023; it will contain a detailed plan for 2022-27 and a perspective plan for 2027-32. As the electricity sector is the single largest source of GHG emissions in India, accounting for 47 per cent of the country’s total emissions, its planning cycle can be argued to be already in conformity with the GAC, and therefore in principle, the GAC can be accommodated in India’s NDC communication cycle, given the information in the 20th EPS/4th NEP.
China. China’s overall socio-economic development policy in the first half of the 21st century is dominated by two ‘Centenary Goals’; these mark the centenary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 and the centenary of the People’s Republic in 2049. As the mid-point between these two centenaries, 2035 has received special attention in China’s current policy making. The deliberations for the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) include, for the first time, a longer-term vision with a 2035 target, which will set the development pathways for the next 15 years. This combination of short-term and long-term targets in China’s policy making is significant for global climate policy, not least because it is perfectly consistent with the proposed Glasgow Ambition Cycle.
The European Union. A key domestic consideration in the EU for determining the timeframe of climate targets is that implementing legislation can take up to 5 years to be adopted. The 2020 communication of a 2030 NDC update shows that a 2025 communication of a 2035 NDC should (in principle) be possible, even if a 2040 timeframe remains the preferred option among some of the key domestic constituents. Given that the Paris Agreement does not preclude the communication of multiple NDCs, there is no need to choose between the two options: the EU can communicate both a 2035 and a 2040 NDC in 2025, and thus take into account all domestic preferences and do so in a manner consistent with the Glasgow Ambition Cycle. The communication of a 2035 in order to facilitate a harmonisation of the GAC should not be seen as a mutually exclusive option, but rather a demonstration of political flexibility that will not prejudice the substantive essence of the EU’s overall ambition.
The Case of India: Electric Power Surveys and National Electricity Plans
India has an elaborate system for developing a National Electricity Plan every five years.[2] This system has been codified by an act of parliament – the Electricity Act of 2003 (‘the Act’). The Act obligates the Central Electricity Authority to formulate policies and plans for the development of the electricity sector, and to conduct and publish an Electric Power Survey (EPS) every five years to forecast both the country’s electricity demand and the contribution of various sources of electricity to meet that demand. The Act also stipulates the preparation of a National Electricity Plan (NEP) every five years, in accordance with India’s National Electricity Policy.
The EPS forecasts, every five years, the electricity demand for the entire country and for each State and Union Territory in the short, medium, and long term. Year-wise electricity demand projections are made for the next ten years, while long-term (perspective) demand projections are carried out for 15- and 20-year time horizons. So far, nineteen EPS have been published, the latest one in January 2017.
The 20th EPS will be published in 2022. It will contain:
Annual electricity demand projections for each State, Union Territory, Region, and All India in detail for the years 2021 to 2031 (see figure above);[3]
Electricity demand for the terminal years 2036 and 2041.
The NEP contains a five-year detailed plan and a 15-year perspective plan. It includes:
Short-term and long-term demand forecast for different regions;
Suggested areas/locations for capacity additions in generation and transmission, keeping in view the economics of generation and transmission, losses in the system, load centre requirements, grid stability, security of supply, quality of power (including voltage profile, etc.), and environmental considerations including rehabilitation and resettlement;
Integration of possible locations of capacity additions with the transmission system and development of the national grid – including the type of transmission systems and requirement of redundancies;
Different technologies available for efficient generation, transmission, and distribution; and,
Fuel choices based on economy, energy security, and environmental considerations.
The latest (Third) NEP was published in January 2018. It contains a review of the previous five-years (2012-17), a detailed plan for the next five years (2017-22), and a perspectives plan for 2022-27.
The Fourth National Electricity Plan will be available in 2023. It will contain a detailed plan for 2022-27 and a perspective plan for 2027-32.
From the above, it is clear that a revolving five-year planning cycle for the electricity sector is well-established in the country. As the electricity sector is the single largest source of GHG emissions in India (accounting for 47 per cent of the country’s total emissions, including LULUCF[4]), its planning cycle could become a basis for India’s NDC communication cycle.
The Case of China: Enhanced Five-Year Planning
At the 15th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1997, President Jiang Zemin introduced two ‘Centenary Goals’ to guide the socio-economic development in China. The first goal refers to the centenary, in 2021, of the founding of the CCP, with the Centenary Goal of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects; the second one referring to the centenary, in 2049, of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, with the goal for China to become a basically modern socialist country.
At the 19th CPC National Congress in 2017, President Xi Jinping brought forward this goal to 2035 as a new mid-term goal, with the second Centenary Goal changing to China becoming fully modernized by 2050.
Three years later, in October 2020, President Xi Jinping introduced, for the first time, a longer-term vision – a 2035 development target – in the course of the discussions on the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) at the 19th meeting of the CPC Central Committee.
This new combination of short-term and longer-term targets in China’ policy making is significant not only for China’s carbon emissions peaking and carbon-neutrality targets, but also for the international climate regime.
At the time of writing, some provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities have published their 14th FYP and 2035 long-term policy recommendations. Among these, the important mid-
and long-term policy goals related to climate change include (but are not limited to): clarifying the carbon emissions peaking action plan, limiting coal use, increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the energy mix, promoting the intelligence and digitalization of energy development models, and developing green financial service systems. These targets will become the backbone of climate policy making at regional levels in the near future.
Since the formulation of its first five-year plan 70 years ago, China has completed thirteen FYPs, and FYPs will continue to provide guidance to the socio-economic development in China, despite debates on the effectiveness of such administrative economic planning. FYPs fit well with the proposed Glasgow Ambition Cycle, particularly in conjunction with the new longer-term 2035 planning horizon.
In short, the establishment of the 2035 target enables China to play an important role in international climate change negotiations. This is crucial for the ability of China’s own adaptive measures to engage with climate change impacts domestically, and also for the joint efforts of the international community to combat climate change. Combining the carbon emissions peaking and carbon-neutrality timelines, China has the opportunity to demonstrate its contribution to climate change mitigation and also its leadership, in the near future.
The Case of the EU: The Issue of Implementing Legislation
The Glasgow Ambition Cycle crucially requires the communication of a 2035 NDC by 2025. Could this be a realistic option for the EU? A practical way to assess possibilities is to look at precedents – in this case at EU past communications under the Paris Agreement (PA).
On 6 March 2015 (see Table 1 below), the EU communicated their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) with a ‘point target’ of emissions in 2030 being at least 40 per cent below 1990 levels, which became its initial NDC on 5 October 2016, when the EU ratified the PA.
This was based on an EU-wide emission trajectory with annual figures from 2021 to 2030, formulated and adopted by EU heads of government in 2014. The subsequent formulation and adoption of the legislation required for implementing the 40 per cent target took almost five years, beginning in July 2015 and ending in December 2020 with the setting of the final 40 per cent target trajectory.
In March 2020, the Commission promulgated the European Climate Law [ECL], which not only mandates the EU to be ‘climate-neutral’ by 2050, but also “proposes the adoption of a 2030-2050 EU-wide trajectory for greenhouse gas emission reductions”[ECL], and five-yearly assessments of “the consistency of EU and national measures with the climate-neutrality objective and the 2030-2050 trajectory”[ECL], synchronized with the Global Stocktakes of the Paris Agreement.
On 17 December 2020, the EU communicated an update of their initial NDC with a new, more ambitious target of at least 55 per cent below the 1990 level for 2030 emissions and – according to the EU Climate Action Progress Report, November 2020 (see also Figure 1) – the Commission is currently determining the annual emissions allocations (AEAs) for each country for the years 2021 – 2030, to take into account the updated, more ambitious, 2030 target.
Figure 1.Emissions in sectors covered by effort-sharing legislation 2005-2030 and Annual Emission Allocations (AEAs), EU-27 (Mt CO2 eq) [Fig. 4 in Climate Action Progress Report 2020]
What is to happen next? In a first instance, new implementing legislation for the 55 per cent target will have to be adopted, and it is expected that this will take (at least) until 2024, which means that in practice the implementation of the updated 55 per cent NDC is unlikely to commence before 2025.
Box 1. Draft by the European Council for the implementing regulation of the ECL (12 December 2020)
Assuming the adoption of the ECL by 2022, the next milestone will be the first of the ECL-mandated assessments in 2023. Following the pattern seen in the run up to the 2015 communication of the (I)NDC, it stands to reason – not least on the basis of the position of the European Council (see Box 1) – that this will be followed by the formulation and adoption of a second ten-year trajectory (2031-40, see Figure 2), presumably based on the 2050 net-zero trajectory mandated in the ECL.
Figure 2. EU Domestic and Paris Agreement Cycles
According to Art. 4.9 of the PA, all Parties have to communicate an NDC in 2025. The key question in the present context is about what timeframes the EU could realistically consider in light of domestic considerations?
One of the key domestic constraints, the time it takes to adopt the required implementing legislation (up to 5 years, as mentioned above), for one rules out another update of the 2030 NDC.
Given the INDC precedent, one option clearly is the communication of a 2040 NDC. But, to be sure, the 2020 communication of the updated 2030 NDC equally provides a precedent for the option of communicating a 2035 NDC, which seems to be the preferred option of a number of Member States,[5] and is consistent with the GAC. Fortunately, Art. 4.9 allows for multiple NDCs to be communicated simultaneously, so that there is no need to choose one over the other.
In short, keeping in mind the domestic legislative constraints, it is possible (as illustrated in Figure 2) for the EU to include the communication pattern set in Paris in a cycle that would be consistent with the GAC by communicating both a 2035 and a 2040 NDC in 2025, updating the 2040 NDC in 2030, and communicating a 2045 NDC and the 2050 (‘net-zero’) NDC in 2035.
Table 1. EU Climate Legislation/Regulation/NDC Timetable. Courtesy of Artur Runge-Metzger
The authors would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, feedback received (in alphabetical order) by Annika Christell, Kishan Kumarsingh, Geert Fremout, and Artur Runge-Metzger.
[3] Note that strictly speaking, the projections are made for financial years, starting in April and ending in March of the following calendar year. However, to avoid cumbersome notation, the calendar year of the initial nine months is here used to designate the financial year in question, i.e., ‘2020’ instead of ‘FY 2020-21’.
[4] MoEFCC. (2018). India: Second Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India.
The Government has introduced an amendment bill in the Lok Sabha on March 15, to further amend the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957. Amendments have been proposed on a number of issues related to mining, including auctions, clearance and permit validity of mine leases, functioning of District Mineral Foundation (DMF) Trusts, among others. What comes across clearly from an overall reading of the MMDR Amendment Bill 2021, is that it increases the power of the Central Government in almost all aspects of decision-making on mining.
One of the most significant amendments in this regard is taking decisions on matters of DMFs. The Government had instituted DMF by amending the MMDR Act in 2015 to improve the social responsiveness of the mining sector. As specified in the law, the objective of DMF is to work for the interest and benefit of areas and people affected by mining and related activities.
The State Governments were entrusted with the primary responsibility of setting up DMFs in every mining district (of the respective state), through a notification. At the same time they were also vested with the power to prescribe the composition and functioning of DMFs.
The 2021 Bill proposes to increase the Centre’s say on matters of DMF. It has been specified that the “Central Government may give directions regarding composition and utilisation of fund” by the DMF.
The question is, what does this mean for DMF implementation, if the Bill becomes a law.
To answer this, it is important to consider what has been going on with DMFs in various states, and whether a direction from the Centre is necessary on its composition and functioning.
The MMDR Amendment Act 2015, under which DMF has been instituted, specifies that its composition and functioning, should be guided by three important people-centric laws. These include, the constitutional provisions as it relates to Fifth and Sixth Schedules (for governing tribal areas), provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996, and the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (in short the Forest Rights Act).
However, the DMF Rules as developed by most State Governments frustrates this. This has also been affecting DMF implementation.
First let us consider the composition of DMFs. Barring a handful, DMFs in most states/districts are dominated by officials and political members. This is true even for DMFs in Scheduled districts. There is negligible representation of Gram Sabha members, or general mining-affected people in the DMF body. This has resulted in top-down decision making. In most top mining districts, the affected community for whom DMFs have been developed, barely have any knowledge of it, or have any say about how it operates.
Second is the issue of DMF functioning and fund use. In nearly six years time, while more than Rs. 45,000 crores have accrued to DMFs across various districts in India, there is little perceptible change on ground with respect to development indicators, and basic factors of human well-being.
A major reason for this is lack of planning. Barely any DMF Trust has developed a DMF plan to use the funds in a targeted manner, and as per the need of the people who are the beneficiaries. This has led to ad-hoc decisions on fund use, without prioritizing issues where intervention is necessary. Just one example shows this clearly. While poverty and livelihood are critical issues for the mining-affected people, no substantial investment has happened. In the first five years, most districts have spent only 0-4% of the DMF budget towards this. Equally neglected areas have been child development, healthcare etc. in many districts. At the same time, there has been no significant effort for delineating the mining-affected areas, or identifying the mining-affected people.
The Centre’s intervention, which the 2021 Bill now suggests, presumably can help to improve DMF implementation, if the right directions are given. The Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kheshtra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY) guidelines must also be revised considering the current challenges with DMFs.
What is urgently required for the states, is to revise their DMF Rules. This is where the Centre can issue necessary directions. This can include directions on:
Revising the composition of DMF to include Gram Sabha members from directly mining-affected villages/panchayats (or ward members) in the DMF Governing Council. At least 10% of the members should be from directly affected villages (or wards if an urban area).
DMF planning, including preparation of annual action plans, and perspective plans, by engaging experts.
Identifying and notifying the beneficiaries (the mining-affected people) and delineating the mining-affected areas to improve effectiveness of fund use.
Setting up of DMF office in districts for purposes of coordination, planning, monitoring, and public disclosure of information. There is already 5% of DMF funds available for this.
Establishment of a state-level monitoring and co-ordination committee, for monitoring and co-ordination of DMF operations in various districts.
Improving accountability by information disclosure in public domain, and mandating both financial and performance audits of DMF Trusts.
The bottom line is, the Centre’s increase in power to intervene on DMF implementation, should not mean more top-down control. The directions must uphold the spirit of DMF, which is of a people-centric institution.
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol entered into force on the 1st of January 2019 upon being ratified by twenty parties. As of today, a total of 112 countries ratified the amendment. Another 86 countries are yet to ratify the amendment; among these are India, China and the USA. India, on its part, has indicated the importance of sustainable and climate-friendly cooling and the essential role of natural refrigerants. This blogpost explains how safety standards of natural refrigerants is a win-win for growth, jobs and the environment.
The Montreal protocol and all its subsequent amendments focused on transitioning away from ozone depleting gases. Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) gases emerged as a stop-gap-solution for cooling applications. While HFCs are not ozone depleting they have a fairly high global warming potential (GWP). The Kigali Amendment addresses this by setting a timeline for phase-down of high-GWP HFCs. A forward-looking strategy at this time would be to avoid making another pitstop for transition refrigerants but instead make a leapfrog to climate-friendly refrigerants.
Alternatives for high-GWP refrigerants have either been low-GWP synthetic HFCs, hydrofluoroolefins (HFOs) and their blends or natural refrigerants such as ammonia, carbon dioxide, hydrocarbons (HC) and water. Multinational companies are promoting synthetic refrigerants as drop-in replacements, allowing for continued use of existing equipment. A critical drawback of synthetic refrigerants is their detrimental impact on the climate and/or the environment. For instance, many ‘low-GWP’ HFCs have GWP values of greater than 100. The breakdown products of HFOs like Trifluoroacetic acid, on the other hand, have been found to be eco-toxic and accumulate in water bodies. Additionally, most synthetic refrigerants are fiercely guarded by patents, making them expensive.
Natural refrigerants, on the other hand, have GWP values as low as 10 and are substantially cheaper than synthetic alternatives. Other widely discussed advantages of natural refrigerants include their cost saving capacity both in terms of energy efficiency and lower maintenance costs. A major hindrance to the widespread use of natural refrigerants is their flammability and/or toxicity relative to HFCs. Technological advances have enabled the safe use of HCs and ammonia for cooling applications albeit in applications requiring low amounts of refrigerants. Widespread use of natural refrigerant-based cooling as well as expanding their applications requires safety standards and skilled labour for installation and maintenance.
In 2020, the Bureau of India Standards (BIS) adopted IEC 60335-2-40:2018 and Code of Practice for design and installation of the closed-circuit ammonia systems (MED 3 (14430)). Both of these standards target natural refrigerants, aiming to make them safe to use in all types of cooling applications.
The adoption of IEC 60335-2-40:2018 is a significant move as it allows for greater charge sizes of refrigerants like HC but with more stringent safety measures. The standard may help with widespread use of Propane (HC 290) as a refrigerant in room air conditioners and perhaps even for commercial applications.
BIS’s decision to publish the code of practice MED 3 (14430) is a critical step as it prescribes India-specific standards to cover all ammonia refrigeration applications. Notably, the Association for Ammonia Refrigeration (AAR) played a pivotal role in the creation of these standards to meet specific design/testing requirements for Indian conditions. With the implementation of these standards, ammonia refrigeration systems in India will be energy-efficient, sustainable and most importantly safe.
With safety standards of natural refrigerants in place, the way forward from here would be to promote their use by the Indian manufacturers. Towards this, the Government of India can roll-out a ‘Make in India’ program for natural refrigerant-based cooling appliances. This will create a large number of jobs in manufacturing and for installation and maintenance of these units. India can also play a major role in promoting the use of natural refrigerants in other developing countries of Asia and Africa as part of south-south cooperation.
The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol entered into force on the 1st of January 2019 upon being ratified by twenty parties. As of today, a total of 112 countries ratified the amendment. Another 86 countries are yet to ratify the amendment; among these are India, China and the USA. India, on its part, has indicated the importance of sustainable and climate-friendly cooling and the essential role of natural refrigerants. This blogpost explains how safety standards of natural refrigerants is a win-win for growth, jobs and the environment.
The Montreal protocol and all its subsequent amendments focused on transitioning away from ozone depleting gases. Hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) gases emerged as a stop-gap-solution for cooling applications. While HFCs are not ozone depleting they have a fairly high global warming potential (GWP). The Kigali Amendment addresses this by setting a timeline for phase-down of high-GWP HFCs. A forward-looking strategy at this time would be to avoid making another pitstop for transition refrigerants but instead make a leapfrog to climate-friendly refrigerants.
Alternatives for high-GWP refrigerants have either been low-GWP synthetic HFCs, hydrofluoroolefins (HFOs) and their blends or natural refrigerants such as ammonia, carbon dioxide, hydrocarbons (HC) and water. Multinational companies are promoting synthetic refrigerants as drop-in replacements, allowing for continued use of existing equipment. A critical drawback of synthetic refrigerants is their detrimental impact on the climate and/or the environment. For instance, many ‘low-GWP’ HFCs have GWP values of greater than 100. The breakdown products of HFOs like Trifluoroacetic acid, on the other hand, have been found to be eco-toxic and accumulate in water bodies. Additionally, most synthetic refrigerants are fiercely guarded by patents, making them expensive.
Natural refrigerants, on the other hand, have GWP values as low as 10 and are substantially cheaper than synthetic alternatives. Other widely discussed advantages of natural refrigerants include their cost saving capacity both in terms of energy efficiency and lower maintenance costs. A major hindrance to the widespread use of natural refrigerants is their flammability and/or toxicity relative to HFCs. Technological advances have enabled the safe use of HCs and ammonia for cooling applications albeit in applications requiring low amounts of refrigerants. Widespread use of natural refrigerant-based cooling as well as expanding their applications requires safety standards and skilled labour for installation and maintenance.
In 2020, the Bureau of India Standards (BIS) adopted IEC 60335-2-40:2018 and Code of Practice for design and installation of the closed-circuit ammonia systems (MED 3 (14430)). Both of these standards target natural refrigerants, aiming to make them safe to use in all types of cooling applications.
The adoption of IEC 60335-2-40:2018 is a significant move as it allows for greater charge sizes of refrigerants like HC but with more stringent safety measures. The standard may help with widespread use of Propane (HC 290) as a refrigerant in room air conditioners and perhaps even for commercial applications.
BIS’s decision to publish the code of practice MED 3 (14430) is a critical step as it prescribes India-specific standards to cover all ammonia refrigeration applications. Notably, the Association for Ammonia Refrigeration (AAR) played a pivotal role in the creation of these standards to meet specific design/testing requirements for Indian conditions. With the implementation of these standards, ammonia refrigeration systems in India will be energy-efficient, sustainable and most importantly safe.
With safety standards of natural refrigerants in place, the way forward from here would be to promote their use by the Indian manufacturers. Towards this, the Government of India can roll-out a ‘Make in India’ program for natural refrigerant-based cooling appliances. This will create a large number of jobs in manufacturing and for installation and maintenance of these units. India can also play a major role in promoting the use of natural refrigerants in other developing countries of Asia and Africa as part of south-south cooperation.
