अजरबैजान के बाकू में हालिया संयुक्त राष्ट्र जलवायु सम्मेलन (COP 29) में जो जलवायु वित्तपोषण समझौता हुआ, उससे इतिहास की एक बड़ी प्रसिद्ध बात याद आती है। 1942 में महात्मा गांधी ने क्रिप्स मिशन की आलोचना करते हुए इसके प्रस्ताव को डूबते हुए किसी बैंक में आया ‘एक आने का चेक’ बताया था। दोनों बातों में बस एक फर्क है- महात्मा गांधी ने इस मिशन के प्रस्ताव को एक आने का चेक कहकर रिजेक्ट कर दिया था, जबकि आलोचना के बावजूद कॉप के वित्तपोषण समझौते को भारत सहित कई देशों ने अपना लिया है। यह मंजूरी बताती है कि जलवायु संकट दूर करने में संयुक्त राष्ट्र फ्रेमवर्क कन्वेंशन ऑन क्लाइमेट चेंज (UNFCCC) सहित बाकी दुनिया ने जो कोशिशें की हैं, वे बड़े लेवल पर फेल हो गई हैं।
नहीं मानी मांग
बाकू सम्मेलन में विकासशील देशों ने 2030 तक क्लाइमेट इमरजेंसी से निपटने के लिए विकसित देशों से सालाना 1.3 ट्रिलियन डॉलर मांगे थे। प्रस्ताव में कम से कम 500 बिलियन डॉलर की सरकारी रकम शामिल थी, बाकी प्राइवेट सेक्टर से रियायती दरों पर दिए जाने की मांग थी। दो हफ्तों की विवादास्पद बातचीत के बाद अंतिम समझौते में विकसित देशों ने 2035 तक केवल 300 बिलियन डॉलर सालाना देने की बात कही। इसमें सरकारी पैसे का कोई जिक्र नहीं है, बल्कि यह लिखा है कि यह किसी भी स्रोत से आ सकता है।
धुंधला वादा
पैसे जुटाने के स्रोतों के मामले में यह समझौता बेहद धुंधला वादा करता है। इससे भी खराब बात यह है कि यह समझौता विकसित देशों को विश्व बैंक जैसे मल्टिलैटरल डिवेलपमेंट बैंकों से जलवायु संबंधी कर्ज को मनी पूल के हिस्से के रूप में शामिल करने की अनुमति देता है। यानी विकसित देशों पर 2035 तक वर्तमान 100 बिलियन डॉलर सालाना से ज्यादा धनराशि देने का कोई दायित्व नहीं है।
क्या करेंगे ट्रंप
इस समझौते का राजनीतिक भविष्य भी अनिश्चित है, क्योंकि इस बात की बहुत कम संभावना है कि बाइडन प्रशासन ने जलवायु को लेकर जो भी प्रतिबद्धताएं की हैं, उनका ट्रंप एडमिनिस्ट्रेशन भी सम्मान करेगा। लब्बोलुआब यह है कि बाकू समझौता बताता है कि विकसित देश जलवायु परिवर्तन के समाधान से अपना हाथ झाड़ना चाहते हैं और जलवायु संकट की बढ़ती लागतों का सारा बोझ विकासशील देशों पर थोपना चाहते हैं।
गलत उम्मीद
वैसे, इन सब चीजों से बहुत ताज्जुब नहीं होना चाहिए। 2009 में विकसित देशों ने 2020 तक क्लाइमेट फाइनेंस में सालाना 100 अरब डॉलर देने का वादा किया था, मगर पूरा किया 2022 तक। इसमें भी लगभग 70% हिस्सा मार्केट की महंगी दरों पर दिया कर्ज था। इससे विकासशील राष्ट्रों पर कर्ज का बोझ और भी बढ़ गया। उन देशों से खरबों डॉलर की उम्मीद करना हमेशा से ही अवास्तविक था, जो अरबों डॉलर देने में ही आनाकानी कर रहे थे। अब विकासशील देशों को क्लाइमेट फाइनेंस को लेकर नए उपाय करने होंगे।
कमजोरों से वसूली
अब वैश्विक वित्तीय प्रणाली में मौलिक सुधारों की जरूरत है ताकि विकासशील देश जलवायु संकट से निपटने के काबिल बन सकें और सभी देशों को ठीक से सहयोग देने के लायक बनाने के लिए UNFCCC में सुधार किया जा सके। आज की वैश्विक वित्तीय प्रणाली कमजोर देशों के खिलाफ है। उदाहरण के लिए, गरीब अफ्रीकी देश कर्ज पर जिन ब्याज दरों का भुगतान करते हैं वे अमेरिका द्वारा भुगतान की जाने वाली दरों से चार गुना अधिक और धनी यूरोपीय देशों द्वारा भुगतान की जाने वाली दरों से आठ गुना अधिक हैं।
बढ़ता बोझ
संयुक्त राष्ट्र पर्यावरण कार्यक्रम की एक रिपोर्ट बताती है कि जलवायु संबंधी चुनौतियों ने पहले ही 25 कमजोर विकासशील देशों को मिलने वाला कर्ज महंगा कर रखा है। इन देशों को सिर्फ सरकारी कर्ज पर 10 वर्षों में अतिरिक्त 40 बिलियन डॉलर के ब्याज का भुगतान करना होता है। इसका मतलब है कि विकासशील देश आज के जलवायु जोखिमों के चलते धनी देशों और उनके बैंकों को करोड़ों डॉलर अलग से दे रहे हैं। यह बोझ अगले दशक में दोगुना हो जाएगा। यानी इन देशों पर जलवायु संबंधी चुनौतियों का फायदा उठाया जा रहा है।
ठंडा पड़ा अजेंडा
इस अन्याय को दूर करने के लिए भारत ने अपनी G20 अध्यक्षता के दौरान कई बेहतरीन प्रस्ताव दिए थे। इसके अलावा वर्षों से कई और प्रस्ताव वैश्विक संस्थानों के अजेंडे में हैं। ये सुधार लागू होंगे, तभी विकासशील देशों की विकसित देशों पर असंगत, अन्यापूर्ण और अपर्याप्त धन की निर्भरता कम होगी और वे अपने संसाधनों का उपयोग करके राहत पा सकेंगे।
भारत का आरोप
वैसे, UNFCCC के भीतर भी सुधार जरूरी हैं। बाकू में भारत ने COP अध्यक्षता और UNFCCC सचिवालय पर वित्त समझौते को अपनाने में होने वाली प्रक्रिया में हेरफेर करने का आरोप लगाया, जो संस्थान में गहरे अविश्वास को दर्शाता है। इसके अलावा UNFCCC की कार्यवाही में फॉसिल फ्यूल बिजनेस के बढ़ते प्रभाव से इसकी विश्वसनीयता और प्रासंगिकता को खतरा है। सचाई यह है कि UNFCCC अब केवल जानकारी जुटाने, उनका हिसाब करके आगे बढ़ाने का ही मंच रह गया है।
कई फ्रेमवर्क बने
अब ऐसे में किया क्या जाए? एक तो UNFCCC को छोटी-छोटी ऐसी मीटिंगों में बदला जाए, जहां समाधान निकले और जहां देश अपने वादों के लिए जवाबदेह हों। किसी सिंगल ग्लोबल फ्रेमवर्क पर निर्भर रहने की जगह अगर वाकई बदलाव लाना है तो ऊर्जा, परिवहन, कृषि, उद्योग वगैरह पर कई वैश्विक और क्षेत्रीय मंच बनाने होंगे।
ब्राजील पर दारोमदार
बाकू सम्मेलन ने इंटरनैशनल क्लाइमेट फ्रेमवर्क कमजोरियां तो दिखाई ही हैं, यह भी उजागर किया है कि इसे लेकर देशों के बीच कितना गहरा अविश्वास है। अब सारा दारोमदार COP30 के मेजबान ब्राजील पर है कि वह भरोसा बहाल करते हुए सार्थक प्रगति करे। ऐसा इसलिए भी, क्योंकि जलवायु परिवर्तन के खिलाफ जो लड़ाई चल रही है, वह ठोस सुधारों के बगैर पूरी नहीं होनी है, अलबत्ता निष्क्रिय होने का उस पर जोखिम जरूर है।
Baku conference has shown up the glaring inadequacy of the international climate framework and the deep mistrust among nations. Bad news for the fight against climate change
Mahatma Gandhi’s famous critique of the Cripps Mission in 1942—describing its proposal as “a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank”—perfectly captures the essence of the climate finance deal adopted at COP29, the recent UN climate conference in Baku, Azerbaijan. However, there is one crucial difference: while Cripp’s figurative cheque was decisively rejected, the Baku finance deal, despite criticism from several nations, including India, was adopted. This highlights the broader failures of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and global efforts to address the climate crisis.
The Baku conference began with developing countries demanding $1.3 trillion in annual funding from developed nations by 2030 to tackle the climate emergency. Their proposal called for at least $500 billion in public funding, with the remainder provided as concessional private finance.
Yet, after two weeks of contentious negotiations, developed countries committed to only $300 billion annually by 2035, with no binding pledge for public funding. Instead, the deal vaguely promises to source funds from “a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.”
Worse still, the agreement permits developed countries to include climate-related loans from multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, as part of the funding pool. This means developed nations are under no obligation to increase funding beyond the current $100 billion annually until 2035. Moreover, they retain the freedom to count virtually any climate-related financial flow to developing countries as part of their contributions.
The political future of this deal is equally uncertain, as there is little chance that the incoming Trump administration will honour the commitments made by the Biden administration.
In essence, the Baku deal offers little more than a continuation of the status quo, allowing developed nations to sidestep meaningful financial obligations while leaving developing countries to shoulder the escalating costs of the climate crisis.
However, this is not surprising. In 2009, developed countries pledged $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020. They met this target in 2022, and even then, nearly 70% of the funds were provided as loans at market rates, burdening developing nations with debt. Expecting trillions from nations that struggled to deliver billions was always unrealistic. So, how should developing countries secure meaningful climate finance?
The path forward requires fundamental reforms in the global financial system to empower developing countries to deal with the climate crisis and revamping the UNFCCC to enable effective international collaboration.
The current global financial system is stacked against vulnerable nations. Poor African countries, for instance, pay interest rates on loans that are four times higher than those paid by the U.S. and up to eight times higher than those paid by wealthy European countries. This disparity is being exacerbated by the climate crisis.
A report by the UN Environment Programme, Climate Change and the Cost of Capital in Developing Countries, found that climate vulnerability has already increased the average cost of debt in 25 vulnerable developing countries by 117 basis points. This translates to an additional $40 billion in interest payments over 10 years on government debt in these countries alone. This means developing nations are currently paying hundreds of billions of dollars to wealthy countries and their banks due to climate risks. The report predicts that this financial burden will double over the next decade. In effect, the current financial system is profiting from their climate vulnerability.
To address this injustice, several proposals, including those advanced during India’s G20 presidency, have been on the agenda for years. These include measures like debt crisis management, multilateral development bank reforms, risk mitigation programmes, and blended finance strategies. Implementing these reforms would enable developing countries to invest more in mitigation and adaptation using their own resources.
Reforms within the UNFCCC are equally urgent. At Baku, India accused the COP Presidency and the UNFCCC Secretariat of manipulating the process to secure the adoption of the finance deal, reflecting a deep trust deficit in the institution. Additionally, the growing influence of the fossil fuel industry in UNFCCC proceedings threatens its credibility and relevance.
The reality is that under the Paris Agreement, all countries are now on their own to mitigate, adapt and pay for the costs of climate impacts. The UNFCCC is now simply a platform to collect, synthesize and disseminate information. It doesn’t have the tools to drive global collective action to combat climate change. So, persisting with UNFCCC in the present form is counterproductive.
There are many ideas on the table including making UNFCCC a smaller solution-driven forum where countries report their progress and are held accountable to their pledges. Other suggestions include establishing multiple sectoral and regional platforms, such as on energy, transportation, agriculture, industry etc., rather than relying on a single global framework.
The Baku conference has laid bare the glaring weaknesses of the international climate framework and the deep mistrust among nations. It is now up to Brazil, the host of COP30, to restore trust and drive meaningful progress. Without decisive reforms, the global fight against climate change risks being mired in inadequacy and inaction, with all the attendant hazards for life on earth.
It was a grim reality check that the world prioritises fortifying borders over securing a liveable planet.
In an era defined by the twin existential crises of security and survival, two pledges stand as examples of human ambition and the competing narratives in 2024.
On one side is NATO’s defence spending of over $1.4 trillion reported in 2024 (with most members stepping up on their war spending with a floor of 2 percent of their GDP) – an amount steeped in the urgency of geopolitical tensions and an evolving war landscape.
On the other is the global demand to mobilise $1.3 trillion for climate action in developing nations – a lifeline for countries most vulnerable to the ravages of climate change, yet least responsible for its causes.
Two Fronts in the Fight for Better Life
The proponents of the NATO pledge argue that in an era of resurgent authoritarianism, territorial disputes, and warfare, military investment is not a luxury but a necessity.
The war in Ukraine has been a reminder for many countries that peace cannot be taken for granted, and deterrence requires resources.
To NATO allies, this is about preserving sovereignty, democracy, and the global rules-based order – a narrative that resonates deeply in a fragmented world.
They rallied for a $1.3 trillion climate finance pledge by the developed countries, which echoed, not only a call for delivering on climate action, but also responding to justice.
These nations face threats of supercharged storms, floods, and droughts, that threaten to erase communities and economies.
Their call is simple yet profound: the industrialised world, which grew wealthy through carbon-intensive development, bears a moral responsibility to fund their transition to greener futures and build resilience against the climate crisis.
At Baku, various developing countries including India, indicated the urgency of climate financing to save the lives and livelihoods of millions of people who are among the most economically insolvent.
The flow of finances for strengthening adaptation measures for these people is extremely important, not only to prevent them from slipping into further distress, but also to ensure justice and equal opportunity in a greener economy.
The requirement for this is substantial, as both mitigation and adaptation measures are costly to put in place.
For example, India’s Economic Survey report this year noted that the country’s adaptation expenditure in 2021-2022 was about Rs 13.35 lakh crore, which amounted to about 5.6 percent of the country’s GDP.
At COP29, India called for a boost of in adaptation finance, indicating that building adaptation capital could rise to over $854 billion.
The Geopolitical Dilemma of the Urgent vs the Essential
The simultaneous existence of these figures reveals a broader geopolitical tension: the challenge of reconciling the urgent with the essential.
Many within the corridors of Baku’s COP pavilion argue that defence spending highlights a paradox: resources can be swiftly mobilised for war, yet climate action commitments often languish unfulfilled.
In 2009, developed countries pledged to mobilise $100 billion annually in climate finance by 2020, a target that remained unmet for the longest time. Even when it came, a large proportion (over 69 percent) was in the form of loans that added to the debt burden of many developing countries.
Therefore, skepticism abounds over the controversial New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) to scale up financing to developing countries to at least $1.3 trillion per year by 2035, in which developed countries have pledged to take the lead to mobilise $300 billion.
However, on the other hand, it is only likely that the defenders of defence spending will argue that without security, there can be no climate action.
As countries prepare to update their climate pledges under the upcoming Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) 3.0 cycle, Just Transition is emerging as an essential cross-cutting agenda to strengthen the action of mitigation, adaption, and resilience measures by various countries.
The draft negotiation text of the United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme (UAE-JTWP) has underscored the “multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional nature of just transition” that cuts across all the pillars of climate action. This comprehensive approach envisions addressing not only the carbon transition but also the socio-economic transformations it entails. Therefore, to ensure a Just Transition, or move away from fossil fuels, requires a ‘whole-of-economy’ approach.
Where are we on actionable steps?
An important agenda for COP29 this week will be to frame actionable steps under the JTWP to enable countries to design and implement Just Transition measures, aligning with climate commitments under the Paris Agreement. While each country’s journey to a Just Transition will be based on unique national circumstances, including socio-economic conditions, resources, and priorities, some clear actionable steps can ensure collective and timebound action.
The second annual inter-ministerial roundtable held in Baku on November 18th brought to light some steps that must be enforced through the work programme.
A key one in this regard is the need for strong financial commitments to support Just Transition measures in developing countries. There is a strong sentiment from the negotiators that this requires significant public investment to ensure a fair and inclusive transition. The emphasis should be on prioritizing public finance as the primary driver, rather than high reliance on market mechanisms or investments driven by profit. By placing public finance at the forefront, international institutions can address the social and economic challenges of transition, ensuring that the process is equitable and aligned with long-term development goals.
The other aspect is to guide Parties and build their capacity to develop comprehensive Just Transition policies and plans that can be suitably integrated into the updated NDs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), and also development plans.
Finally, there is a need to specify measurable targets, especially short and medium-term targets, to achieve long-term outcomes.
With such measures put in place through the JTWP, Just Transition can be a huge opportunity to support inclusive and green economic growth in developing countries, and not undermine their developmental ambitions.
Listening to voices beyond decision-makers
Besides these, an important issue for Just Transition will be to create appropriate platforms, to ensure representation and participation of various stakeholders. Mr. Nabeel Munir, the Chairperson of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) to the UNFCCC, in his opening remarks at the inter-ministerial roundtable emphasized that a transition “will never be just if the floor is only given to the decision-makers.”
The JTWP should therefore design spaces where diverse voices can actively contribute to decision-making. This inclusivity will help to bring to the floor the unique challenges and needs of those most affected by the transition, making policies more responsive and grounded in local realities. Such an approach will also build trust, legitimacy, and broader support for Just Transition action and make it truly a people’s agenda.
Air pollution is plaguing the capital and smaller cities across India. But who contributes the most—vehicles, industries, wood-fired cookstoves, or stubble burning? These FAQs address common questions, using latest data.
1. What is the true scale of our pollution crisis?
We are facing a subcontinental-scale problem. The thick haze in Delhi extends across the Indo-Gangetic Plains (IGP). Smaller cities like Bhiwadi, Darbhanga, and Moradabad often report higher pollution levels than Delhi, and rural areas are equally affected.
Pollution levels are 5–10 times higher than national standards and 20–40 times higher than WHO health-based guidelines. Solving this problem requires collective action from every city, state, and sector of the economy to significantly reduce emissions.
2. What are the main sources of pollution in India and Delhi-NCR?
Our research shows that India emits approximately 5.2 million tonnes (MT) of direct PM2.5 annually (excluding natural and manmade dust). Of this:
48% comes from biomass (e.g., fuelwood and dung cakes) used for cooking and heating.
6.5% comes from open burning of crop residues. Together, biomass burning accounts for 55% of total PM2.5 emissions.
37% comes from industry and power plants.
7% comes from the transport sector.
Figure 1: PM2.5 inventory of India
Source: iFOREST
In Delhi-NCR, biomass burning contributes more than 60% of PM2.5, industry accounts for 25%, and transport contributes around 6%.
Figure 2: PM2.5 inventory of Delhi-NCR
Source: iFOREST
3. Are there other studies that support the claim that biomass is a major source of pollution in Delhi-NCR?
Several studies confirm the significant role of biomass burning in Delhi-NCR’s air pollution, including one from the Central Pollution Control Board.
1. Awasthi, A. et al.: Biomass-burning sources control ambient particulate matter, but traffic and industrial sources control volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions and secondary-pollutant formation during extreme pollution events in Delhi, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 24, 10279–10304, https://doi.org/10.5194/acp-24-10279-2024, 2024.
This paper shows that during the smog season, direct PM10 (52 ± 8 %) and PM2.5 (48 ± 12 %) emissions were dominated by different biomass-burning sources.
2. Mishra, S. et al.: Rapid night-time nanoparticle growth in Delhi driven by biomass-burning emissions, Nat. Geosci., 16, 224–230, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41561-023-01138-x, 2023.
This paper found that biomass burning is the primary cause of intense and frequent night time particle growth during haze development in Delhi.
3. Lalchandani, V. et al.: Effect of Biomass Burning on PM2.5 Composition and Secondary Aerosol Formation During Post-Monsoon and Winter Haze Episodes in Delhi, J. Geophys. Res. Atmos., 126, e2021JD035232, https://doi.org/10.1029/2021JD035232, 2021.
This paper too finds that the burning of biomass material is the largest contributor to haze events during post-monsoon and winter haze events.
4. Central Pollution Control Board: Report of the Committee in O.A. No. 19/2021 in the matter of Sanjay Kumar versus State of UP & Ors, in compliance with the order dated 09.09.2021 of the Hon’ble National Green Tribunal,December 2022.
This report of the Central Pollution Control Board, on the direction of the NGT, published the emissions inventory of the entire Indo-Gangetic Plans, found the following:
The total PM2.5 emissions was 2.3 million tonnes. Biomass burning contributed about 35% of the total PM2.5, industries contributed 48.5% and transport sector’s contribution was 5%.
As you can see from the above reports, while numbers can vary dependent on the methodology and scope of the study, there is no doubt that biomass is a major contributor of air pollution in Delhi and in the entire country.
4. Why does biomass burning in homes and fields contribute so much to PM2.5?
The reason is simple: unlike automobiles and industries where some pollution control devices are used, biomass cookstoves and open burning in fields emit all of their pollutants unconstrained into the air. Thus, PM2.5 emission per kilogram of biomass in cookstoves is tens to hundreds of times more than those from per kg of coal in power plants or diesel in automobiles.
An estimate by renowned scientists Kirk R. Smith and Ajay Pillarisetti show that one year of cooking on a traditional chulha emits particles equivalent to the emissions of 20 diesel trucks driving 50,000 km a year and meeting Euro 6 standards. This is precisely why rural areas suffer equally from air pollution. There is ample research evidence to show that outdoor air pollution in India is not just an urban India problem.
5. Are we not blaming and victimising the poor by focussing on biomass?
Absolutely not. The poor, especially poor women and children, are the worst sufferers of air pollution. They are hit twice over. They are affected by indoor air pollution, because of firewood and cow dung cakes burning in their chulhas and they are affected by outdoor air pollution.
We advocate for transitioning the poor to cleaner cooking fuels, reducing their exposure to harmful pollutants. This makes air pollution mitigation a pro-poor and pro-women agenda, as it prioritises vulnerable populations while also addressing the main sources of pollution.
Central Government schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which enable the poor with cleaner cooking fuels, have been far more transformative in combating air pollution than implementing GRAP, odd even, or other quick fix measures that are implemented each year. We are recommending a new version of PMUY to support the poor households in shifting to cleaner cooking fuel like LPG, biogas or electricity.
6. Are you not equating the luxury emissions of rich to the survival emissions of poor?
When we use the framework of ‘luxury vs. survival’ emissions, which is a construct of the climate change politics between developed and developing countries, we are basically advocating to keep the poor exposed to the worst air pollution. This ‘luxury vs. survival’ emissions politics basically says that let the poor burn biomass and suffer, till the time we can show that we are acting on the rich by focussing on SUVs and large industries. This is what we have done in the last 25 years. Our singular focus has been on automobiles and large industries but it has not made any significant impact on the air quality. ‘Luxury vs. survival’ emissions is one of the most unethical framing of the air pollution issue.
The fact is that the politics over rich vs. poor, farmers vs. city-dwellers, SUVs vs. cook stoves, and Diwali vs. stubble burning have stalled real work on air pollution. We must work on an agenda which helps the poor and small industries to transition to cleaner fuels.
7. What are iFOREST’s key policy recommendations for Delhi-NCR?
PM Ujjwala 3.0: Our study shows that the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana has been the most impactful air pollution intervention in the last decade. Expanding access to clean cooking fuel across Delhi-NCR could reduce PM2.5 generation by 25%. Achieving this will require a new PM Ujjwala Yojana to transition households to LPG or electricity for cooking. Research indicates a 75% subsidy is necessary to enable exclusive LPG use in low-income households, requiring around Rs. 5,000–6,000 per household annually, similar to the PM Kisan Samman Nidhi. In Delhi-NCR, this initiative would cost around Rs. 6,000–7,000 crore per year, a fraction of the annual healthcare costs associated with air pollution-related diseases. This will be a profoundly pro-poor and pro-women initiative, especially considering that nearly 600,000 Indians, primarily women, die prematurely from indoor air pollution each year.
Clean Heating Fuel: Across India, over 90% of households rely on biomass and solid fuels to heat their homes during winter, contributing to pollution spikes in December and January. One of China’s pivotal air quality initiatives was a national clean heating fuel policy. While developing a similar long-term plan is essential, in the short term, the Delhi government could ensure that only electricity is used for winter heating and enforce a strict ban on open burning. This approach will yield swift improvements in Delhi’s air quality.
Package to End Stubble Burning: Stubble burning is a primary contributor to the sharp rise in pollution levels each October and November. Curbing this practice would reduce the occurrence of severe and hazardous air pollution days. Both short- and long-term strategies are needed. In the long term, agriculture in Punjab, Haryana, and parts of UP must transition from intensive rice-wheat farming to a diversified crop system. In the short term, technology and incentives can play a key role. The simplest technological solution is to modify or mandate combine harvesters that cut closer to the ground like manual harvesting, leaving minimal stubble on the ground. Additionally, an incentive of Rs. 1,000 per acre—similar to what the Haryana Government provides—could encourage farmers to manage stubble sustainably, coupled with penalties, such as fine and exclusion from government schemes for those who continue to burn it. This scheme would cost approximately Rs. 2,500 crores annually.
Energy Transition in Industry: Industry and power plants account for roughly one-third of annual PM2.5 emissions in Delhi-NCR. Reducing these emissions will require both technological upgrades and stricter enforcement. A scheme encouraging MSMEs to adopt cleaner fuel sources, especially electric boilers and furnaces, could significantly curb emissions. For larger industries, stringent pollution norms and enforcement are essential. Shutting down older thermal power plants and enforcing the 2015 standards, which have yet to be fully implemented, will also be critical.
EVs and Public Transport: Scaling up electric vehicles is crucial for reducing city’s air pollution. Initially, the focus should be on transitioning two- and three-wheelers, as well as buses, since they are already economically viable. Aiming for 100% electrification of new two- and three-wheeler sales by 2030, and converting all new buses to electric by 2025 in Delhi-NCR, would significantly lower vehicle emissions. Additionally, setting a 30–50% electrification target for cars and other vehicles will help accelerate the transition to cleaner urban transport. Apart from EVs, scaling up public transport and NMTs is crucial. This will also need clear city-wide targets and promotion as a lifestyle choice.
Green Belt Development: Dust pollution from within Delhi and neighboring areas, coupled with seasonal dust from the Thar Desert, has a substantial impact on air quality. Creating a green belt around Delhi would serve as a natural barrier against incoming dust. Additionally, increasing green cover within the city, including roadside and open space greening, is essential to control local dust pollution.
Strengthen Municipalities: Local sources of pollution—such as dust from roads and construction, open burning, traffic congestion, and inadequate waste management—are best controlled by municipalities. Municipalities must be held accountable for addressing these issues year-round, rather than only during peak pollution seasons. Strengthening the National Clean Air Program to support municipal efforts will be key to achieving sustainable air quality improvements.
Acknowledging the true impact and sources of our pollution crisis is the first step toward meaningful action
A quarter-century ago, over 200 scientists from the US, Europe, the Maldives, and India came together to study the haze over the Indian Ocean. Led by atmospheric scientist V Ramanathan of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography in California, the Indian Ocean Experiment (INDOEX) undertook intensive field observations using aircraft, ships, surface stations, and satellites. They discovered a giant brown layer of cloud hanging over much of the Indian Subcontinent and the Indian Ocean between October and February, which they termed the Indian Ocean Brown Cloud or Asian Brown Cloud. INDOEX revealed that this layer was primarily created by the burning of biomass in fields and homes, as well as fossil fuels like coal in industries, and that it traveled thousands of kilometres. The study also found that the haze significantly affected regional temperatures, precipitation patterns, and ground-level pollution, reducing agricultural productivity and causing widespread respiratory and cardiovascular diseases.
When the UN Environment Programme published the INDOEX report in 2002, some prominent Indian scientists called it sensationalist and argued that the “Indian Ocean” or “Asian” Brown Cloud was not unique to India or Asia and should, therefore, be renamed. Because of their opposition, the name was changed to “Atmospheric Brown Cloud with a Focus on Asia”. Governments in South Asia ignored the report.
This episode underscores two key points: First, the causes of air pollution have been known for at least 25 years and second, we have been avoiding the issue for just as long. By injecting ideology and politics into what should be a straightforward matter, we continue to muddy the waters. Debates over rich versus poor, farmers versus city-dwellers, SUVs versus cook stoves, and Diwali versus stubble burning have stalled real action.
The result of this obfuscation is that today, from Amritsar in Punjab to Agartala in Tripura, an arc of brown haze, up to 3 km thick, has engulfed the Indo-Gangetic plains (IGP), impacting lives, livelihoods, and the economy. While pollution levels are severe in the IGP, air quality is poor across the country. Most Indian cities fail to meet national ambient air quality standards, which are quite lenient compared to WHO’s health-based guidelines. The primary cause of this pollution remains the same as what Ramanathan and his colleagues identified 25 years ago.
In a study conducted by my colleagues and me in 2023, we estimated that India emits about 52 lakh tonnes of PM2.5 (particulate matter less than 2.5 microns in size, which has high health impacts) annually, excluding dust from natural and manmade sources. Around 48 per cent of these emissions come from biomass use — such as agricultural residue, fuelwood, and dung cakes — for cooking and heating in homes. Stubble burning contributes an additional 6.5 per cent, making biomass burning responsible for 55 per cent of total PM2.5 emissions.
Industry and power plants are the second-largest emitters, contributing about 37 per cent, primarily from coal burning. The transport sector, a major focus of air pollution mitigation, contributes about 7 per cent of the emissions, while the remainder comes from sources such as open garbage burning.
These findings are not surprising if we follow the dictum: What we burn the most, pollutes the most. In India, we burn about 220 crore tonnes of fuel and waste. Of this, 85 per cent is coal and biomass, while 15 per cent comprises other fuels such as petrol, diesel, and natural gas. Naturally, most of our pollution is due to burning biomass and coal. Additionally, dust from roads, construction sites, and barren land contributes to particulate pollution, especially PM 10.
To address air pollution decisively, we must follow a scientific approach, and move beyond optics like odd-even, construction bans and artificial rain, and instead focus on the real solution – energy transition. Shifting households to LPG, biogas, or electricity for cooking and heating will eliminate a significant proportion of PM 2.5 emissions. It will also prevent 8,00,000 premature deaths, caused by exposure to PM 2.5 inside homes. Though challenging, this is achievable through targeted policy initiatives like a new PM Ujjwala Yojana that provides sufficient incentives to encourage low-income households to move away from traditional biomass.
Similarly, energy transition in industry, especially in MSMEs, along with rigorous monitoring and enforcement, is necessary to reduce pollution. A programme encouraging MSMEs to adopt cleaner fuel and technologies, such as electric boilers and furnaces, could curb emissions significantly. Law enforcement of stringent pollution norms is a basic necessity for larger industries and thermal power plants. For that, the modernisation of pollution control boards is urgently required.
On the other hand, eliminating stubble burning is essential to decrease severe and hazardous pollution days in October and November. Technological interventions along with incentives/ disincentives can solve this problem. The simplest technological solution is to modify or mandate combine harvesters that cut closer to the ground, like manual harvesting, leaving minimal stubble behind. Additionally, an incentive of Rs 1,000 per acre — similar to what the Haryana government provides — could encourage sustainable stubble management, along with fines and exclusion from government schemes for those who continue to burn.
As far as automobiles are concerned, scaling up electric vehicles and public transport is crucial. This will need clear targets for EV adoption and the promotion of public transport as a lifestyle choice. Lastly, to reduce local sources of pollution — dust from roads and construction, garbage burning, and traffic congestion — local bodies must be strengthened and held accountable.
Real progress will only begin once we accept the science. Acknowledging the true impact and sources of our pollution crisis is the first step toward meaningful action.
Trump’s re-election is a stark wake-up call for all nations. They must increase their climate finance and mitigation targets for 2035 and beyond without relying on Washington
The 29th UN Climate Conference (COP29), held in Baku, Azerbaijan, from November 11 to 22, has opened under ominous circumstances. The re-election of Donald Trump as U.S. president looms over the event, reviving memories of his first term, when he withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, halted climate funding, and significantly slowed international climate progress. During those years, the U.S. largely stood on the sidelines, often obstructing negotiations through proxies. Aside from partial progress at COP24 in Katowice in 2018—where the “rulebook” for implementing the Paris Agreement was advanced—Trump’s presidency was largely a setback for climate action.
Now, as global leaders gather in Baku, they face the possibility of similar inaction and obstruction from the U.S. The pressing question, therefore, is whether the world can afford another four years of inaction. If not, what strategies should countries pursue to advance international climate goals independently of the U.S.?
Falling Short: Recent data from international agencies reveal that, despite record-breaking investments in clean energy, the world remains off track to meet the Paris Agreement targets. In 2023, nearly $2 trillion was invested in clean energy projects—almost twice the amount invested in new oil, gas, and coal infrastructure. Yet, current policies and investments are leading the world toward a dangerous trajectory, with global temperatures likely to increase by more than 3°C.
This shortfall is largely due to the inadequate emission reduction efforts by G20 countries, which collectively account for roughly 80% of global greenhouse gas emissions. A UN Environment Programme assessment shows that several major economies—including the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia, China, and Saudi Arabia—are not on course to meet their 2030 emission-reduction pledges, known as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). While countries like India are projected to meet their NDCs, their overall emissions are expected to increase as they expand energy use to support basic development needs.
Against this backdrop, COP29 in Baku must tackle three interlinked priorities: scaling up climate finance, establishing effective carbon market rules, and setting the next phase of NDCs for 2035 and beyond.
Climate Finance: Dubbed the “Finance COP,” COP29’s primary focus is on climate finance. The conference is tasked with setting a new climate finance target, known as the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG), to support vulnerable and developing countries in combating climate change. This NCQG is intended to replace the previous target established in 2009, when developed nations committed to providing $100 billion annually by 2020. However, independent assessments reveal that this $100 billion goal was only reached in 2022, two years late, and much of the funding was in the form of loans, which has exacerbated debt burdens in many developing countries. The current need for climate finance is now far greater than in 2009.
A recent UN evaluation estimates that developing countries require around $500 billion annually, with some other projections suggesting that over $1 trillion is needed each year. At COP29 in Baku, developed countries must agree on the scope of the NCQG in a way that meets the needs of developing nations. Yet, with Trump’s U.S. unlikely to contribute significantly, the question remains: What will other developed countries offer? Will Baku see only a symbolic financial pledge, or will it result in substantial funding to spur global climate action?
Carbon Trading: Closely tied to climate finance is the contentious issue of carbon markets. In recent years, carbon markets have been a focal point in negotiations due to their mixed impact. On the one hand, they have potential to generate funding for climate mitigation; on the other, issues like fraudulent accounting and greenwashing have undermined their credibility. These concerns stalled agreement on carbon market rules in the past few COPs, but Baku is expected to finalize and operationalize these rules to restore trust and ensure integrity.
Setting New Targets: While many countries are not on track to meet their 2030 NDCs, new targets for 2035 are required by early 2025. COP29 is likely the last major opportunity to clarify expectations for post-2030 climate targets. These goals, however, are intertwined with outcomes on climate finance and carbon markets. An ambitious NCQG would allow developing countries to commit to higher targets, while a robust and transparent carbon market could empower developed countries to set more ambitious targets through emissions offsetting.
While COP29 in Baku is an important milestone, the odds of achieving an ambitious outcome appear slim considering the likely backtracking by the US. In addition, Azerbaijan, a significant oil and gas producer, is not known for climate leadership, so expectations must be tempered.
The key question facing the world now is how to drive global climate action without relying heavily on the US. I believe that over-reliance on U.S. leadership has been the main reason for the shortcomings of global climate progress. The US has never been a climate leader. Since 1992, when the first global climate agreement was signed, the US emissions have only reduced by 3%, meaning they have remained virtually unchanged in the last three decades. Furthermore, the U.S. has not been a major contributor to climate finance, often falling short on its commitments.
Trump’s re-election should, therefore, be a stark wake-up call, highlighting the need for a more diverse, multipolar approach to climate leadership. Just as global power structures are evolving into a multipolar landscape, climate governance must follow suit. Countries like China, India, the EU, Russia, South Africa, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil are well-positioned to champion climate action within their respective regions, fostering a more resilient and collective approach.
By distributing climate leadership across multiple nations, the world has a better chance to unify and make substantial progress on this existential crisis, without being stalled by any one country’s political shifts.
