Publisher: TOI+

Yes, China massively reduced urban air pollution. Some of its strategies are worth studying. But an authoritarian govt can implement changes a democracy can’t. And India can’t spend as much as China did. We need our own solution

There is a Hindi idiom – chutki lena – that loosely translates as teasing, trolling, mocking or putting someone down. Social media today is full of people taking chutki over air pollution in Delhi. The recent tweet by Chinese Embassy spokesperson, offering a “step-by-step guide” on how Beijing tackled air pollution, falls into this category. It is unsolicited, overly generic and not helpful regardless that the Chinese capital on Thursday suffered a rare smog (AQI climbed to 214) after years of pollution clean-up efforts.

Researchers in India, including myself, have followed Beijing’s air quality journey closely for years. We have studied the “Beijing model”, examined its successes and understood its limitations. One must first recognise a basic reality about information coming out of China:it is tightly controlled and never complete.While general descriptions of actions taken and headline pollution reductions are widely available, crucial information is missing.

Data on regulatory enforcement, economic costs, public expenditure, private sector liabilities, worker displacement, compensation and social costs are largely absent. Without this information, simply lifting the Beijing model and superimposing it on Delhi is neither feasible nor responsible.

That said, there is no denying Beijing has achieved remarkable improvements in air quality in a relatively short period. India can – and should – learn from their experience. But learning does not mean copying. We must clearly distinguish between what can be replicated, what cannot, and what is unique to India and therefore requires additional solutions beyond anything Beijing did.

What to learn from Beijing
Value of a regional action plan. The Beijing-Tianjin- Hebei (BTH) regional framework enabled coordinated action across an airshed, leading to significant emission reductions. However, it is important to understand the administrative simplicity behind it.

BTH region covers about 2.2L sq km under two centrally administered municipalities Beijing and Tianjin – and a single province, Hebei, with 11 cities. Coordinatingaction across this region, while challenging, was administratively manageable.

Replicating this approach for Delhi is far more complex. A meaningful regional plan for Delhi would need to cover areas within a 150km radius, spanning six states (Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, UP, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan), urban local bodies and cantonment areas. Delhi is governed by three authorities – Centre, state and municipal corporations, cantonment aside. So, we’ll require an entirely new administrative and governance model to make regional action work.

Public transport and vehicle electrification are other areas where Beijing offers important lessons. Many measures Beijingadopted-stricter emission standards, cleaner fuels, and scrapping old vehicles-are also being attempted in Delhi, but with limited success.

A key difference is that Beijing actively curtailed the growth of private vehicles; Delhi has not. But like Beijing, we need to build world-class public transport across all of NCR. Similarly, rapid electrification of transport is essential.

In many ways, Beijing’s air pollution crisis helped catalyse China’s rise as the world leader in electric vehicles. China converted an environmental crisis into an economic opportunity; India should aim to do the same.

Reduction of coal use and strict regulation of power plants and industries is another critical lesson. While Delhi has shut down its thermal power plants and shifted many industries to the outskirts, coal use within the broader airshed remains substantial. Beijing not only reduced coal consumption by nearly 90% but also enforced extremely stringent emission standards. For example, the particulate matter standard for coal power plants in China is 10 mg/m³ or lower; in India, the standard is 30-100 mg/m³-3 to 10 times higher.

China’s SO2 standard is 35 mg/m³, whereas in India even relaxed limits of 100-600 mg/m³ were exempted for nearly 75% of coal-based power plants. Without enforcing strict pollution norms, meaningful air quality improvement is impossible. This is one of Beijing’s clearest lessons.

What won’t work here

Shutting down or relocating more than 3,000 heavy industries, as Beijing did, would effectively de-industrialise the entire region. Such an approach would be economically disastrous, socially destabilising and politically untenable in India.

Then there is the question of cost. While exact figures are unavailable, it is clear that Beijing spent billions of dollars to clean its air. That scale of expenditure is simply not feasible for India. Any clean air plan for Delhi must work within the country’s fiscal constraints.

Finally, Delhi faces challenges Beijing never had to confront. The most prominent is stubble burning. Beijing’s air quality was not affected by seasonal agricultural fires in the way Delhi’s is. Any serious clean air plan for Delhi must directly address this problem. Similarly, clean cooking fuel was never an issue for Beijing.

China transitioned most households to gas by the early 2000s and launched a Clean Heating policy in 2013 to move residential heating away from biomass and coal. In contrast, biomass use for cooking and heating remains a major source of pollution in Delhi-NCR and must be tackled head-on. Lastly, the Delhi airshed also faces a major challenge from pollution generated by lakhs of informal micro and small enterprises – from jaggery and confectionery makers to small metalworkers and many others. These enterprises must be supported to shift to clean fuels.

In sum, while Delhi can and should learn from Beijing-andfrom other cities around the world-itmust develop its own clean-air strategy and make it work in Indian conditions. From a researcher’s perspective, it is clear Delhi’s air pollution challenge is far more complex than Beijing’s ever was. Social media chutki may earn likes and retweets, but cleaning Delhi’s air requires far more than a step-by-step guide.

Core causes of India’s air pollution crisis have been clear for 25 years: burning of biomass and coal.
Still, the bickering continues. And the Delhi problem spreads to Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad

Every winter, Delhi’s air pollution debate follows a familiar script. We look for villains, argue over blame, ignore science and solutions. This year has been no different – except that it has bordered on the absurd.
Pollution season opened with the Supreme Court allowing “green crackers”, followed by Delhi govt’s failed cloud-seeding experiment. Soon after came official data claiming a 90% reduction in stubble burning in Punjab and Haryana. Overnight, stubble burning was declared “not a problem”. Even though scientific evidence told a very different story.

A paper from ISRO and an independent analysis by my colleagues showed that stubble burning continued widely across Punjab. Haryana, UP, and MP, significantly contributing to pollution in Delhi-NCR. Real issue was not theabsence of fires, but the failure of monitoring. Govt agencies rely largely on polar-orbiting satellites that pass over India in the early after- noon. As farmers simply shift the burning to late afternoon and evening, a large proportion of farm fires is no longer being detected.

Instead of fixing the monitoring system, we wasted weeks in tu-tu main-main over whether stubble burning or Delhi’s local sources were to blame. Lost in this noise was a far more important question: how prepared were institutions such as MCD. Delhi Pollution Control Committee, and Commission for Air Quality Management for the pollution season? As usual, we forgot to demand real solutions or hold institutions accountable.

All this is particularly frustrating because the core causes of India’s air pollution crisis have been known for at least 25 years. In 1999, more than 200 scientists from across the world participated in the Indian Ocean Experiment, led by the renowned atmospheric scientist V Ramanathan. Thisstudy identified a massive brown haze which they called the “Asian Brown Cloud” – stretching over the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean from Oct to Feb.

Their findings were unequivocal. This haze was largely caused by the burning of biomass in homes and fields, and fossil fuels (especially coal) in industry and power plants. Pollution travelled thousands of kms, altered rainfall patterns, reduced agri productivity, and caused widespread respiratory and cardiovascular disease

When UNEP published the findings in 2002, some prominent Indian scientists questioned the terminology and intent. The phenomenon was renamed the “Atmospheric Brown Cloud with a focus on Asia”, while the warnings were largely ignored by govts.

A quarter century later, air pollution has become a pan-India crisis. Cities such as Mumbai, Bengaluru, and Hyderabad, which once had relatively clean air, now routinely fail to meet national air quality standards. This deterioration is not accidental. It is the direct result of our persistent failure to address the primary sources of pollution identified decades ago.

What pollutes India? | Over the last five years, Indian scientific institutions have produceda growing body of research that policymakers have largely ignored. A 2024 study involving researchers from prominent institutions, including earth sciences ministry found that about 50% of PM10 and PM2.5 in Delhi during the peak pollution season comes from biomass-burning sources. Another study from IIT-Kanpur, published in 2023, showed that biomass burning (especially residential heating) is the main driver of intense and frequent night-time haze in Delhi during Janand Feb.
Similar findings have emerged from other parts of the country Together, they point to a clear conclusion: open burning of biomass (whether for cooking and heating in homes, in small industrial and commercial establishments, or in agricultural fields) is the single largest source of air pollution in India. Without sharply reducing biomass burning, we simply cannot clean the country’s air.

The second major source of pollution is coal use in industries and power plants. A 2023 study by my colleagues estimated that around 37% of India’s PM2.5 emissions come from industry and power generation. Vehicular pollution is the third largest source, especially in cities.
Basically, what we burn the most, pollutes the most. India burns around 220cr tonnes of fuel and waste every year. About 85% of this iscoal and biomass; petrol, diesel and gas together account for only 15%. Unsurprisingly, most of our pollution comes from coal and biomass. Add dust from roads, construction sites and barren land, and the picture becomes even clearer.

No short-cuts | Solving India’s air pollution crisis requires a clean energy transition and an “all-of-the-above” approach.

• Biggest gains will come from the residential sector. Transitioning households to LPG, biogas or electricity for cooking and heating would eliminate a large share of PM2.5 emissions and prevent nearly 800,000 premature deaths each year from indoor air pollution. This is difficult, but achievable through targeted policies such as a strengthened PM Ujjwala programme that provides adequate incentives for low-income households to abandon biomass completely
• Industry must be the next priority Encouraging MSMEs to adopt cleaner fuels and technologies, such as electric boilers and furnaces, combined with strict monitoring, can substantially Teduce emissions. For large industries and power plants, enforcementof strict emission standards must be non-negotiable.
• Eliminating stubble burning remains essential to reducing severe pollution episodes in Oct and Nov. In just 45 days, stubble burning emits as much PM2.5 as all vehicles in India do in an entire year. The solutions- technology, market access, incentives, penalties – are well-known and proven.
• Scaling up electric vehicles and public transport will steadily reduce urban pollution, but this requires ambitious targets and serious investment, not slogans. Finally, local sources (dust, construction, garbage burning, congestion) must be tackled by empowered and accountable urban local bodies.

Real progress on the above action plan will only begin when we stop bickering over science. So, acknowledging the true impact and sources of our pollution crisis is the first step towards meaningful action.

How to read biennial forest surveys? The best way is decadal data produced by same methods

India State of Forest Reports (ISFRs) are published every two years. And, every ISFR shows an increase in the forest cover compared to the previous one. ISFR 2021, released last week, too shows an increase of 1,540 sq kms of forest area – an area slightly more than that of Delhi – compared to ISFR 2019.

But is this biennial good news the correct way to assess the state of our forests? Can we evaluate the health of our forest, and how government policies have affected it, in such a short time? The answer is no. We need at least a decade to judge whether forests have improved or deteriorated. So instead of getting into the quagmire of biannual assessment, let’s check how India’s forest has fared on a decadal scale.

ISFRs, despite their many shortcomings, contain a vast amount of data on growing stocks (the total volume of all trees), carbon stock (total amount of carbon stored in the forest), forest cover etc. Though all data is not available for all years, there is enough to enable a coherent analysis of the health of our forests. But before we make any comparison, it is necessary to understand the technology used for the forest assessment and its implications on numbers.

The assessment of forests is done using satellites along with ground-truthing. Over time, satellite technology has improved vastly, and so has the technology to produce ISFRs. Since 2001, high-resolution satellite data and digital interpretation have been used for ISFRs. This technology is so sophisticated that it can capture tree cover on even 1 hectare of land.

Before 2001, the satellites had lower resolution and could catch tree cover only on a large piece of land. So, to get a correct picture of the state of the forest, the comparison should only be made with data generated by similar technology. Fortunately, we have comparable data for the past two decades, viz, ISFR 2001 onwards, to make a decadal-scale assessment.

Forest cover: ISFR 2021 recorded the total forest cover in the country as 7,13,789 sq kms, ie, 21.71% of the country’s geographical area. Out of this, dense forests (considered as good forest) are 4,06,669 sq kms and open forests (deemed to be degraded forests) 3,07,120 sq kms. In comparison, ISFR 2001 recorded the total forest cover as 6,75,538 sq kms, ie, 19.5% of the geographical area. An area of 4,16,809 sq kms had dense forest cover, and 2,58,729 sq kms was open forests.

In the last 20 years, therefore, the country’s forest cover has increased by 38,251 sq kms – an area equal to the size of Kerala. But, during this period, dense forests have reduced by 10,140 sq kms (similar to the area of Tripura), and open forests have increased by 48,391 sq kms (equal to the size of Punjab). So, while the total forest cover has grown, they have increased mainly in the degraded forest category; good quality forests have reduced.

Recorded forest area: RFA are lands recorded as forests in government records and are managed by the forest departments. ISFRs have data on forest cover inside RFA and outside since 2011, and it reveals the following:

• RFA in the country is 7,75,288 sq kms or 23.58% of the country’s geographical area. But the forest cover exists only on 5,16,630 sq kms. That is, only two-thirds of the forest area under government control have forests on them. There is little data on what exists on the remaining one-third – an area equal to the size of UP
• In the last 10 years, forest cover inside RFA has reduced by 14,071 sq kms, while it has increased by 35,779 sq kms outside. So, forest cover is expanding on private land (mainly as plantation) and decreasing in forests managed by the government

Volume of all trees: Growing stocks in forests have reduced from 4,781.4 million cubic metres (cu-m) in 2003 to 4,388.15 million cu-m in 2021 – a decline of 8% in the last two decades. This indicates a significant degradation of the forest.

Overall, contrary to the impression given by the ISFRs, it is pretty clear that the health of our forests has declined significantly in the last two decades. The increase in forest cover shown in subsequent ISFRs is mainly due to the growth in plantations on private land. Forest areas, on the other hand, have lost large tracts of rich biodiverse forests and have experienced significant degradation. All in all, there is little to cheer about India’s forests.

The question then is, how do we restore our degraded forests, preserve biodiversity and wildlife, meet the livelihood demands of 300 million people living in and around forests and fulfil our pledge to mitigate climate change?

It is clear that the current forest administration, which the British created to exploit forest resources, cannot solve the myriad of challenges facing our forests. Most researchers are now convinced that India needs an entirely new paradigm of forest management in which forest-dependent communities will have a significant role in forest management, with the forest department as a facilitator and enabler.

There is enough evidence to show that such a shift has yielded impressive results in many countries. Currently, over 500 million hectares of forests in the world (1.5 times India’s area) are under some form of community control.

Forest departments in these countries have reversed their roles from being owners and regulators of forests to becoming facilitators in community-managed forests. Our forest administration, too, will have to shed its colonial hangover to enable India’s forests to flourish.

The writer is CEO of the International Forum for Environment, Sustainability and Technology (iFOREST)

Glasgow wasn’t a washout. But on coal, India gained little & let China get away.

Climate change conferences follow a pattern: They never end on time; they make incremental progress, and there is always a last-minute drama that captures the headlines, drowning the overall assessment of the meeting. COP26 in Glasgow followed the pattern to a tee, though with a little more drama than some of the previous meetings.

Over the next few days, we will read headlines (mainly from Western media) screaming murder on how India weakened the outcome of COP26 by forcing a last-minute amendment that diluted the language on ending coal power. We will also read headlines from India defending this amendment. But in these headlines, consequential decisions made by this COP would be lost. First, though, let’s look at the coal controversy.
In the conference’s closing minutes, a dramatic process to change one paragraph of the final text unfolded, which was started by China, ended by India and decried by many countries. The paragraph relates to the phasing out of coal power. In the final version of the text, “phase-out” of coal power was mentioned.

China was the first to ‘mildly’ object to this paragraph. Then India proposed a new version of the paragraph that replaced “phase-out” with “phase-down” to describe what needs to happen to coal use in power generation. While India’s proposal was accepted, several countries, mainly Europeans and small vulnerable countries, objected to this change, including how it was done. Though the change in the word itself is a non-issue, how India got this done is certainly something that needs introspection.

Phase-down means progressively reducing the use of coal, whereas phase-out means altogether eliminating its use over a period of time. Thus, a country will have to first phase down its coal use and ultimately phase it out. So, phase-out is the end of phase-down. By changing the word to phase-down, India accepted that coal power must be reduced but did not agree to completely end it.

Now, this differentiation would be significant if there was a deadline to do so. But nowhere in the text is a timeline mentioned. In fact, Germany, the poster child of coal phase-out, is planning to end coal power by 2038 – two decades in the future. So, this fight over phase-out and phase-down is immaterial without a deadline, at least for this decade. And, the way renewable plus storage technology is developing, it is inevitable that India will not instal new coal power post-2030.

So, the question is what India gained by forcing this change? In my view, the answer is nothing. This change has no material bearing on India’s energy future or its development trajectory. However, by projecting itself as a coal champion and forcing the modification at the last moment, India’s image has undoubtedly taken a hit.

What is even more galling is that China, which consumes 50% of the world’s coal and had initiated the demand to change the paragraph, sat pretty while we exposed ourselves to the scorn of Western media. And, this has been the problem of India’s negotiating strategy at climate meets. We pick up fights where there is none.

At COP26, we should have exposed the double standards of developed countries on oil and gas, and fought for the finance and technology needed to meet the ambitious target announced by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the beginning of the conference. But we did little of these and wasted our energy on issues that are good for rabble-rousing. India has to decide what it wants. I am not sure that we have really thought through the end game.
Coming back to the decisions taken at COP, it is clear that many of them will shape how the world will develop in the future.

• First, there is a tacit acceptance that the temperature goal must be 1.5°C and not between 1.5°C and 2.0°C as per the Paris Agreement. This is good for India’s poor, who will be most hit by higher temperatures.

• Second, all the major economies have now announced a net-zero target. If all the net-zero commitments are met, we are on course to limit warming to 1.8°C-1.9°C. This means that we must now devise processes and mechanisms to hold countries accountable for their net-zero pledges.

• Third, the rulebook of the Paris Agreement has been wrapped-up. After six years of haggling, a deal was finally struck on the market mechanism rules. These rules are stricter than the previous one and will allow countries like India to gain by selling carbon credits and bringing new technologies.

• Fourth, while developed countries have wriggled out of making any future commitment on climate finance, there are enough provisions in the final decision to hold them accountable for delivering $100 billion in the near term and developing a road map for enhanced long-term climate finance.

• Fifth, both adaptation and loss and damage have received much more attention than before. As a result, developed countries have agreed to double the adaptation finance and were forced to start a dialogue process for financing loss and damage.

• Finally, the need to ensure just transitions while phasing down fossil fuels has received due recognition in the final decision. Accordingly, the decision includes providing finance and technology support to developing countries for the just transition.

Overall, while the Glasgow climate conference has not delivered everything, it has provided enough to keep the hope alive for meeting the 1.5°C climate goal. As far as India is concerned, it has decided to decarbonise its economy and pursue green development by announcing a net-zero target for 2070 and an ambitious 2030 target. We must now develop a negotiating strategy to facilitate and get financial and technological support for these targets.

The writer is CEO, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability and Technology (iFOREST)

From reforming discoms to recruiting skilled energy managers, the list of reforms is formidable.

On the first day of the Glasgow climate conference – COP26 – the biggest announcement came from India. Ending speculations on whether India ‘will’ or ‘can’ make a net-zero pledge, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that the country will reach net-zero emissions by 2070. He also announced four major nearer-term targets exhibiting India’s will and ambition on climate action.

The targets, all of which are to be met by 2030, include an installed renewable energy capacity of 500 GW (up from 450 GW target); meeting 50% of the electricity requirement through renewable sources; reducing total projected cumulative carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes between 2020 and 2030; and reducing the carbon intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels (up from the 33-35% target).

So how ambitious are these new targets?
India’s renewable energy targets mean that coal power will peak before 2030, when about 70% of India’s electricity installations will be renewable-based, battery and smart grid will dominate the market. This would be one of the most rapid decarbonisations of electricity sector anywhere in the world.
India’s net-zero target is equally ambitious, but few more details are required to understand what it means. There is confusion on whether the target is for all greenhouse gases (GHGs) or only for carbon dioxide (CO ₂). If it is for all GHGs, then India’s target is compliant with 1.5°C warming. If it is only for CO ₂, it is 2.0°C compliant. However, even if only for CO ₂, it is still a strong signal to decarbonise the economy. As zero-carbon technologies become more accessible, India will update this target to attract massive global investments.

What domestic reforms do they demand?
In nutshell, these announcements have put India in a leadership role on climate mitigation action. The question now is, what are some of the major steps that must be taken domestically to steer the course of action in the coming years? There are three ‘make or break’ factors for realising India’s ambitious targets.

• Firstly, if 500 GW of power-generation capacity must be achieved, India must create an enabling environment for attracting global investments. Reforming the distribution companies (discoms) is most important to create that environment.
• Secondly, for meeting 50% of electricity supply through renewables, India’s grid infrastructure will have to be strengthened and battery storage capacity will have to be massively increased. Investing in smart grid and battery infrastructure is crucial for this.
• Third, a huge skilled workforce will be required to run the new electricity infrastructure. This means investments must start in reskilling of existing and skilling of new workforce to meet the future requirements.
• Finally, all of these changes in the energy and industrial systems must be paralleled by a plan of just transition, to ensure that we do not carry forward the legacy of unequal development challenges of the coal era, into the new era of renewable energy and a greener economy.

In fact, while energy transition has been a hot topic on the policy and business front, just transition has not got the due attention. However, as coal power will peak before 2030, it is time for India to start policy deliberations, develop plans for, and consider investing in it. And this is why it is crucial.

Could renewables mean unequal development?
India’s energy geography will change because of massive investments in renewables. Today’s coal-producing states will not be renewable superpowers. The renewable energy will be generated in western and southern states.
Therefore, as the share of non-fossil fuel energy grows, the coal regions can spiral into a poverty trap, which many of the districts here are already saddled with. There can also be huge social instability triggered by job losses and uncertainty of income opportunities. An estimated 20 million plus workers will be impacted countrywide by the transition. In fact, the disproportionately high number of informal workers in our key economic sectors such as coal mining, transportation, steel, cement etc adds to the challenge. But all this can be avoided through a well-planned and well-managed just transition over the next decades.
Planning a ‘just’ energy transition will be a smart move by the government to further a development agenda that benefits all. We have the next 30 years to complete the transition, but the process must start now.

The writer is Director, India Just Transition Centre, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology (iFOREST)

Glasgow will not solve the climate crisis but it can fast-track global climate collaboration.

A great hype has been created around the 26th Conference of Parties (COP26) at Glasgow. John Kerry, the US climate czar, has called this meeting the world’s “last best chance” to avoid climate hara-kiri. Similar sentiment has been expressed by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. More than 100 world leaders will attend this climate gala, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden.

This is not the first time such hype has been created around climate summits. I can list at least three (two of which I attended) – Kyoto in 1997, Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015 – where the noise was deafening, but the outcome was muted. Unfortunately, Glasgow COP is heading in the same direction.

Over the last few months, a long list of demands has been put forth by various governments. The UK is pushing for a treaty to “consign coal power to history”, the US wants a net-zero deal, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) has demanded a 1.5°C declaration. Least Developing Countries (LDCs) want climate polluters to pay them billions of dollars for loss and damage, and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) want $100 billion climate finance and carbon space. Unfortunately, most of these demands will not be met because the groundwork has not been done to achieve them.

Take the case of coal power phase-out. The UK is pushing to end coal power by 2030 in developed countries and by 2040 in the rest of the world. But it has failed to get support from most coal-consuming countries, especially the top two consumers, India and China.
The reason is simple: Unlike developed countries that depend on gas for electricity, coal provides 70% of India’s and 62% of China’s electricity production. While phasing out of coal power is essential to combat the climate crisis, so is gas power. Countries are not convinced that prioritising one over the other is the right way to move ahead. Also, there has not been any discussion on how this coal transition will happen and who will pay for the closure of coal mines and power plants.

As a sizeable population depends on coal for livelihood in countries like India, huge investments are required to transition coal regions to non-coal economies. But, there has not been any discussion on global cooperation on coal transition. So, without discussing the nut-bolts, expecting a coal power treaty is unrealistic.

Likewise, there are disagreements on loss and damage. Developing countries are now facing a new reality – the destruction unleashed by the climate crisis is taking lives, destroying assets and infrastructure, and costing vast amounts of money in relief and reconstruction. They are demanding that the big polluters compensate them for the losses. But the developed countries have refused to negotiate any responsibility for climate-induced losses. This issue is going to be a significant sticking point at Glasgow and may derail the negotiations.
Similar disagreements exist on all major proposals. So, what should we realistically expect from Glasgow?

COP26 is taking place in the background of a vast trust deficit that emerged between countries during the Trump regime; the vaccine apartheid and the unilateral withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan have further eroded the credibility of developed countries. Hence, the pretence of the developed countries that everything is hunky-dory is misplaced. Therefore, their attempt to forge an alliance on issues like net zero is destined to become high-sounding declarations that are ritually announced at all COPs.

But the Glasgow meeting can achieve some important outcomes, the most important being the rule book for the Paris Agreement. Over the last six years, countries have struggled to finish the rule book and operationalise the Agreement in its entirety, mainly due to disagreements over the design of the carbon market. Theoretically, the carbon market can enhance mitigation, reduce cost and transfer real resources to developing countries for decarbonisation. At Glasgow, negotiators must set robust rules to eliminate past loopholes and ensure the carbon market works for the planet.

Glasgow is also an opportunity to kick-start the process of confidence-building to bring back the global collaboration on track. Both developed and developing countries must cross the aisles, understand each other’s concerns, and announce confidence-building measures.
Developed countries can put out a new plan for climate finance that is ambitious and credible. A recent report on climate finance road map shows how little money is being given by them. For example, in 2019, developed countries provided $16.7 billion as a grant. This means that every person in developed countries contributed just $1 per month for climate finance. Developed countries can surely afford more than this. A credible climate finance plan from them is, therefore, crucial.

Similarly, developing countries need to discuss their decarbonisation plans because there is no carbon space to emit. Even if developed countries reach net zero by 2030 (which is unlikely), developing countries will still have to start reducing emissions very soon. So, a serious plan on decarbonisation from developing countries would go a long way in building confidence in the process.
#TelltheTruth is a popular hashtag for COP26. It exemplifies the frustration of young climate campaigners with the negotiation process. At COP26, leaders must tell the truth. Dishonesty and falsehood are the reason why the three decades of climate negotiations have achieved little.

The writer is CEO, International Forum for Environment, Sustainability and Technology (iFOREST)