Category: Op-ed
Falling sick in Brazil showed me what India gets wrong about antibiotics
Across the world, antibiotics are viewed as curative medicines — to be used only when truly necessary. In India, they tend to be used preventively, routinely prescribed for viral infections that the human body is fully capable of handling
The tragedy is that we already know what to do. In 2016-17, the Government of India convened a committee to develop the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (NAP-AMR). I was a member of that committee.
I have travelled extensively over the past three decades and never once fallen sick outside India — until my visit to Brazil last month for COP30. A simple viral infection ended up becoming a mirror, revealing how differently India and Brazil approach antibiotics use, and why this difference matters.
In India, like most people, I rely on a familiar ecosystem of doctors, chemists and well-meaning advisers. Over time, one becomes comfortable with this formal–informal healthcare network. For routine illnesses like cough and cold, I consult them, weigh their advice, and take (or avoid) medication accordingly. The advice, however, is predictable. Every time I have had a viral infection, the prescription has included an anti-allergic and an antibiotic — even when the doctor clearly diagnosed it as viral.
The justification was always the same: “Take antibiotics to prevent a secondary bacterial infection.” It never mattered that antibiotics do not treat viruses. Prevention became a catch-all excuse. A couple of years ago, this approach backfired. After one course of antibiotics, I developed a lingering cough that lasted for months. Since then, I have been cautious with antibiotics.
What happened in Brazil
On my fourth day in Brazil, I fell ill. You never truly know where viral infections come from — long flights, crowded airports, air-conditioned taxis, or poorly ventilated conference halls. I followed my usual routine: Steam inhalation, saline gargles, warm fluids and paracetamol. But by day six, the fever and congestion worsened, so I consulted my doctor in India.
As expected, he prescribed paracetamol, an anti-allergic, a broad-spectrum antibiotic, throat soothers, vitamins and a cough suppressant. Armed with the prescription, I went to a chemist — and what followed was eye-opening.
First, the chemist refused to accept my Indian prescription. Brazilian law requires a prescription from a local doctor. Second, he separated what he could sell without a prescription — lozenges, vitamins, paracetamol — from what he could not: Antibiotics. Third, he directed me to a 24×7 government urgent-care centre and advised me to consult a Brazilian doctor. Reluctantly, I went.
The centre was spotless, efficient and welcoming. Though I spoke only English and the staff only Portuguese, a translation app bridged the gap. They took basic details and a copy of my passport. There was no consultation fee.
The doctor examined me thoroughly. I showed him the Indian prescription. He glanced at it politely and set it aside.
“You have a viral infection,” he said. “It will resolve on its own in 10-12 days.”
His prescription was astonishingly simple: Paracetamol in case of high fever, a throat lozenge, and a saline nasal rinse. No antibiotics. No anti-allergic.
When I mentioned that my sputum had turned yellowish-green — something that some Indian doctors may treat as a sign of bacterial infection — he smiled gently. “That is a myth. Viral infections can also produce coloured sputum,” he said. In effect, he refuted much of what I had been told about cough and cold management in India.
I returned to India still mildly symptomatic. Out of curiosity, I got a sputum culture done. After three days of incubation, the report showed moderate growth of a bacteria. My Indian doctor immediately advised me to start antibiotics. The Brazilian doctor, however, responded: “This does not require antibiotics. Minor bacterial growth often resolves naturally.”
This time, I chose to trust him. Thirteen days after falling sick, I have recovered — without taking a single antibiotic or anti-allergic.
Why this story matters
I share this not to criticise Indian doctors, but to highlight a systemic failure. Across the world, antibiotics are viewed as curative medicines — to be used only when truly necessary. In India, they tend to be used preventively, routinely prescribed for viral infections that the human body is fully capable of handling.
This misuse and overuse are key reasons India is now the epicentre of the global antimicrobial resistance (AMR) crisis. The numbers are alarming:
An estimated 3,00,000 deaths in India are directly attributable to AMR.
ICMR surveillance shows widespread resistance to commonly used antibiotics like ciprofloxacin, amoxicillin and azithromycin.
Many Indian hospitals report 40-70 per cent resistance rates among bacteria causing pneumonia, bloodstream infections and urinary tract infections.
And this is not solely due to human misuse. India is also indiscriminately pumping antibiotics into its food chain. In poultry and livestock production, antibiotics are used not just to treat illness but as growth promoters to fatten animals quickly. These drug-resistant bacteria travels from farms to food to humans.
The result? As my own test result suggested, we are walking reservoirs of resistant bacteria. When we eventually contract a serious infection — one that truly requires antibiotics — we may find our options limited or ineffective.
Implementation paralysis
The tragedy is that we already know what to do. In 2016-17, the Government of India convened a committee to develop the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance (NAP-AMR). I was a member of that committee. We created a multi-sectoral plan for 2017-2021, spanning human health, agriculture and environmental waste. A revised plan for 2025-2029 was released in November 2025.
Yet the first plan largely remained on paper. Implementation was hampered by weak regulation, inadequate surveillance and a healthcare culture that favours quick fixes over medical discipline.
The real difference between India and countries like Brazil is not medical expertise but strict enforcement of a policy. It is the refusal to prescribe and sell antibiotics unless absolutely necessary. My Brazilian doctor summed it up best: “Use antibiotics when they are needed, not when you are worried.” We need this culture of medical discipline and strict enforcement to solve the AMR crisis.
Delhi’s bad air: Govt has to get down to serious work
For more than a decade, Delhi has experimented with various pollution control measures — the ‘odd-even scheme’, smog towers, water cannon, tree plantation, the Graded Response Action Plan or GRAP, (which restricts industry, construction, and vehicular activity during winter), and now cloud seeding. Despite these efforts, the city continues to suffer. The root cause is simple: these reactive measures do not address the core pollution problem.
Delhi, which constitutes only 2.7 percent of the National Capital Region (NCR), sits at the heart of one of the most urbanized, industrialized, and agricultural regions in the world. Consequently, its air is heavily influenced by pollution from neighbouring districts. Studies reveal that only 30 to 50 percent of Delhi’s air pollution originates within the city, while the remaining 50 to 70 percent comes from outside. This means that a regional approach is essential to reduce air pollution in the city.
Further, the main sources of pollution in Delhi-NCR are the use of biomass for cooking, heating, and in micro and small industries, along with the burning of agricultural residue in surrounding states. These activities contribute over 50 percent of total PM2.5 pollution. Another 30 percent comes from industries and power plants that rely on coal and other fossil fuels. In other words, more than 80 percent of PM2.5 pollution in Delhi-NCR results from solid fuels — particularly biomass and coal burning — with vehicles contributing about 10 percent. This estimate does not include dust from roads, construction sites, and barren land, which are also significant sources of particulate pollution.
If Delhi is serious about improving air quality, it must stop relying on ineffective, superficial solutions. These quick fixes do more harm than good by hurting the economy without tackling the root cause. The real solution lies in collaboration between the Central government and the states — Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan — to confront pollution at its source. This collaborative effort can be operationalized through a new governance framework and institution to implement a coordinated clean air action plan. This would require all states to relinquish some powers for the common good. Here’s how this can be achieved:
POLLUTION CONTROL ZONE
The Central government should declare Delhi and its surrounding areas an Air Pollution Control Zone. Within this zone, all air pollution-related measures should be implemented in a coordinated manner. Ideally, the zone should cover the entire airshed, spanning a 300-km radius around Delhi. However, considering the existing institutional set-up, this zone could include Delhi-NCR and four additional districts in Uttar Pradesh — Aligarh, Hathras, Mathura and Agra. This would encompass an area within a radius of about 150 km, with a population of around 80 million. Although this excludes key agricultural areas in Punjab and Haryana where stubble burning is rampant, that issue can be addressed through dedicated programmes aimed at eliminating crop residue burning.
EMPOWERED AGENCY
To oversee and implement a coordinated clean air action plan, a new empowered agency should be established. This agency should include representatives from both the Central and state governments at the decision-making level. To ensure adequate authority, it should be headed by a senior secretary-level serving officer of the Central government. The agency should have district offices, its own technical and administrative staff, and act as the nodal agency for air pollution control in the zone — superseding other Central and state agencies.
Similar agencies exist elsewhere, such as the California Air Resources Board, established in 1967 to tackle severe pollution in cities like Los Angeles. China has also created the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei Regional Coordination Council to reduce pollution levels in Beijing. While India’s Central government has set up the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas, it has not been very effective because it lacks resources, authority, and a proactive action plan.
REAL ACTION PLAN
Delhi’s air quality — and India’s overall — cannot improve without a rapid transition to clean energy, along with a credible plan to reduce agricultural residue burning and control dust. The plan should consist of high-impact strategies that can significantly improve air quality within the next five years. Sample the following:
PM UJJWALA 3.0
The study we have done at iFOREST shows that the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana has been the most impactful air pollution intervention in the past decade. Expanding access to clean cooking fuel across Delhi-NCR could reduce PM2.5 levels by 25 percent. Achieving this would require a new phase — PM Ujjwala 3.0 — to transition households to LPG or electricity for cooking. Research indicates that a 75 percent subsidy is necessary to enable exclusive LPG use in low-income households, costing about `5,000 to `6,000 per household annually — similar to the PM Kisan Samman Nidhi. In Delhi-NCR, this would cost around `6,000 crore to `7,000 crore per year, a fraction of the annual healthcare costs associated with air pollution-related diseases. This would be a profoundly pro-poor and pro-women initiative, especially considering that nearly 600,000 Indians — primarily women — die prematurely each year from indoor air pollution.
CLEAN HEATING FUEL
Across India, over 90 percent of households rely on biomass and solid fuels for heating during winter, contributing to severe pollution spikes in December and January. One of China’s pivotal air quality initiatives was a national clean heating fuel policy. While developing a similar long-term plan is essential, in the short term the Delhi government could ensure that only electricity is used for winter heating and enforce a strict ban on open burning. This approach would yield swift improvements in Delhi’s air quality.
END STUBBLE-BURNING
A major contributor to pollution spikes in October and November is stubble-burning. Curbing this practice would significantly reduce the occurrence of severe pollution episodes. Both short- and long-term strategies are required.
In the long term, agriculture in Punjab, Haryana and parts of UP must transition from intensive rice-wheat farming to diversified cropping systems. In the short term, technology and incentives can play a key role. The simplest technological solution is to modify or mandate combine harvesters that cut closer to the ground — like manual harvesting — and attach balers to collect residue. The residue can then be sold to industries.
Governments can launch an entrepreneurship-cum-market scheme to promote residue collection, processing, and sale. An incentive of `1,000 per acre, coupled with penalties such as fines or exclusion from government schemes for farmers who continue burning residue would be effective. This scheme would cost approximately `2,500 crore annually.
ENERGY TRANSITION IN INDUSTRY
Power plants and industry account for roughly one-third of annual PM2.5 emissions in Delhi-NCR. Reducing these emissions requires both technological upgrades and stricter enforcement. A scheme encouraging MSMEs to adopt cleaner fuel sources — especially electric boilers and furnaces — could significantly curb emissions. For larger industries, stricter compliance with pollution norms is essential. Shutting down older thermal power plants and enforcing the 2015 emission standards (still not fully implemented) will be critical.
TRANSITION TO EVs
Scaling up electric vehicles is crucial for reducing urban air pollution. Initially, the focus should be on transitioning two- and three-wheelers and buses, since these are already economically viable. Achieving 100 percent electrification of new two- and three-wheeler sales by 2030, and converting all new buses to electric in Delhi-NCR, would significantly reduce vehicle emissions. Setting a 30 to 50 percent electrification target for cars and other vehicles would further accelerate the transition to cleaner urban transport.
GREEN BELTS
Dust pollution from within Delhi and neighbouring areas, compounded by seasonal dust from the Thar desert, has a major impact on air quality. Creating a green belt around Delhi would serve as a natural barrier against incoming dust. Additionally, increasing green cover within the city — especially roadside and open-space greening — is essential to control local dust pollution.
STRENGTHEN MUNICIPALITIES
Local pollution sources — such as road dust, construction activities, open burning, traffic congestion, and poor waste management — are best managed by municipalities. Municipalities must be held accountable for addressing these issues year-round, not just during peak pollution seasons. Strengthening the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP) to support municipal efforts will be key to achieving sustainable air quality improvements.
If we implement these measures, air pollution can be reduced by 50 to 60 percent within five years. However, this will not be easy. We will need to work with millions of households to adopt clean cooking and heating fuels, millions of farmers to stop stubble burning, hundreds of thousands of industries to reduce emissions, and vehicle owners to shift to EVs.
There are no quick fixes to improving air quality. Systemic changes are essential if we are to breathe clean air. Everywhere in the world, environmental progress has come from systemic, scientific, accountable, and long-term solutions — not quick-fixes. Delhi must learn this lesson.
Chandra Bhushan is one of India’s foremost public policy experts and the Founder-CEO of the International Forum for Environment, Sustainability & Technology (iFOREST)
One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward
The world needs a new multilateral architecture for a new phase of climate action
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva had declared the 30th Conference of Parties (COP30) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the “COP of truth”. And truth, indeed, was unmistakable in Belém. The meeting made it clear, how fragmented and fragile the global consensus on climate action has become. Decisions that countries had once celebrated as historic achievements were rejected outright. Commitments that were hailed as breakthroughs only a few years ago suddenly appeared to have evaporated.
The most prominent example was the decision to “transition away from fossil fuels”, which had been agreed at the Dubai COP in 2023. That phrase — hailed then as a diplomatic triumph — did not even appear in the final text at Belém. Countries that had supported it earlier refused to accept it now. A similar retreat occurred on deforestation. At COP26 in Glasgow, over 130 nations pledged to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030. At COP30, a roadmap to achieve this was quietly dropped. The symbolism was striking: a climate summit held at the edge of the Amazon was unwilling to reaffirm the world’s most widely supported forest pledge.
The question, then, is what COP30 actually achieved. The honest answer is: very little. Ten years after the Paris Agreement, instead of accelerating climate action, the world found itself postponing decisions and shifting difficult conversations away from the UN climate process. The most contentious issues were not resolved; they were simply moved elsewhere.
Future indecision
Confronted with the deadlock, the Brazilian COP presidency took a significant step. It removed the two most sensitive matters — the phase-out of fossil fuels and the roadmap to halt deforestation — from the formal negotiation track. Brazil now intends to craft roadmaps for both issues outside the COP process and present them at the next summit. This marks a profound acknowledgement: the world’s central climate negotiation forum no longer has the capacity to broker consensus on the most important questions. The UNFCCC is signalling that some of the hardest decisions must be made elsewhere.
This pattern extended to other unresolved issues. Climate-related unilateral trade measures, such as the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), were among the most divisive. CBAM will apply a carbon price on imports of carbon-intensive goods like steel, cement and aluminium starting January 2026. Many developing countries see it as protectionist, inequitable and imposed without genuine consultation. But at Belém, countries could not agree on a collective position or a negotiating route. Instead, the final decision merely launched three dialogues involving governments and institutions such as the WTO, stretching until mid-2028 — long after CBAM has begun affecting global trade flows.
Adaptation — the issue of greatest urgency for the developing world — was no exception. Developing countries had demanded a tripling of adaptation finance from rich nations. The
headline outcome seemed to meet this demand, but the substance fell far short. The additional funds are not new; they will be drawn from the US$300 billion pledge announced last year. Worse, the financing will only be available after 2035, even though developing countries had sought support by 2030. For nations already enduring increasingly destructive floods, cyclones, droughts and sea-level rise, money arriving more than a decade from now will offer little relief.
One of the few bright spots at COP30 was the agreement to create a Just Transition Mechanism. Its purpose is to provide support to regions undergoing transitions away from fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive sectors. If the mechanism becomes operational and well-funded, it could provide substantial benefits to coal regions of India. Yet a mechanism on paper is only the first step. Making it effective — designing its functions, ensuring financing, defining eligibility, and delivering real outcomes — is the true test. COP30 has created a container, but its contents remain undefined.
A New Architecture for a New Phase
The broader truth emerging from COP30 is that the UNFCCC is struggling to adapt to the current phase of climate action. The UNFCCC is fundamentally a treaty negotiation body. For 33 years it has done what it was built to do: deliver international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Cancun Agreement, the Paris Agreement and hundreds of smaller decisions.
But the global climate challenge has shifted from negotiation to implementation. The world is no longer debating broad goals; it now faces the far harder task of transforming energy systems, restructuring industries, reforming trade rules, mobilising finance and conserving ecosystems at scale. These are deeply political, economic and sector-specific tasks. Yet the COP still operates as though stronger wording in a negotiation text will somehow cut emissions or save forests. It cannot. This is not a failure of ambition or diplomacy; it is a structural reality. The UNFCCC lacks both the authority and the tools to make decisions on critical issues like fossil fuels, trade, finance, forests or industrial transitions. Nor can it enforce or implement the decisions it does take.
To move forward, the world must recognise that the next phase of climate action requires specialised implementation platforms that focus on real-world levers of change. For instance, a fossil fuel phase-out roadmap should be negotiated among the largest producers and consumers who regulate fossil energy. Trade and carbon border measures should be handled by institutions such as the WTO and national trade ministries, which already negotiate tariffs, subsidies and regulatory alignment.
Halting deforestation should be discussed at a platform of major forest- and biodiversity-rich countries, along with indigenous groups and forest alliances. Industrial decarbonisation should similarly be pursued at platforms driven by major producing countries. For example, 15 countries produce more than 90% of the world’s steel and cement; a roadmap developed and agreed at this platform will yield quicker and more substantive results than negotiations among nearly 200 countries at a COP. This doesn’t mean we are jettisoning multilateralism; we will instead strengthen it.
In this new architecture, the COP should evolve into a high-level political stocktake held once every two to three years to assess progress, identify gaps and provide direction. It should remain the moral anchor for global climate action.
The truth revealed at COP30 is uncomfortable but unavoidable: the climate crisis has outgrown the UNFCCC system. It now demands rapid implementation and hard political choices. For this, multiple specialised and implementation-driven platforms are essential. The sooner we build and activate them, the faster we can move from words to action.
COP in cop out time
From Paris to Belem: A decade of Hiatus
The 30th UN Climate Change Conference in Belem, Brazil, is taking place against the backdrop of a major pushback against climate action. The United States has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement. The European Union has diluted its 2040 climate target. Some of the world’s largest banks—J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley—have walked away from their net-zero alliances. Even Bill Gates, a champion of climate innovation, now argues that the world should prioritise health and development over climate goals—ignoring that prosperity and public health depend on a stable climate.
But let us ask a simple question: is the world really doing so much on climate that we need a pause? A decade after the signing of the Paris Agreement, it’s time for a reality check.
The Emissions Gap
Since the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015, governments have announced countless new pledges, policies, and net-zero roadmaps. Yet, greenhouse gas (GHG) data tell a very different story.
Each year since 2010, UNEP’s Emissions Gap Report has projected where global emissions are heading under different scenarios. In 2015, UNEP projected that under the current policies scenario—which estimates emissions based on existing measures taken by countries—global emissions in 2030 would reach 60 gigatonnes (Gt) of CO₂ equivalent. However, to stay within the 2°C pathway, emissions would need to be 42 Gt by 2030, leaving an 18 Gt gap.
The report also projected that if countries meet their pledges under their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), emissions could drop to 54–56 Gt, depending on whether they meet their conditional pledges (dependent on finance and technology support from developed countries) or unconditional pledges (to be achieved from their own resources).
| Emissions Gap Reports | Projected Emissions in 2030 (Gt) | Actual Emissions (Gt) | ||
| . | Current Policies | Conditional NDCs | Unconditional NDCs | |
| 2015 | 60 | 54 | 56 | 51.5 |
| 2020 | 59 | 53 | 56 | 54.5 |
| 2024 | 57 | 51 | 55 | 57.7 |
| 2025 | 58 | 51 | 53 | |
Source: UNEP Emissions Gap Reports; emissions include land use changes and forestry.
A decade later, the numbers have barely shifted. The 2025 Report estimates that emissions under current policies will be 58 Gt in 2030, leaving a 16 Gt gap. Even if countries meet their Paris pledges, emissions would still be 51–53 Gt, leaving a gap of 9–11 Gt. In short, the world has spent a decade pledging and re-pledging—only to move the needle by a few gigatonnes.
The Uncomfortable Arithmetic
But the reality is emissions are growing faster than projected. In 2015, global GHG emissions stood at 51.5 Gt. By 2024, it had already reached 57.7 Gt—very close to the projected emissions for 2030 under the current policies scenario. This rapid growth in emissions is making the Paris targets much harder to meet.
Meeting the 2°C target now requires global emissions to peak immediately and then fall by about 4% every year until 2050. For the 1.5°C goal, the required annual decline is 7.3%. Such reductions have never been achieved outside major economic collapses or pandemics. During the 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns, for example, global emissions fell by 5.4%, only to rebound the following year.
In essence, to meet the Paris targets, the world would have to achieve a permanent, voluntary, global “COVID-level” drop every year for the next 25 years—without crashing economies or livelihoods. That is the scale of transformation now required. And it explains why some political and corporate leaders are quietly retreating from ambition.
But retreat is not an option. Failure to close the emissions gap will be catastrophic—not the end of civilisation, a poorer, unhealthier, and more dangerous world. Vast regions will become unliveable; food systems will strain; and economies will stagger under the weight of disasters and displacement. History warns what happens when climate change outpaces adaptation. The end of the Indus Valley civilisation did not end humanity in South Asia—but it certainly depopulated vast regions.
From Paris to Belem
Today, even as science demands urgent action, political and corporate will is eroding. Global elites are, in effect, normalising failure—claiming the climate agenda has gone “too far, too fast.”
But this narrative is not just defeatist—it is false. The world has barely begun to act. Despite all the pledges, global energy use remains 80% fossil-fuel-based. The share of renewables, though rising, is expanding too slowly to offset surging demand. The problem, therefore, is not too much climate action—it is the chronic lack of it.
As the world gathers in Belem, the task is not to lower ambition but to restore credibility. It is time to build a Coalition of the Willing—a group of nations committed to implementation, not rhetoric. Emerging economies like India, which will soon hold the BRICS presidency, must lead this effort.
For developing countries, climate action is not a moral burden—it is an opportunity to drive green growth, ensure energy independence, create millions of new jobs, and protect citizens from escalating climate risks. Their interests and survival are aligned.
Ten years after Paris, the world stands at a dangerous crossroads. Yet this is not the time to despair—it is the time to fight back.
Defunct DVC’s bright future
MOST of us know the Damodar Valley either from school textbooks or from its portrayal in films like Kala Patthar and Gangs of Wasseypur. Yet the valley is far more than what is captured in books or on screen. Spanning the coal-rich districts of Jharkhand and West Bengal, the Damodar Valley — often called India’s Ruhr Valley — has powered the nation’s growth since Independence. Coal from Jharia and Raniganj fuelled India’s rise, while the steel plants of Durgapur and Bokaro and the fertilizer factories of Sindri became the celebrated “temples of modern India.” The valley was an engine of national ambition.
Today, that engine is sputtering. The region stands as a stark paradox: rich in coal and industrial infrastructure, yet choking on the very resources that once made it prosperous. The air is thick with pollution, the rivers run contaminated, and the economic model that once promised secure employment is now creating a landscape of uncertainty. The mines that built modern India are becoming its tombstones. The imperative is clear: the Damodar Valley must urgently transition from a coal-based past or risk terminal decline.
The evidence of this decline is everywhere. In Dhanbad, the coal capital of India, nearly half the mines are abandoned or non-operational. By 2030, a staggering 80 percent of the mines will cease operations due to exhausted reserves or unprofitability. This narrative is echoed across the valley. For example, coal production in the Raniganj coalfield in West Bengal has plateaued at about 40-50 million tonnes per year and is likely to decline rapidly. Once the nation’s largest coal producer, the Damodar basin has now slipped to third place, overtaken by coalfields in Odisha and Chhattisgarh.
The downstream industries are faring no better. Jharkhand, despite sitting on mountains of coal, is paradoxically a net importer of electricity. Ageing thermal power plants at Patratu, Bokaro, Bandel and Kolaghat have shut down. Overall, less than 5 percent of India’s thermal power capacity remains in the valley. Even the Damodar Valley Corporation’s (DVC) multipurpose dams, designed for flood control, irrigation and hydropower, are silting up: their power generation is minimal and flood control capabilities increasingly compromised. Parts of West Bengal now flood annually due to diminished water-holding capacity in dams such as Maithon, Panchet, Konar and Tilaiya.
But this is not just an economic crisis; it is a human one. Over 200,000 workers — the very people who dug the coal and manned the plants — now face the spectre of job losses. The region’s workforce participation rate is already a worryingly low 30 percent. Without a viable alternative, we are staring at a social and economic vacuum of immense proportions.
Yet, within this crisis lies an unprecedented opportunity. The same assets that defined the valley’s industrial age can be repurposed to build its green future. A recent assessment by my colleagues reveals that the districts of Dhanbad, Bokaro and Ramgarh (DBR) — the core of the valley — have the potential to become a major green industrial corridor.
Consider the resources. The region has over 100,000 hectares of barren and mining-ravaged land. Under the intense sun of eastern India, this land is not a scar but an asset — a potential site for solar farms capable of generating up to 10 gigawatts (GW) of clean power by 2030, far exceeding Jharkhand’s 2027 target of 4 GW. The reservoirs at Maithon, Panchet and Tenughat can host floating solar projects and form the foundation for a green hydrogen industry. With India pushing for hydrogen-based steelmaking and fertilizer production, DBR — with its existing steel and fertilizer plants and water infrastructure — is uniquely positioned to become a hub for green hydrogen, green steel, and green fertilizer. In addition, repurposing closed mines into solar farms, industrial parks, or even tourism sites can drive local employment and economic diversification, creating lakhs of new, sustainable jobs.
The infrastructure is already in place: robust connectivity via national highways and railways, and proximity to the upcoming Amritsar–Kolkata Industrial Corridor. Most important, the region has a young, resilient workforce eager for new opportunities.
To realize this potential, however, a deliberate and just strategy is essential. First, the Central government must partner with the states to create a new blueprint for the Damodar Valley, transforming it from a traditional coal economy into a vanguard of green development. A dedicated Green Growth Plan for the DBR region should be the starting point. In addition, the DVC itself must diversify into a green energy company.
Most critically, this transition must be just. The workers and communities who built the coal economy must not be left behind. This requires massive investment in skilling, social protection, and enterprise development. The Jharkhand government, in particular, must pioneer a Just Transition Policy to ensure that the shift to a green economy is equitable and inclusive.
History offers a powerful parallel. Germany’s Ruhr Valley faced an identical crisis with the decline of coal. It chose a path of proactive transformation, investing in technology, education and culture. Its last coal mine closed in 2018, but today, former industrial sites are vibrant museums, universities, and green spaces. The Ruhr transformed a monoculture economy into a diversified, resilient hub.
The Damodar Valley now stands at the same crossroads. It has given its energy, its environment, and its labour to build the nation. But it must now confront the dual realities of depleting coal reserves and the global shift toward clean energy. The Ruhr teaches us that transformation cannot be left to chance — it requires foresight, planning, and investment. If India acts decisively, the Damodar Valley can avoid decline and instead lead the green transition in eastern India
Cloud seeding was never the solution for Delhi’s air pollution
Even if it had succeeded, cloud seeding would have offered Delhi only momentary relief from the toxic air. What the current crisis calls for is science-based governance
Delhi’s much-anticipated cloud seeding experiment on October 28 failed to produce the desired rainfall, despite the hope that artificial showers could wash away the thick haze choking the city. While disappointment is understandable, this outcome should not come as a surprise. It reinforces what environmental scientists have long maintained: The capital’s pollution problem cannot be dispersed with one-off, high-visibility interventions.
Each year, as autumn fades into winter, Delhi’s skyline turns into a haze of toxic grey. With air quality indices breaching hazardous levels, the pressure to act swiftly intensifies. The latest response: A pilot cloud seeding experiment, aimed to induce rainfall that can temporarily wash pollutants from the atmosphere. While the intent is understandable, it is critical to ask whether such an intervention can truly address Delhi’s deeply entrenched complex air pollution problem.
Cloud seeding is a weather modification technique that involves dispersing substances such as silver iodide or sodium chloride into clouds to encourage rainfall. It has been used in several countries, including China, the United States, and the UAE, mostly to tackle drought or enhance water availability. In India, it has been used intermittently in states such as Maharashtra and Karnataka for similar purposes.
Its use to reduce air pollution, however, remains rare and scientifically inconclusive. While rainfall can temporarily wash away suspended particulates, its effects are short-lived and depend heavily on the presence of suitable clouds, humidity, and wind conditions. Even globally, cloud seeding has offered only localised and temporary improvement in air quality.
Delhi’s pollution pattern is no longer a mystery. It’s a challenge well understood. Decades of research have consistently identified both its sources and its seasonal behaviour. Studies by IIT Delhi, TERI, and the System of Air Quality and Weather Forecasting and Research (SAFAR) have shown that air quality deteriorates sharply in October and November due to a combination of anthropogenic and meteorological factors.
Flawed Seeding
Experiments around the world have already established that cloud seeding can’t defeat air pollution. What Delhi is doing in their wake can’t even be called innovation. It’s just political theatre
Yesterday, to mitigate air pollution, Delhi govt, in collaboration with IIT Kanpur, conducted the first cloud-seeding trial in areas like Burari, north Karol Bagh and Mayur Vihar. This follows the 25-point Air Pollution Mitigation Plan for 2025 it had unveiled in June, as a prelude to the smog season. The very first item in this plan was a “pilot project of cloud seeding through IIT Kanpur to study its effectiveness in dust mitigation”.
I am all for experiments that explore innovative solutions. But I have a problem when experiments are touted and advertised as ready-made solutions, distracting attention from the real ones. This is precisely what is happening with cloud seeding in Delhi.
To understand why projecting cloud seeding as a solution is misleading, it is important to recall what we already know about this technology and its history.
First, cloud seeding-also known as artificial rain-is not new. It is an old technique historically used to induce rain during droughts. India first tested it in the 1950s and has continued researching it, most recently through the ‘Cloud Aerosol Interaction and Precipitation Enhancement Experiment (CAIPEEX)’, conducted over a rain-shadow region of the Western Ghats by Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology.
Thailand even has a ‘Department of Royal Rainmaking and Agricultural Aviation’ dedicated to inducing artificial rain. China and US today run the largest weather-modifi-cation programmes in the world. Dozens of countries continue to use cloud seeding, but almost exclusively for drought relief during rainy seasons.
Cloud seeding as a way to reduce air pollution, however, is a relatively recent idea-barely a decade old. Over this period, Lahore, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, and several other Chinese cities have all tried it at least once. Almost all have since abandoned the practice, and for good reasons:
- Cloud seeding works only if clouds are present but insufficient to produce rain on their own. This is why it is used during rainy seasons, not dry winters.
- Even when conditions look promising, seeding often fails. Most experiments to improve air quality have produced no rainfall.
- At best, a few localities in a large city receive showers. In Lahore in 2023, pockets of rain briefly improved air quality-but only for a few hours, not even days.
Because of these limitations, most cities worldwide have dropped cloud seeding, even as an emergency measure for air pollution control. Govts are well aware of these realities.
In 2024, Union environment ministry told Parliament that, based on expert opinion, cloud seeding as an emergency measure to improve Delhi’s air quality was not feasible.
Their assessment was categorical:
- Winter clouds over north India form mostly from Western Disturbances, which are short-lived and already bring natural rain, making seeding unnecessary
- High-altitude clouds (above 5-6km) cannot be seeded due to aircraft limitations.
- Effective seeding requires specific cloud conditions, which are absent in Delhi’s cold, dry winters.
- Even if precipitation formed, dry air beneath the clouds could evaporate it before reaching the ground.
- Concerns remain about the chemicals used, their efficacy and possible unintended consequences.
In short: it won’t work.
So why is Delhi govt trying something that, according environment ministry, is destined to disappoint, if not fail? The answer lies in Delhi’s political theatre.
AAP first floated the idea of cloud seeding during the 2023 smog season but could not implement it, due to unsuitable weather. Now the new BJP govt wants to prove it can do what AAP could not. This is less about science and more about one-upmanship And IIT Kanpur, unfortunately, has allowed itself to be drawn into this spectacle.
But here is the bottom line: Delhi govt is promising to clean the city’s air or Yamuna with quick fixes that are doomed to fail. There are no shortcuts to solving environmental problems.
Take Yamuna, for instance. It will not be revived by interception and diversion (I&D) drains or by merely adding sewage treatment plant (STP) capacity, as Delhi govt is being advised.
Yamuna can only be restored through a modern wastewater management system-one that separates stormwater drains from sewers, ensures every household and establishment is connected to the sewer network, and treats all sewage in advanced plants that enable recycling and reuse.
Equally critical is coordinated action with neighbouring states, especially Haryana, to release adequate freshwater into the river during lean seasons.
Likewise, Delhi’s air will not improve through gimmicks like cloud seeding or water cannons. It requires a regional airshed approach: coordinated action across all states within a 300km radius of Delhi This means tackling biomass burning in households and industries, stubble burning in fields, Industrial and vehicular pollution, and dust from construction sites and roads-at their sources.
Everywhere in the world, environmental progress has come from systemic, scientific, accountable, and long-term solutions not quick fixes. Delhi must learn this lesson.
Experimentation and innovation have their place, but innovation cannot replace fundamentals. Unless we build robust infra and systems, we will remain trapped in an illusion of progress while our rivers and skies stay poisoned.
Cloud seeding is not rainmaking. It is policymaking by optics. Delhi deserves better.
Chhath Puja: The Yamuna can be cleaned — but only if we abandon shortcuts
We have been asking the wrong question. Instead of asking if rivers can be cleaned, we must ask how we can stop polluting them
Every year, as Chhath Puja brings millions of devotees to the banks of the Yamuna, the issue of river pollution takes centre stage. This, in turn, revives a perennial question: Can the Yamuna — or any polluted river in India — be cleaned?
The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because many countries across the world have restored their rivers and kept them clean. The technology exists; India, too, can achieve it. No state or authority has succeeded in keeping a water body unpolluted over the long term. The failure lies not in capacity but in approach. We have been asking the wrong question. Instead of asking if rivers can be cleaned, we must ask how we can stop polluting them. The difference is subtle but crucial. If waste is prevented from entering rivers, they will revive naturally, as we briefly saw during the COVID-19 lockdown when industries were shut.
Across the developed world, wastewater management is a solved problem: Sewage is collected from every household through a sewer network, sent to pumping stations, treated at sewage treatment plants (STPs), and discharged only after treatment. Industrial effluent is also strictly regulated, and industries comply with standards. In India, however, the story is different.
Why India is failing where others succeeded
In developed countries, and even in emerging economies like China, growing populations prompted cities to build systems that separated drains and sewers. Sewage went through a closed network of pipes to treatment plants, while drains carried only rainwater. In India, however, there is often no separation between sewer lines and stormwater drains. And where separate sewer lines do exist, a large percentage of households are not connected. Their sewage either flows directly into drains or into millions of septic tanks, from which untreated effluent eventually runs off into drains.
Instead of ensuring every household and institution is connected to a separate sewer line, we have promoted shortcuts — installing new STPs along with Interception and Diversion (I&D) drains that intercept open drains carrying mixed waste and divert them to STPs. On paper, this looks promising: If we can collect all wastewater through I&D drains and install enough STPs, then we can clean our rivers. This approach has been adopted by all river-cleaning schemes, including Namami Gange and the new Yamuna cleaning plan. But the reality on the ground is something else.
In the last decade, India has built impressive treatment capacity. Many cities now have more STP capacity than the sewage they generate. Delhi, for instance, generates 2,674 million litres per day (MLD) of sewage but has STPs capable of treating 3,300 MLD. Why then does untreated wastewater still flow into the Yamuna? The reason is simple: 30–40 per cent of Delhi’s population lives in colonies without sewer connections. Their sewage enters open drains, where it mixes with stormwater and other waste before being sent to STPs.
| City | Population (Million) | Sewage Generated (MLD) | Installed STP Capacity (MLD) |
| Lucknow | 4.13 | 495.6 | 605 |
| Prayagraj | 1.35 | 162 | 340 |
| Varanasi | 2.08 | 294.6 | 410 |
| New Delhi | 22.28 | 2673.6 | 3300 |
But no treatment plant can handle the massive volumes of drain discharge, especially during the monsoon when untreated sewage is allowed to bypass the system entirely. Even in dry seasons, STPs struggle because they are designed for specific sewage parameters that they never actually receive — owing to the mixing of sewage with drain water — making treatment inefficient. Treating a mixture of sewage, rainwater, and industrial waste is unscientific and wasteful, yet this remains India’s dominant approach.
Another problem is fragmented responsibility. In Uttar Pradesh, different contractors from multiple organisations — such as Jal Sansthan and Jal Nigam — handled sewer networks, pumping stations, and STPs separately, with no single agency accountable. In 2019, the state introduced the ‘One-City-One-Operator’ model, under which one company manages the entire sewerage system of a city for 10–15 years, with payments linked to performance. International firms like SUEZ, VA Tech Wabag, and Toshiba now operate under this model, with centralised payment, effluent testing by accredited agencies, and independent monitoring. Accountability has improved, but without full sewer coverage and separation of sewage from drains, even the best operators cannot solve the problem.
The way forward
For years, Indian cities have avoided building comprehensive household-level sewerage systems, citing costs, and have relied on I&D drains as a stopgap until all households are connected. But it is now clear that both the environmental and economic costs of treating drains instead of sewage collected through closed sewer networks are unsustainable.
It is important to recognise that modern sewage treatment infrastructure is costly to build and maintain. There are no cheap solutions. The cost of sewage treatment is nearly three times the cost of producing potable water. In Lucknow, for example, it costs Rs 7 to produce 1,000 litres of potable water, but Rs 21 to treat sewage to tertiary standards (BOD below 10). This cost must ultimately be recovered from the public. Wherever possible, treated water should be reused, recycled, and sold, but a well-functioning sewerage system must simply be accepted as a necessary public cost.
The Yamuna can indeed be cleaned — but only if we abandon shortcuts. We must follow the basic principles that have worked elsewhere and invest in comprehensive, scientific, and accountable systems. We can certainly innovate and make our systems more efficient. But unless we get the fundamentals right, we will remain trapped in an illusion of progress while our rivers continue to die.
India’s ACs cool homes and are a hot problem
World Ozone Day is a good reminder of what refrigerants used in millions of air-conditioners do to environment. Hydrofluorocarbons heat up earth even more than CO2
The ozone hole is healing. The layer that shields us from the sun’s deadly ultraviolet rays was severely damaged by chemicals like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), once widely used as refrigerants in air-conditioners and refrigerators. Thanks to the Montreal Protocol, these chemicals will be phased out globally by 2030. Scientists now predict that the ozone layer will fully recover by 2066, saving millions of lives from skin cancer.
Yet, as one crisis recedes, another is fast unfolding—this time caused by the new refrigerants that replaced CFCs and HCFCs. The coolants we use today—hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)—are hundreds of times more potent than carbon dioxide (CO₂) in heating the climate. And in India, we are leaking them recklessly from our room air-conditioners (RACs).
A cooling boom
The sale of RACs has been growing at 15–20% annually since 2020. Urbanization, rising incomes, and intensifying heatwaves have turned ACs from a middle-class luxury into a household necessity. India currently has about 70 million RACs. Even with modest annual sales growth of 10%, this number will triple to 245 million by 2035.
But how responsibly are we using and maintaining our ACs? How conscious are we about energy efficiency? How frequently are we refilling refrigerants? And how aware are we of their harmful impacts?
To find answers, my colleagues at iFOREST recently conducted a first-of-its-kind national household survey covering more than 3,100 families from all income groups across seven major cities—Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Pune, and Jaipur. The results are both fascinating and deeply worrying.
Perception vs. reality
The survey busted some long-held myths. For instance, the perception that most AC-owning households have multiple RACs is incorrect. Nearly 87% of such households own just one AC; only 13% have more than two. This shows that ACs are no longer limited to the wealthy. A large share is now in middle- and lower-income households.
Another myth is that Indians operate their ACs at freezing lows. The survey shows that the most preferred temperature setting across cities is 22–26°C, not the ultra-low levels we often assume. There is therefore little need for the government to mandate thermostat settings.
Encouragingly, Indian consumers are conscious about energy efficiency. Nearly 98% of households own 3-star to 5-star rated appliances, with the 3-star category dominating.
But these positives are overshadowed by one stark reality: the way we service our ACs is damaging for both the climate and consumer pockets.
Servicing equals refrigerant refill
In India, refrigerant leakage and refilling have reached crisis proportions. About 80% of ACs older than five years require refilling annually. Even one-third of newer ACs—less than five years old—are refilled every year. In effect, around 40% of all ACs in India are refilled annually. Ideally, ACs should need a refill only once in five years. In India, it happens every two to three years.
This unnecessary refilling comes at a steep cost. In 2024 alone, India’s ACs consumed 32 million kg of refrigerant. At an average cost of ₹2,200 per refill, households spent about ₹7,000 crore ($0.8 billion). If business continues as usual, the refilling bill will quadruple to nearly ₹27,500 crore ($3.1 billion) by 2035.
The environmental cost is even higher. HFC-32, the most widely used refrigerant in India, is 675 times more potent than CO₂ in trapping heat. In 2024, refrigerant leakage from ACs emitted greenhouse gases (GHGs) equivalent to 52 million tonnes (MT) of CO₂. By 2035, this will rise to 84 MT.
When we add emissions from electricity consumption, the total GHG emissions of India’s ACs in 2024 reached 156 MT—about the same as emissions from all passenger cars in the country. Put simply: the annual GHG emissions from an AC that is refilled every two years is as much as a car. By 2035, the total emissions from ACs are projected to double to 329 MT, making them the single largest GHG-emitting household appliance in India.
Policy without teeth
While India does have policies on refrigerant management, these are half-measures without strong enforcement. The India Cooling Action Plan aims to reduce refrigerant demand by 25–30% by 2037–38, but lacks regulations to back it. Similarly, the amended E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2023, include provisions for environmentally sound disposal of refrigerants from end-of-life ACs at approved facilities, but these are being poorly enforced.
Therefore, currently there are no effective systems to prevent leaks during servicing, no monitoring of refrigerant refills, and no accountability for end-of-life disposal. Unlike plastics or electronic waste, refrigerants do not fall under any meaningful Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework in India.
A solvable crisis
The refrigerant leakage crisis is urgent—but it is solvable. India must establish a comprehensive Lifecycle Refrigerant Management (LRM) regulation covering every stage—from refrigerant filling to servicing to disposal. AC manufacturers should be made responsible under an EPR regime to ensure recovery, recycling, and safe destruction of refrigerants. Such regulations are being implemented by many countries including Canada, Australia, the EU, China and Singapore.
If implemented effectively, LRM could prevent 500–650 MT of GHG emissions between 2025 and 2035—worth $25–33 billion in carbon credits at a moderate price of $50 per tonne. Consumers too would benefit, saving over $10 billion in unnecessary refill costs. This is a win-win solution: lower household expenses, reduced refrigerant wastage, and significant climate gains.
India showed leadership in the fight to protect the ozone layer by phasing out CFCs and HCFCs well before global deadlines. We can lead once again, this time in protecting the climate.
