Category: Op-ed

Defunct DVC’s bright future

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

MOST of us know the Damodar Valley either from school textbooks or from its portrayal in films like Kala Patthar and Gangs of Wasseypur. Yet the valley is far more than what is captured in books or on screen. Spanning the coal-rich districts of Jharkhand and West Bengal, the Damodar Valley — often called India’s Ruhr Valley — has powered the nation’s growth since Independence. Coal from Jharia and Raniganj fuelled India’s rise, while the steel plants of Durgapur and Bokaro and the fertilizer factories of Sindri became the celebrated “temples of modern India.” The valley was an engine of national ambition.

Today, that engine is sputtering. The region stands as a stark paradox: rich in coal and industrial infrastructure, yet choking on the very resources that once made it prosperous. The air is thick with pollution, the rivers run contaminated, and the economic model that once promised secure employment is now creating a landscape of uncertainty. The mines that built modern India are becoming its tombstones. The imperative is clear: the Damodar Valley must urgently transition from a coal-based past or risk terminal decline.

The evidence of this decline is everywhere. In Dhanbad, the coal capital of India, nearly half the mines are abandoned or non-operational. By 2030, a staggering 80 percent of the mines will cease operations due to exhausted reserves or unprofitability. This narrative is echoed across the valley. For example, coal production in the Raniganj coalfield in West Bengal has plateaued at about 40-50 million tonnes per year and is likely to decline rapidly. Once the nation’s largest coal producer, the Damodar basin has now slipped to third place, overtaken by coalfields in Odisha and Chhattisgarh.

The downstream industries are faring no better. Jharkhand, despite sitting on mountains of coal, is paradoxically a net importer of electricity. Ageing thermal power plants at Patratu, Bokaro, Bandel and Kolaghat have shut down. Overall, less than 5 percent of India’s thermal power capacity remains in the valley. Even the Damodar Valley Corporation’s (DVC) multipurpose dams, designed for flood control, irrigation and hydropower, are silting up: their power generation is minimal and flood control capabilities increasingly compromised. Parts of West Bengal now flood annually due to diminished water-holding capacity in dams such as Maithon, Panchet, Konar and Tilaiya.

But this is not just an economic crisis; it is a human one. Over 200,000 workers — the very people who dug the coal and manned the plants — now face the spectre of job losses. The region’s workforce participation rate is already a worryingly low 30 percent. Without a viable alternative, we are staring at a social and economic vacuum of immense proportions.

Yet, within this crisis lies an unprecedented opportunity. The same assets that defined the valley’s industrial age can be repurposed to build its green future. A recent assessment by my colleagues reveals that the districts of Dhanbad, Bokaro and Ramgarh (DBR) — the core of the valley — have the potential to become a major green industrial corridor.

Consider the resources. The region has over 100,000 hectares of barren and mining-ravaged land. Under the intense sun of eastern India, this land is not a scar but an asset — a potential site for solar farms capable of generating up to 10 gigawatts (GW) of clean power by 2030, far exceeding Jharkhand’s 2027 target of 4 GW. The reservoirs at Maithon, Panchet and Tenughat can host floating solar projects and form the foundation for a green hydrogen industry. With India pushing for hydrogen-based steelmaking and fertilizer production, DBR — with its existing steel and fertilizer plants and water infrastructure — is uniquely positioned to become a hub for green hydrogen, green steel, and green fertilizer. In addition, repurposing closed mines into solar farms, industrial parks, or even tourism sites can drive local employment and economic diversification, creating lakhs of new, sustainable jobs.

The infrastructure is already in place: robust connectivity via national highways and railways, and proximity to the upcoming Amritsar–Kolkata Industrial Corridor. Most important, the region has a young, resilient workforce eager for new opportunities.

To realize this potential, however, a deliberate and just strategy is essential. First, the Central government must partner with the states to create a new blueprint for the Damodar Valley, transforming it from a traditional coal economy into a vanguard of green development. A dedicated Green Growth Plan for the DBR region should be the starting point. In addition, the DVC itself must diversify into a green energy company.

Most critically, this transition must be just. The workers and communities who built the coal economy must not be left behind. This requires massive investment in skilling, social protection, and enterprise development. The Jharkhand government, in particular, must pioneer a Just Transition Policy to ensure that the shift to a green economy is equitable and inclusive.

History offers a powerful parallel. Germany’s Ruhr Valley faced an identical crisis with the decline of coal. It chose a path of proactive transformation, investing in technology, education and culture. Its last coal mine closed in 2018, but today, former industrial sites are vibrant museums, universities, and green spaces. The Ruhr transformed a monoculture economy into a diversified, resilient hub.

The Damodar Valley now stands at the same crossroads. It has given its energy, its environment, and its labour to build the nation. But it must now confront the dual realities of depleting coal reserves and the global shift toward clean energy. The Ruhr teaches us that transformation cannot be left to chance — it requires foresight, planning, and investment. If India acts decisively, the Damodar Valley can avoid decline and instead lead the green transition in eastern India

Cloud seeding was never the solution for Delhi’s air pollution

Posted on by Pratima Singh

Even if it had succeeded, cloud seeding would have offered Delhi only momentary relief from the toxic air. What the current crisis calls for is science-based governance

Delhi’s much-anticipated cloud seeding experiment on October 28 failed to produce the desired rainfall, despite the hope that artificial showers could wash away the thick haze choking the city. While disappointment is understandable, this outcome should not come as a surprise. It reinforces what environmental scientists have long maintained: The capital’s pollution problem cannot be dispersed with one-off, high-visibility interventions.

Each year, as autumn fades into winter, Delhi’s skyline turns into a haze of toxic grey. With air quality indices breaching hazardous levels, the pressure to act swiftly intensifies. The latest response: A pilot cloud seeding experiment, aimed to induce rainfall that can temporarily wash pollutants from the atmosphere. While the intent is understandable, it is critical to ask whether such an intervention can truly address Delhi’s deeply entrenched complex air pollution problem.

Cloud seeding is a weather modification technique that involves dispersing substances such as silver iodide or sodium chloride into clouds to encourage rainfall. It has been used in several countries, including China, the United States, and the UAE, mostly to tackle drought or enhance water availability. In India, it has been used intermittently in states such as Maharashtra and Karnataka for similar purposes.

Also Read | The ‘patakha’ police won’t solve Delhi’s toxic air crisis

Its use to reduce air pollution, however, remains rare and scientifically inconclusive. While rainfall can temporarily wash away suspended particulates, its effects are short-lived and depend heavily on the presence of suitable clouds, humidity, and wind conditions. Even globally, cloud seeding has offered only localised and temporary improvement in air quality.

Delhi’s pollution pattern is no longer a mystery. It’s a challenge well understood. Decades of research have consistently identified both its sources and its seasonal behaviour. Studies by IIT Delhi, TERI, and the System of Air Quality and Weather Forecasting and Research (SAFAR) have shown that air quality deteriorates sharply in October and November due to a combination of anthropogenic and meteorological factors.

Flawed Seeding

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

Experiments around the world have already established that cloud seeding can’t defeat air pollution. What Delhi is doing in their wake can’t even be called innovation. It’s just political theatre

Yesterday, to mitigate air pollution, Delhi govt, in collaboration with IIT Kanpur, conducted the first cloud-seeding trial in areas like Burari, north Karol Bagh and Mayur Vihar. This follows the 25-point Air Pollution Mitigation Plan for 2025 it had unveiled in June, as a prelude to the smog season. The very first item in this plan was a “pilot project of cloud seeding through IIT Kanpur to study its effectiveness in dust mitigation”.

I am all for experiments that explore innovative solutions. But I have a problem when experiments are touted and advertised as ready-made solutions, distracting attention from the real ones. This is precisely what is happening with cloud seeding in Delhi.

To understand why projecting cloud seeding as a solution is misleading, it is important to recall what we already know about this technology and its history.

First, cloud seeding-also known as artificial rain-is not new. It is an old technique historically used to induce rain during droughts. India first tested it in the 1950s and has continued researching it, most recently through the ‘Cloud Aerosol Interaction and Precipitation Enhancement Experiment (CAIPEEX)’, conducted over a rain-shadow region of the Western Ghats by Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology.

Thailand even has a ‘Department of Royal Rainmaking and Agricultural Aviation’ dedicated to inducing artificial rain. China and US today run the largest weather-modifi-cation programmes in the world. Dozens of countries continue to use cloud seeding, but almost exclusively for drought relief during rainy seasons.

Cloud seeding as a way to reduce air pollution, however, is a relatively recent idea-barely a decade old. Over this period, Lahore, Bangkok, Chiang Mai, Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, and several other Chinese cities have all tried it at least once. Almost all have since abandoned the practice, and for good reasons:

  • Cloud seeding works only if clouds are present but insufficient to produce rain on their own. This is why it is used during rainy seasons, not dry winters.
  • Even when conditions look promising, seeding often fails. Most experiments to improve air quality have produced no rainfall.
  • At best, a few localities in a large city receive showers. In Lahore in 2023, pockets of rain briefly improved air quality-but only for a few hours, not even days.

Because of these limitations, most cities worldwide have dropped cloud seeding, even as an emergency measure for air pollution control. Govts are well aware of these realities.

In 2024, Union environment ministry told Parliament that, based on expert opinion, cloud seeding as an emergency measure to improve Delhi’s air quality was not feasible.

Their assessment was categorical:

  • Winter clouds over north India form mostly from Western Disturbances, which are short-lived and already bring natural rain, making seeding unnecessary
  • High-altitude clouds (above 5-6km) cannot be seeded due to aircraft limitations.
  • Effective seeding requires specific cloud conditions, which are absent in Delhi’s cold, dry winters.
  • Even if precipitation formed, dry air beneath the clouds could evaporate it before reaching the ground.
  • Concerns remain about the chemicals used, their efficacy and possible unintended consequences.

In short: it won’t work.

So why is Delhi govt trying something that, according environment ministry, is destined to disappoint, if not fail? The answer lies in Delhi’s political theatre.

AAP first floated the idea of cloud seeding during the 2023 smog season but could not implement it, due to unsuitable weather. Now the new BJP govt wants to prove it can do what AAP could not. This is less about science and more about one-upmanship And IIT Kanpur, unfortunately, has allowed itself to be drawn into this spectacle.

But here is the bottom line: Delhi govt is promising to clean the city’s air or Yamuna with quick fixes that are doomed to fail. There are no shortcuts to solving environmental problems.

Take Yamuna, for instance. It will not be revived by interception and diversion (I&D) drains or by merely adding sewage treatment plant (STP) capacity, as Delhi govt is being advised.

Yamuna can only be restored through a modern wastewater management system-one that separates stormwater drains from sewers, ensures every household and establishment is connected to the sewer network, and treats all sewage in advanced plants that enable recycling and reuse.

Equally critical is coordinated action with neighbouring states, especially Haryana, to release adequate freshwater into the river during lean seasons.

Likewise, Delhi’s air will not improve through gimmicks like cloud seeding or water cannons. It requires a regional airshed approach: coordinated action across all states within a 300km radius of Delhi This means tackling biomass burning in households and industries, stubble burning in fields, Industrial and vehicular pollution, and dust from construction sites and roads-at their sources.

Everywhere in the world, environmental progress has come from systemic, scientific, accountable, and long-term solutions not quick fixes. Delhi must learn this lesson.

Experimentation and innovation have their place, but innovation cannot replace fundamentals. Unless we build robust infra and systems, we will remain trapped in an illusion of progress while our rivers and skies stay poisoned.

Cloud seeding is not rainmaking. It is policymaking by optics. Delhi deserves better.

Chhath Puja: The Yamuna can be cleaned — but only if we abandon shortcuts

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan, Manoj Kumar Singh and Akhilesh Gautam

We have been asking the wrong question. Instead of asking if rivers can be cleaned, we must ask how we can stop polluting them

Every year, as Chhath Puja brings millions of devotees to the banks of the Yamuna, the issue of river pollution takes centre stage. This, in turn, revives a perennial question: Can the Yamuna — or any polluted river in India — be cleaned?

The answer is both yes and no. Yes, because many countries across the world have restored their rivers and kept them clean. The technology exists; India, too, can achieve it. No state or authority has succeeded in keeping a water body unpolluted over the long term. The failure lies not in capacity but in approach. We have been asking the wrong question. Instead of asking if rivers can be cleaned, we must ask how we can stop polluting them. The difference is subtle but crucial. If waste is prevented from entering rivers, they will revive naturally, as we briefly saw during the COVID-19 lockdown when industries were shut.

Across the developed world, wastewater management is a solved problem: Sewage is collected from every household through a sewer network, sent to pumping stations, treated at sewage treatment plants (STPs), and discharged only after treatment. Industrial effluent is also strictly regulated, and industries comply with standards. In India, however, the story is different.

Why India is failing where others succeeded

In developed countries, and even in emerging economies like China, growing populations prompted cities to build systems that separated drains and sewers. Sewage went through a closed network of pipes to treatment plants, while drains carried only rainwater. In India, however, there is often no separation between sewer lines and stormwater drains. And where separate sewer lines do exist, a large percentage of households are not connected. Their sewage either flows directly into drains or into millions of septic tanks, from which untreated effluent eventually runs off into drains.

Instead of ensuring every household and institution is connected to a separate sewer line, we have promoted shortcuts — installing new STPs along with Interception and Diversion (I&D) drains that intercept open drains carrying mixed waste and divert them to STPs. On paper, this looks promising: If we can collect all wastewater through I&D drains and install enough STPs, then we can clean our rivers. This approach has been adopted by all river-cleaning schemes, including Namami Gange and the new Yamuna cleaning plan. But the reality on the ground is something else.

In the last decade, India has built impressive treatment capacity. Many cities now have more STP capacity than the sewage they generate. Delhi, for instance, generates 2,674 million litres per day (MLD) of sewage but has STPs capable of treating 3,300 MLD. Why then does untreated wastewater still flow into the Yamuna? The reason is simple: 30–40 per cent of Delhi’s population lives in colonies without sewer connections. Their sewage enters open drains, where it mixes with stormwater and other waste before being sent to STPs.

City Population (Million) Sewage Generated (MLD) Installed STP Capacity (MLD)
Lucknow 4.13 495.6 605
Prayagraj 1.35 162 340
Varanasi 2.08 294.6 410
New Delhi 22.28 2673.6 3300

But no treatment plant can handle the massive volumes of drain discharge, especially during the monsoon when untreated sewage is allowed to bypass the system entirely. Even in dry seasons, STPs struggle because they are designed for specific sewage parameters that they never actually receive — owing to the mixing of sewage with drain water — making treatment inefficient. Treating a mixture of sewage, rainwater, and industrial waste is unscientific and wasteful, yet this remains India’s dominant approach.

Another problem is fragmented responsibility. In Uttar Pradesh, different contractors from multiple organisations — such as Jal Sansthan and Jal Nigam — handled sewer networks, pumping stations, and STPs separately, with no single agency accountable. In 2019, the state introduced the ‘One-City-One-Operator’ model, under which one company manages the entire sewerage system of a city for 10–15 years, with payments linked to performance. International firms like SUEZ, VA Tech Wabag, and Toshiba now operate under this model, with centralised payment, effluent testing by accredited agencies, and independent monitoring. Accountability has improved, but without full sewer coverage and separation of sewage from drains, even the best operators cannot solve the problem.

The way forward

For years, Indian cities have avoided building comprehensive household-level sewerage systems, citing costs, and have relied on I&D drains as a stopgap until all households are connected. But it is now clear that both the environmental and economic costs of treating drains instead of sewage collected through closed sewer networks are unsustainable.

It is important to recognise that modern sewage treatment infrastructure is costly to build and maintain. There are no cheap solutions. The cost of sewage treatment is nearly three times the cost of producing potable water. In Lucknow, for example, it costs Rs 7 to produce 1,000 litres of potable water, but Rs 21 to treat sewage to tertiary standards (BOD below 10). This cost must ultimately be recovered from the public. Wherever possible, treated water should be reused, recycled, and sold, but a well-functioning sewerage system must simply be accepted as a necessary public cost.

The Yamuna can indeed be cleaned — but only if we abandon shortcuts. We must follow the basic principles that have worked elsewhere and invest in comprehensive, scientific, and accountable systems. We can certainly innovate and make our systems more efficient. But unless we get the fundamentals right, we will remain trapped in an illusion of progress while our rivers continue to die.

India’s ACs cool homes and are a hot problem

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

World Ozone Day is a good reminder of what refrigerants used in millions of air-conditioners do to environment. Hydrofluorocarbons heat up earth even more than CO2

The ozone hole is healing. The layer that shields us from the sun’s deadly ultraviolet rays was severely damaged by chemicals like chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), once widely used as refrigerants in air-conditioners and refrigerators. Thanks to the Montreal Protocol, these chemicals will be phased out globally by 2030. Scientists now predict that the ozone layer will fully recover by 2066, saving millions of lives from skin cancer.

Yet, as one crisis recedes, another is fast unfolding—this time caused by the new refrigerants that replaced CFCs and HCFCs. The coolants we use today—hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)—are hundreds of times more potent than carbon dioxide (CO₂) in heating the climate. And in India, we are leaking them recklessly from our room air-conditioners (RACs).

A cooling boom

The sale of RACs has been growing at 15–20% annually since 2020. Urbanization, rising incomes, and intensifying heatwaves have turned ACs from a middle-class luxury into a household necessity. India currently has about 70 million RACs. Even with modest annual sales growth of 10%, this number will triple to 245 million by 2035.

But how responsibly are we using and maintaining our ACs? How conscious are we about energy efficiency? How frequently are we refilling refrigerants? And how aware are we of their harmful impacts?

To find answers, my colleagues at iFOREST recently conducted a first-of-its-kind national household survey covering more than 3,100 families from all income groups across seven major cities—Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Ahmedabad, Pune, and Jaipur. The results are both fascinating and deeply worrying.

Perception vs. reality

The survey busted some long-held myths. For instance, the perception that most AC-owning households have multiple RACs is incorrect. Nearly 87% of such households own just one AC; only 13% have more than two. This shows that ACs are no longer limited to the wealthy. A large share is now in middle- and lower-income households.

Another myth is that Indians operate their ACs at freezing lows. The survey shows that the most preferred temperature setting across cities is 22–26°C, not the ultra-low levels we often assume. There is therefore little need for the government to mandate thermostat settings.

Encouragingly, Indian consumers are conscious about energy efficiency. Nearly 98% of households own 3-star to 5-star rated appliances, with the 3-star category dominating.

But these positives are overshadowed by one stark reality: the way we service our ACs is damaging for both the climate and consumer pockets.

Servicing equals refrigerant refill

In India, refrigerant leakage and refilling have reached crisis proportions. About 80% of ACs older than five years require refilling annually. Even one-third of newer ACs—less than five years old—are refilled every year. In effect, around 40% of all ACs in India are refilled annually. Ideally, ACs should need a refill only once in five years. In India, it happens every two to three years.

This unnecessary refilling comes at a steep cost. In 2024 alone, India’s ACs consumed 32 million kg of refrigerant. At an average cost of ₹2,200 per refill, households spent about ₹7,000 crore ($0.8 billion). If business continues as usual, the refilling bill will quadruple to nearly ₹27,500 crore ($3.1 billion) by 2035.

The environmental cost is even higher. HFC-32, the most widely used refrigerant in India, is 675 times more potent than CO₂ in trapping heat. In 2024, refrigerant leakage from ACs emitted greenhouse gases (GHGs) equivalent to 52 million tonnes (MT) of CO₂. By 2035, this will rise to 84 MT.

When we add emissions from electricity consumption, the total GHG emissions of India’s ACs in 2024 reached 156 MT—about the same as emissions from all passenger cars in the country. Put simply: the annual GHG emissions from an AC that is refilled every two years is as much as a car. By 2035, the total emissions from ACs are projected to double to 329 MT, making them the single largest GHG-emitting household appliance in India.

Policy without teeth

While India does have policies on refrigerant management, these are half-measures without strong enforcement. The India Cooling Action Plan aims to reduce refrigerant demand by 25–30% by 2037–38, but lacks regulations to back it. Similarly, the amended E-Waste (Management) Rules, 2023, include provisions for environmentally sound disposal of refrigerants from end-of-life ACs at approved facilities, but these are being poorly enforced.

Therefore, currently there are no effective systems to prevent leaks during servicing, no monitoring of refrigerant refills, and no accountability for end-of-life disposal. Unlike plastics or electronic waste, refrigerants do not fall under any meaningful Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) framework in India.

A solvable crisis

The refrigerant leakage crisis is urgent—but it is solvable. India must establish a comprehensive Lifecycle Refrigerant Management (LRM) regulation covering every stage—from refrigerant filling to servicing to disposal. AC manufacturers should be made responsible under an EPR regime to ensure recovery, recycling, and safe destruction of refrigerants. Such regulations are being implemented by many countries including Canada, Australia, the EU, China and Singapore.

If implemented effectively, LRM could prevent 500–650 MT of GHG emissions between 2025 and 2035—worth $25–33 billion in carbon credits at a moderate price of $50 per tonne. Consumers too would benefit, saving over $10 billion in unnecessary refill costs. This is a win-win solution: lower household expenses, reduced refrigerant wastage, and significant climate gains.

India showed leadership in the fight to protect the ozone layer by phasing out CFCs and HCFCs well before global deadlines. We can lead once again, this time in protecting the climate.

Beating the Heat

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

On September 2, 2025, Bhubaneswar became the first Indian city to release an Integrated Heat and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP) to comprehensively tackle two growing crises—rising heat stress and the explosion in air conditioning demand.

Heat stress is not new to India. Over the past two decades, the country has experienced increasingly frequent and intense heatwaves that have claimed thousands of lives, reduced worker productivity, and strained health systems. But the crisis has changed. Cities are now caught in a vicious cycle of heat and cooling: higher temperatures and humidity drive-up air-conditioning use, which worsens the Urban Heat Island (UHI) effect and greenhouse gas emissions. This, in turn, makes cities even hotter—and more dependent on cooling.

It is precisely this cycle that Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP seeks to break. It is India’s first city-level plan that integrates urban planning, green buildings, sustainable cooling, and heat adaptation measures under one umbrella.

A City on the Frontline of Heat

Bhubaneswar has long been one of India’s most heat-affected cities. Over the last four decades, average temperatures and humidity levels have risen steadily across the year. Even more worrying is the rise in night-time temperatures, which robs people of relief and increases health risks. Today, heat stress stretches from February to October. As per the IMD’s “Feels Like” index, which uses temperature and humidity to measure heat stress, the city endured nearly 230 days of Yellow or Orange heat alerts in 2024.

Rapid urbanisation has further compounded heat stress. Between 2018 and 2024, Bhubaneswar’s built-up area grew by 23%, while vegetation declined by nearly 10% and water bodies by a staggering 75%. The result is a far more pronounced UHI effect, with the city now 2–5°C hotter than surrounding rural areas.

The impacts are already evident. Outdoor workers—from construction crews to street vendors—lose 20–30% of productivity and wages to heat stress. Overall, the city lost 8.6% of its annual income due to heat stress. At the same time, AC ownership has more than doubled in just two years, rising from 6% of households in 2021 to 15% in 2023. Cooling now accounts for one-third of the city’s electricity use—and nearly two-thirds in peak summer months.

Looking ahead, the situation could worsen dramatically. Under an intermediate climate warming scenario, a “normal hot day” in 2050 will feel like today’s extreme heat days. The city, therefore, will have to rely on cooling to survive. Under a Business-as-Usual (BAU) scenario, therefore, electricity demand from cooling could rise 7.6 times by 2050 compared to current levels.

What the IHCAP Offers

Against this backdrop, Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP lays out a comprehensive five-pillar strategy:

  • Cool the City: Expand greenery, revive water bodies, promote cool roofs, and redesign streets to reduce UHI.
  • Cool Buildings: Implement energy conservation building codes and promote climate-responsive designs to reduce heat absorption and enhance indoor comfort.
  • Sustainable Cooling for All: Ensure access to affordable, efficient, and climate-friendly cooling solutions such as efficient fans and ACs, district cooling systems, and white roofs for low-income homes.
  • Enhance Heat Resilience: Strengthen electricity, water, and health systems; build cooling shelters and provide cool bus stops and public water kiosks.
  • Adapt to Heat: Update heat alert thresholds to account for humidity and night-time temperatures, provide insurance for vulnerable workers, and expand awareness campaigns.

If implemented effectively, these interventions could reduce surface temperatures by 0.5–9.4°C, depending on the type of measure, and cut the city’s cooling-related electricity demand by 44–67% compared to the BAU scenario.

Beyond Bhubaneswar

The IHCAP connects two national policies that have so far worked in silos. The India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP) of the environment ministry that promotes sustainable cooling, and the Heat Action Plan (HAP) of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), which focus primarily on early warning and heat adaptation. By unifying them, the IHCAP offers a comprehensive framework to address heat stress that other cities can adapt and adopt.

Scaling this framework, however, will require significant policy reforms. NDMA’s HAP guidelines must be updated to include heat mitigation and sustainable cooling measures. City master plans and building codes will also need revision. For example, the Energy Conservation and Sustainable Building Code, 2024 for commercial and institutional buildings and the Eco-Niwas Samhita 2024 for residential buildings cover only a fraction of upcoming construction. In Bhubaneswar, just 25% of commercial and institutional buildings and a mere 1.5% of residential construction fall under these codes. Likewise, master plans do not consider UHI, heat mitigation strategies or the need for heat-resilient infrastructure.

By mid-century, India will be home to 600–700 million urban residents, most of them in heat-stressed cities. Without integrated action, we risk a future where outdoor work becomes unsafe for millions, inequality deepens, and cities completely rely on cooling appliances to survive.

Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP, however, shows that cities can avoid this dystopian future and break the vicious cycle of heat and cooling through scientific modelling, innovative planning, and forward-looking policy.

Note: Bhubaneshwar’s IHCAP is developed by iFOREST in collaboration with the Singapore-ETH Centre, which is running the Cooling Singapore program.

Our Ruhr Valley Needs Reinvention

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

Spanning the coal-rich districts of Jharkhand and West Bengal, Damodar Valley (DV)-India’s ‘Ruhr Valley’-has powered the country’s growth since Independence. Coal from Jharia and Raniganj has fuelled India’s rise while steel plants of Durgapur and Bokaro, and fertiliser factories of Sindri became ‘temples of modern India’.

Today, the region stands as a stark paradox: rich in coal and industrial infrastructure, yet choking on resources that once made it prosperous. The air is thick with pollution, rivers flow contaminated and the economic model that once promised eternal employment is now creating a landscape of uncertainty. The imperative is clear: DV must urgently transition from a coal-based past, or risk terminal decline. Evidence of the coming decline is everywhere:

► In Dhanbad, India’s ‘coal capital’, nearly half the mines are abandoned or non-operational. By 2030, 80% of its mines will cease operations due to exhausted reserves or unprofitability. This story echoes across the Valley. Coal production in West Bengal’s Raniganj has plateaued at about 40-50 MT per year. Once the country’s largest coal producer, the Damodar basin has now fallen to third place, overtaken by coalfields in Odisha and Chhattisgarh.

► Downstream industries are faring no better. Jharkhand, sitting on mountains of coal, is ironically, a net importer of electricity. Ageing thermal power plants at Patratu, Bokaro, Bandel and Kolaghat have shut down. Overall, less than 5% of India’s thermal power capacity remains here. Even Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC)’s multi-purpose dams, designed for flood control, irrigation and hydropower, are silting up. Their power generation is minimal, and their flood-control capabilities are increasingly compromised.

But this is not just an economic crisis. It’s a human one. Over 2 lakh workers face the spectre of job losses. The region’s workforce participation rate is 30%. Without a viable alternative, the region is staring at a socioeconomic vacuum of immense proportions.

Yet, within this crisis lies an unprecedented opportunity. The same assets that defined the valley’s industrial age can be repurposed to build its green future. An August 2025 iFOREST Assessment, ‘Transforming India’s Coal Capital’, reveals that Dhanbad, Bokaro and Ramgarh (DBR)—the core of the valley—have the potential to become a major green industrial corridor.

The region has over 1 lakh ha of barren and mining-ravaged land, a potential site for solar farms capable of generating up to 10 GW of clean power by 2030. Reservoirs at Maithon, Panchet, and Tenughat can host floating solar projects and become the foundation for a green hydrogen industry.

With India pushing for hydrogen-based steelmaking and fertiliser production, DBR—with its existing steel and fertiliser plants and water infra—is uniquely positioned to become a hub for green hydrogen, green steel and green fertiliser. Also, repurposed coal mines into solar farms, industrial parks, or even as carbon sinks can drive local employment and economic diversification.

Infrastructure is already in place: robust connectivity via national highways and railways, and proximity to upcoming Amritsar-Kolkata Industrial Corridor. Most importantly, the region has a young, resilient workforce. To realise this potential, however, a good strategy is essential.

► Plan green GoI must partner with states to create a new blueprint for DV, transforming it from a traditional coal economy into a vanguard of green development. A dedicated Green Growth Plan for the DBR region should be the starting point. In addition, DVC must diversify into a green energy company.

► Just transition Workers and communities who built the coal economy must not be left behind. This requires investment in skilling, social protection and enterprise development. Jharkhand must prepare a ‘just transition policy’ to ensure that the move to a green economy is equitable and inclusive. Germany’s Ruhr Valley faced an identical crisis with the decline of coal. It chose a path of proactive transformation, investing in tech, education and culture. Its last coal mine closed in 2018. But today, former industrial sites are vibrant museums, universities and green spaces.

The valley now stands at the same crossroads. It has given its energy, environment and labour to build India. But it must now face the dual realities of depleting coal reserves and global shift toward clean energy. Ruhr teaches us that transformation cannot be left to chance. It requires foresight, planning and investment. If India acts decisively, Damodar Valley can avoid decline. Instead, it can lead the green transition in eastern India.

Breaking a vicious cycle

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

Scientific modelling, innovative planning, & forward-looking policy can help cities beat heat stress.

Bhubaneswar has become the first Indian city to launch an Integrated Heat and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP).

On September 2, Bhubaneswar became the first Indian city to release an Integrated Heat and Cooling Action Plan (IHCAP) to comprehensively tackle two growing crises—rising heat stress and the explosion in air conditioning demand.

Heat stress is not new to India. Over the past two decades, the country has experienced increasingly frequent and intense heatwaves that have claimed thousands of lives, reduced worker productivity, and strained health systems. But the crisis has changed. Cities are now caught in a vicious cycle of heat and cooling—higher temperatures and humidity drive up air-conditioning use, which worsens the urban heat island (UHI) effect and greenhouse gas emissions. This, in turn, makes cities even hotter—and more dependent on cooling.

It is precisely this cycle that Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP seeks to break. It is India’s first city-level plan that integrates urban planning, green buildings, sustainable cooling, and heat adaptation measures under one umbrella.

A city on the frontline of heat

Bhubaneswar has long been one of India’s most heat-affected cities. Over the last four decades, average temperatures and humidity levels have risen steadily across the year. Even more worrying is the rise in night-time temperatures, which robs people of relief and increases health risks. Today, heat stress stretches from February to October. According to the India Meteorological Department’s (IMD) “feels like” index, which uses temperature and humidity to measure heat stress, the city endured nearly 230 days of yellow or orange heat alerts in 2024.

Rapid urbanisation has further compounded heat stress. Between 2018 and 2024, Bhubaneswar’s built-up area grew by 23%, while vegetation declined by nearly 10% and water bodies by a staggering 75%. The result is a far more pronounced UHI effect, with the city now 2 to 5°C hotter than surrounding rural areas.

The impacts are already evident. Outdoor workers—from construction crews to street vendors—lose 20-30% of productivity and wages to heat stress. Overall, the city lost 8.6% of its annual income due to heat stress. At the same time, AC ownership has more than doubled in just two years, rising from 6% of households in 2021 to 15% in 2023. Cooling now accounts for one-third of the city’s electricity use—and nearly two-thirds in the peak summer months.

Looking ahead, the situation could worsen dramatically. Under an intermediate climate warming scenario, a “normal hot day” in 2050 will feel like today’s extreme heat days. The city, therefore, will have to rely on cooling to survive. Under a business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, therefore, electricity demand from cooling could rise 7.6 times by 2050 compared to current levels.

What the IHCAP offers

Against this backdrop, Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP lays out a comprehensive five-pillar strategy:

Cool the city: Expand greenery, revive water bodies, promote cool roofs, and redesign streets to reduce UHI.

Cool buildings: Implement energy conservation building codes and promote climate-responsive designs to reduce heat absorption and enhance indoor comfort.

Sustainable cooling for all: Ensure access to affordable, efficient, and climate-friendly cooling solutions such as efficient fans and ACs, district cooling systems, and white roofs for low-income homes.

Enhance heat resilience: Strengthen electricity, water, and health systems; build cooling shelters and provide cool bus stops and public water kiosks.

Adapt to heat: Update heat alert thresholds to account for humidity and night-time temperatures, provide insurance to vulnerable workers, and expand awareness campaigns.

If implemented effectively, these interventions could reduce surface temperatures by 0.5-9.4°C, depending on the type of measure, and cut the city’s cooling-related electricity demand by 44-67% compared to the BAU scenario.

Beyond Bhubaneswar

The IHCAP connects two national policies that have so far worked in silos. The India Cooling Action Plan (ICAP) of the environment ministry promotes sustainable cooling and the Heat Action Plan (HAP) of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) (focusses primarily on early warning and heat adaptation. By unifying them, the IHCAP offers a comprehensive framework to address heat stress that other cities can adapt and adopt.

Scaling this framework, however, will require significant policy reforms. The NDMA’s HAP guidelines must be updated to include heat mitigation and sustainable cooling measures. City master plans and building codes will also need revision. For example, the Energy Conservation and Sustainable Building Code, 2024, for commercial and institutional buildings and the Eco-Niwas Samhita 2024 for residential buildings cover only a fraction of upcoming construction. In Bhubaneswar, just 25% of commercial and institutional buildings and a mere 1.5% of residential construction fall under these codes. Likewise, master plans do not consider UHI, heat mitigation strategies, or the need for heat-resilient infrastructure.

By mid-century, India will be home to 600-700 million urban residents, most of them in heat-stressed cities. Without integrated action, we risk a future where outdoor work becomes unsafe for millions, inequality deepens, and cities completely rely on cooling appliances to survive.

Bhubaneswar’s IHCAP, however, shows that cities can avoid this dystopian future and break the vicious cycle of heat and cooling through scientific modelling, innovative planning, and forward-looking policy.

Delhi’s old car muddle

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

The Delhi government has taken a U-turn from its initiative to deny fuel and impound diesel vehicles older than 10 years and petrol vehicles older than 15 years, largely due to public backlash. The Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM), which had given this direction, has now decided to postpone this action to November.

But I’m somewhat amused by this entire episode. I am amused by the sudden public outrage over this directive as many seem to believe this is a new crackdown. But here’s the fact: these vehicles were banned in Delhi nearly seven years ago, on October 30, 2018, when the Delhi government began enforcing a Supreme Court-backed order that prohibits such vehicles not just from operating, but even from being parked or being present in the city. The latest directive was merely an attempt to enforce an old order using a new method.

In fact, law-abiding citizens have been selling their older vehicles ever since the 2018 law. Take my case. I sold my well-maintained 10-year-old Bharat Stage IV diesel car — barely run for 100,000 km — in 2022. It went to a tour operator in Punjab at a bargain price so generous that he still sends me Diwali sweets. I didn’t want to part with the car, but the law left me no choice. And I wasn’t alone. Over the past seven years, lakhs of Delhiites have sold their vehicles to comply with the ban. Of course, the majority of these vehicles have not gone to scrapyards as intended; instead, they’ve been relocated to other parts of the country, polluting their environments instead.

So, why has the Delhi government decided to enforce the refuelling restriction now, seven years after banning these vehicles? More specifically, why has the CAQM issued this direction at this moment? Do they have data showing that the original ban has been ineffective? The answer is no. The fact is, the entire air quality action plan being enforced by the Delhi government and agencies like CAQM is bereft of data. There is no evidence showing the impact of the vehicle ban on air quality — or even tracking the enforcement of the ban itself.

Take the case of enforcement. There is no formal vehicle deregistration system in Delhi. Even when vehicles are scrapped, they remain technically “registered” with the Regional Transport Office (RTO). Owners are expected to voluntarily deregister their vehicles — a process so tedious that few attempt it. This bureaucratic blind spot means the government has no reliable data on how many vehicles remain on Delhi’s roads, let alone how much pollution they continue to cause. And that’s the crux of the issue — an absence of governance systems to enforce or evaluate its actions.

The CAQM’s decision to block fuel sales, therefore, is not driven by scientific insight or robust data. Delhi has spent years creating the illusion of action without building the capacity to measure impact. Despite the relentless headlines on Delhi’s air pollution, there is no data showing whether banning vehicles or halting construction during winter has improved air quality. We’re acting in a blindfolded manner, hoping that symbolic policies will solve real problems.

And that brings us to the real question: does banning 10-year-old diesel and 15-year-old petrol vehicles help? The honest answer: not much.

Vehicles contribute less than 10 percent of Delhi’s PM 2.5 emissions. Of that, the majority comes from two- and three-wheelers. But we know that banning two-wheelers is a political hot potato and therefore difficult to enforce. That means cars — which contribute less than 5 percent to Delhi’s PM 2.5 problem — are the main focus of the ban. The impact of banning cars on air quality, therefore, will be minimal.

This is exactly why the much-hyped odd-even vehicle rationing scheme failed. It ignored the science of air pollution and tried to project political will through traffic gimmicks. Banning cars based on age and denying them fuel is another version of the same performative theatre.

In fact, these policies will do more harm than good to the environment. They prematurely dispose vehicles, pushing people to buy new ones, thereby boosting automobile sales and adding more vehicles to the road. In addition, every new vehicle carries a hidden environmental cost in terms of emissions from raw materials, manufacturing, and logistics.

Rather than fixing arbitrary age limits, a sensible vehicle retirement policy would be based on fitness. Around the world, vehicles are allowed to operate as long as they pass periodic fitness checks, including emissions testing. A 15-year-old car that is well maintained and meets pollution standards is less harmful than a new one, if we consider the environmental impact of a vehicle’s full lifecycle.

But the problem is that India lacks the necessary infrastructure to make this happen. There’s no robust inspection and certification (I&C) system, no reliable pollution testing, and no systematic registration-deregistration process for vehicles. Nor do we have an effective network of End-of-Life Vehicle collection and recycling centres. If we’re serious about reducing vehicular pollution, we must invest in a credible and modern vehicle lifecycle management system.

Let me be very clear: banning polluting vehicles is a good idea. Old, polluting vehicles must be phased out. But they must be banned through a structured, evidence-based, and environmentally sound policy regime — not ad hoc decisions. In the absence of systems, such bans serve more as virtue signalling than pollution control. The air will not get cleaner because you made life harder for a few car owners. It will get cleaner when you treat clean air not as a slogan, but as a regional economy-wide problem — one that needs a long-term plan, and scientific and institutional investment. 

 

Virtue Signalling Doesn’t Control Pollution

Posted on by Chandra Bhushan

Public outrage has muted Delhi’s drive to push out old cars. Bigger problem is that clean air policies are fashioned without scientific insight or robust data. Some actually hurt the environment

Public backlash has forced Delhi govt to walk back from its initiative to impound ‘end of life’ vehicles. But before this, the sudden outrage over the directive to stop refuelling diesel vehicles older than 10 years and petrol vehicles older than 15 years was somewhat amusing. Many seemed to believe this was a new crackdown.

But these vehicles were banned in Delhi nearly seven years ago, on Oct 30, 2018, when govt began enforcing a Supreme Court backed order that prohibits such vehicles not just from operating, but even from being parked or present in the city. So, the fuel denial directive was merely an attempt to enforce an old order using a new method.

In fact, law-abiding citizens have been selling their older vehicles ever since the 2018 law. I sold my well-maintained 10 years old Bharat Stage IV diesel car (barely run for 100,000 km) in 2022. It went to a tour operator in Punjab at a bargain price so generous that he still sends me Diwali sweets.

Over the past seven years, lakhs of Delhiites have sold their vehicles to comply with the ban. Of course, the majority of these vehicles have not gone to scrap yards as intended; instead, they’ve been relocated to other parts of the country, polluting their environments instead.

So, why did Delhi govt decide to enforce the refuelling restriction seven years after banning these vehicles? Did the Commission for Air Quality Management have data showing that the original ban had been ineffective? No. There entire air quality action plan being enforced by Delhi govt and agencies like CAQM is bereft of data. There is no evidence showing the impact of vehicle ban on air quality, or even tracking the enforcement of the ban itself.

There is no formal vehicle deregistration system in Delhi. In effect, end-of-life vehicles are permanently technically ‘registered’ with the Regional Transport Office. Owners are expected to voluntarily deregister their vehicles – a process so tedious that few attempt it. This bureaucratic blind spot means govt has no reliable data on how many vehicles remain on Delhi’s roads, let alone how much pollution they continue to cause.

CAQM’s decision to block fuel sales, therefore, was not driven by scientific insight or robust data. Delhi has spent years creating the illusion of action without building the capacity to measure impact. Despite the relentless headlines on its air pollution, there is no data showing whether banning vehicles or halting construction during winters has improved air quality. We’re acting blindfolded, hoping that symbolic policies will solve real problems.

That brings us to the real question: does banning 10-year-old diesel and 15-year-old petrol vehicles help? Not much. Vehicles contribute less than 10% of Delhi’s PM2.5 emissions. Of that, the majority comes from two- and three-wheelers. But banning two-wheelers is a political hot potato and therefore difficult to enforce. That means cars (which contribute less than 5% to Delhi’s PM2.5 problem) are the main focus of the ban, even though the impact of banning cars on air quality would be minimal.

This is exactly why the much-hyped odd-even vehicle rationing scheme failed. It ignored the science of air pollution and tried to project political will through traffic gimmicks. Banning cars based on age and denying them fuel is another version of the same performative theatre.

Such policies do more harm than good to the environment. Prematurely disposing of vehicles, pushing people to buy new ones, boosts automobile sales and adds more vehicles to the road. In addition, every new vehicle carries a hidden environmental cost in terms of emissions from raw materials, manufacturing and logistics.

Rather than fixing arbitrary age limits, a sensible vehicle retirement policy would be based on fitness. Around the world, vehicles are allowed to operate as long as they pass periodic fitness checks, including emissions testing. A 15-year-old car that is well-maintained and meets pollution standards is less harmful than a new one, if we consider the environmental impact of a vehicle’s full life cycle.

But the problem is that India lacks the necessary infra to make this happen. There’s no robust inspection and certification system, no reliable pollution testing, and no systematic registration or deregistration process for vehicles. Nor do we have an effective network of end-of-life vehicle collection and recycling centres. If we’re serious about reducing vehicular pollution, we must invest in a credible and modern vehicle lifecycle management system.

To be clear, banning polluting vehicles is a good idea. Old, polluting vehicles must be phased out. But they must be banned through a structured, evidence-based, and environmentally sound policy regime, not ad hoc decisions. In the absence of systems, such bans serve more as virtue signalling than pollution control.

The air will not get cleaner because you make life harder for car owners. It will get cleaner when you treat clean air not as a slogan, but as a system – one that needs long-term, scientific, and institutional investment.

 

 

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